1 Boring Old Man

Interrogation Tactics Were Challenged at White House

^{Bruce C. Swartz, a criminal division deputy in charge of international issues, repeatedly questioned the effectiveness of harsh interrogation tactics at White House meetings of a special group formed to decide detainee matters, with representatives present from the Pentagon, the State Department and the CIA. Swartz warned that the abuse of Guantanamo inmates would do "grave damage" to the country’s reputation and to its law enforcement record, according to an investigative audit released earlier this week by the Justice Department’s inspector general. Swartz was joined by a handful of other top Justice and FBI officials who said the abuse would almost certainly taint any legal proceedings against the detainees…}

^{Besides Swartz, the others depicted as raising sustained objections are then-FBI assistant general counsel Marion "Spike" Bowman, who documented his concerns in written reports, and Pasquale D’Amuro, then the bureau’s assistant director for counterterrorism. Michael Chertoff, who was then assistant attorney general in charge of the criminal division, raised concerns in November 2002 about the effectiveness of the military’s methods, although he said later he did not recall hearing assertions that they were illegal. One of Chertoff’s concerns, according to the report, was that even if FBI agents interviewed detainees after they were harshly interrogated by the CIA, "he did not think this approach would successfully prevent the statement from being ‘tainted’ by any prior enhanced interview techniques"…}

^{Two major policy splits are highlighted in the report’s account of the long to-and-fro over the tactics. One reflected a clash of cultures between the experienced interrogators at the FBI who were looking to prosecute terrorism crimes, and military and CIA officials who were seeking rapid information about al-Qaeda and were willing to push legal boundaries to do it. The report shows that FBI agents appeared more concerned about the long view, while others wanted detainees to break immediately in the panicked days after Sept. 11, 2001.}

^{A softer split occurred within the Justice Department itself. On one side was its Office of Legal Counsel, where attorney John C. Yoo — acting in direct consultation with Vice President Cheney’s then-counsel David S. Addington — wrote a series of memos that gave legal backing to harsh interrogation techniques. On the other side were career officials such as Swartz and some top Justice political appointees, even including then-Attorney General John D. Ashcroft, who sources say disliked some of Yoo’s conclusions and resented his back-channel discussions with the White House…}

^{D’Amuro stated that such aggressive interrogation techniques would not be effective, that they would impede the ability of FBI agents to appear as witnesses at trials, and that the tactics would blacken the country’s reputation by helping al-Qaeda spread negative views. D’Amuro recognized that the bureau would have a "taint problem" if the FBI did the interviews after the CIA had used its aggressive approaches, the report said. Mueller subsequently decided that the FBI agents would not go back to the sessions.}

These were not "moral" people. George Bush was a ner-do-well who had dodged the draft and bailed out on completing his own military obligations. His sidekick, Karl Rove, was a political operative in on the early days of dirty tricks under Nixon  – a moral black hole. Dick Cheney had spent most of his political life honing his skills as a political wheeler-dealer in the back rooms of Congress and the White House. His only credential was as a schemer. His previous efforts had produced little except for shepherding an unlosable war skillfully conducted by Norman Schwartzkopf. With the exception of Colin Powell, they were surrounded with civilian draft dodgers, and unwilling to listen to anyone with either expertise or experience. So, in spite of being elected on a platform of morality [the Moral Majority], they were an unprincipled and inexperienced lot. We know they were enormous pressure to get information and they passed that on to their subordinates – do whatever it takes to find out what’s coming, where bin Laden’s hiding, how Iraq and Iran were part of the plot. We know that their subordinates were under a lot of pressure to get results – C.I.A., F.B.I., Military Intelligence.

As much as I feel otherwise, I do have some empathy for the pressure they were under in those early days as we tried to figure out how to live in the post-911 world. Even though I don’t like what they did – Invade Iraq, Suspend Geneva, Torture, N.S.A. Domestic Spying, ignore F.I.S.A. – I can accept that those were extraordinary times with unusual and unknown issues to deal with. But they kept doing it. Well beyond the time when the panic of 911 had passed, they kept on abusing power, making un-necessary and un-American decisions. If anything, they got worse rather than better. When things came up that called for a course correction, they dug in their heels. They lied, became secretive, evoked powers they had no right to have, became publicly defiant.

But it wasn’t just the Administration. As we learned last year, the Department of Justice central offices became a center for political operations for the Republican Party. The Department of Defense and the Military became the publicity department for the Administration. The Department of State all but evaporated under Condi Rice. The C.I.A. became part of the Executive Branch, effecting policies rather than gathering Intelligence. In this recent report, the F.B.I. is exonerated because they didn’t join in the Torture policies effected by the C.I.A. and Military Intelligence. But is that supposed to be the best they can muster. They seemed worried that Torturing people wouldn’t work and would make the cases impossible to prosecute.