sins of our fathers…

Posted on Friday 20 February 2009


Who’ll Stop the Pain?
By PAUL KRUGMAN
February 19, 2009

Earlier this week, the Federal Reserve released the minutes of the most recent meeting of its open market committee — the group that sets interest rates. Most press reports focused either on the Fed’s downgrade of the near-term outlook or on its adoption of a long-run 2 percent inflation target.

But my eye was caught by the following chilling passage [yes, things are so bad that the summarized musings of central bankers can keep you up at night]: “All participants anticipated that unemployment would remain substantially above its longer-run sustainable rate at the end of 2011, even absent further economic shocks; a few indicated that more than five to six years would be needed for the economy to converge to a longer-run path characterized by sustainable rates of output growth and unemployment and by an appropriate rate of inflation.”

So people at the Fed are troubled by the same question I’ve been obsessing on lately: What’s supposed to end this slump? No doubt this, too, shall pass — but how, and when? To appreciate the problem, you need to know that this isn’t your father’s recession. It’s your grandfather’s, or maybe even [as I’ll explain] your great-great-grandfather’s.

Your father’s recession was something like the severe downturn of 1981-1982. That recession was, in effect, a deliberate creation of the Federal Reserve, which raised interest rates to as much as 17 percent in an effort to control runaway inflation. Once the Fed decided that we had suffered enough, it relented, and the economy quickly bounced back.

Your grandfather’s recession, on the other hand, was something like the Great Depression, which happened in spite of the Fed’s efforts, not because of them. When a stock market bubble and a credit boom collapsed, bringing down much of the banking system with them, the Fed tried to revive the economy with low interest rates — but even rates barely above zero weren’t low enough to end a prolonged era of high unemployment.

Now we’re in the midst of a crisis that bears an eerie, troubling resemblance to the onset of the Depression; interest rates are already near zero, and still the economy plunges. How and when will it all end?…

The closest 19th-century parallel I can find to the current slump is the recession that followed the Panic of 1873. That recession did eventually end without any government intervention, but it lasted more than five years, and another prolonged recession followed just three years later. You can see, then, why some Fed officials are so pessimistic.

Let’s be clear: the Obama administration’s policy initiatives will help in this difficult period — especially if the administration bites the bullet and takes over weak banks. But still I wonder: Who’ll stop the pain?
Paul Krugman’s emotional journey is laid out here for all to see in the New York Times. He’s as gloomy about things as he has been since the outset, though his focus has changed. He was critical of TARP. He’s been critical of whatever Obama has tried to do. In today’s offering, I think he’s getting a little closer to "self-knowledge." He sees something – and it’s not pretty. The future looks plenty bleak, and he doesn’t see how it will end. He feels helpless, and kind of hopeless. This op-ed reminds me of one he wrote a couple of months ago – a really good one [in spite of the cheesy ending]:
The Madoff Economy
By PAUL KRUGMAN
December 19, 2008

The revelation that Bernard Madoff — brilliant investor [or so almost everyone thought], philanthropist, pillar of the community — was a phony has shocked the world, and understandably so. The scale of his alleged $50 billion Ponzi scheme is hard to comprehend.

Yet surely I’m not the only person to ask the obvious question: How different, really, is Mr. Madoff’s tale from the story of the investment industry as a whole?…

Think of the way almost everyone important missed the warning signs of an impending crisis. How was that possible? How, for example, could Alan Greenspan have declared, just a few years ago, that “the financial system as a whole has become more resilient” — thanks to derivatives, no less? The answer, I believe, is that there’s an innate tendency on the part of even the elite to idolize men who are making a lot of money, and assume that they know what they’re doing. After all, that’s why so many people trusted Mr. Madoff.

Now, as we survey the wreckage and try to understand how things can have gone so wrong, so fast, the answer is actually quite simple: What we’re looking at now are the consequences of a world gone Madoff.
On the drive down to the beach, I asked, "What was Madoff thinking? Why didn’t he have a plan for the end of the road? Maybe a new identity in Egypt Venezuela?" But that’s exactly Krugman’s point – he wasn’t thinking long term. He was living in the "now." Actually, deregulation of our financial system dates back to 1980 when Jimmy Carter signed the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act. At the time, he didn’t see it as deregulation. It was an attempt to give the FDIC control of all Banks. But there were some other things:
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, a United States federal financial statute law passed in 1980, gave the Federal Reserve greater control over non-member banks.
  • It forced all banks to abide by the Fed’s rules.
  • It allowed banks to merge.
  • It removed the power of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors under the Glass-Steagall Act and Regulation Q to set the interest rates of savings accounts.
  • It raised the deposit insurance of US banks and credit unions from $40,000 to $100,000.
  • It allowed credit unions and savings and loans to offer checkable deposits.
  • Allowed institutions to charge any interest rates they chose.
It was supposed to be an anti-inflationary measure, but the highlighted provisions opened Pandora’s Box. At each juncture down the deregulation road, the signing speeches [including Carter’s] touted the Bills as great leaps forward, when they were, in fact, sowing the seeds of disaster [see Deregulation I, Deregulation II]. Each short-term solution magnified the long term problem. One might now ask, "What was Madoff were we thinking? Why didn’t he we have a plan for the end of the road?" But, like Madoff, we weren’t thinking about the end of the road [at least the we that made the decisions].

There have been a few heros along the way. Brooksley Born was chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in the late 1990’s. She did everything in her power to stop the Unregulated Derivative Trading – appearing before Congress seventeen times. Robert Shiller, the Yale economist who is "Mr. Bubble" told us about the housing bubble – and proved it. There were plenty of villians. Bob and Wendy Gramm head the list as arch fiends on the take [Enron puppets]. And there was the powerful but misguided Alan Greenspan, stuck in his youthful love affair with Ayn Rand. But no Captain Americas emerged as we slid down our slippery slope. So, about Bernie Madoff? Just like the rest of us – vaguely aware that something was very wrong, but in denial, drunk on prosperity.

Krugman is finally getting in touch with the truth. There’s nothing to do. No way to "get it back." It was really never there in the first place. And who will stop the pain? The person who focuses us on our actual reality, and helps us adapt to its inevitability. I think President Obama understands that:
What the cynics fail to understand is that the ground has shifted beneath them — that the stale political arguments that have consumed us for so long no longer apply. The question we ask today is not whether our government is too big or too small, but whether it works — whether it helps families find jobs at a decent wage, care they can afford, a retirement that is dignified. Where the answer is yes, we intend to move forward. Where the answer is no, programs will end. And those of us who manage the public’s dollars will be held to account — to spend wisely, reform bad habits, and do our business in the light of day — because only then can we restore the vital trust between a people and their government.


Nor is the question before us whether the market is a force for good or ill. Its power to generate wealth and expand freedom is unmatched, but this crisis has reminded us that without a watchful eye, the market can spin out of control — and that a nation cannot prosper long when it favors only the prosperous. The success of our economy has always depended not just on the size of our gross domestic product, but on the reach of our prosperity; on our ability to extend opportunity to every willing heart — not out of charity, but because it is the surest route to our common good.

Barack Obama, January 20th, 2009

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