1 Boring Old Man

^{BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: I think this morning we have actually published notes that you sent to the Foreign  Secretary on 26 March, which is a — records the  Secretary of State’s conversation with Colin Powell.
SIR MICHAEL WOOD: Yes.
BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: I mean, were you concerned what he  said, that he felt entirely comfortable making a case for military action to deal with Iraq’s WMD? What were   your concerns and why did he choose to write in this way?
SIR MICHAEL WOOD: I was obviously quite concerned by what I saw him saying. I mean, often reports are not accurate. They are summaries, they are short. He may well not have said it in quite the form it came out in  the telegram, but whenever I saw something like that, whether from the Foreign Secretary or from the Prime Minister or from officials, less often perhaps, I would do a note just to make sure they understood the legal position. This is just an example of quite a few notes, but I don’t think — it certainly wasn’t my impression that the Foreign Secretary really misunderstood the legal position at this stage.
BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So if you think he didn’t  misunderstand, why did you take this step, what you  yourself call "aggressive" briefing?
SIR MICHAEL WOOD: I don’t call it "aggressive", the Americans call it "aggressive". Well, just to make sure that everybody was clear about the position. This was quite early. It was  before it had got into the bloodstream, if you like, of the Foreign Office and others, what the legal position was. So it was necessary just to remind people of what was the accepted view.
BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So you were fulfilling your responsibility, making sure that everybody was fully  aware of what was within the bounds —
SIR MICHAEL WOOD: That’s right, and I see that I made the other very important point at the end of the note that  it is, of course, ultimately for the Attorney General to  advise when it comes to questions of use of force.  So although this was clear, I was setting this out,  I said I was pleased that we weren’t being drawn into  public statements and reminded them, as I reminded them  frequently, that, at the end of the day, it would be for the Attorney to advise if they were going to war.}

^{Sir Michael Wood, Downing Street’s chief legal adviser, wrote to Straw on 24 January 2003 expressing concern about comments Straw had made to then-US vice president, Dick Cheney, in Washington. Straw told Cheney Britain would "prefer" a second resolution but it would be "OK" if they tried and failed to get one "à la Kosovo".}

^{Wood commented that this was "completely wrong from a legal point of view". He told Straw: "I hope there is no doubt in anyone’s mind that, without a further decision of the [UN security] council, and absent extraordinary circumstances of which at present there is no sign, the UK cannot lawfully use force against Iraq to ensure compliance with its security ­council WMD obligations." In a memo to Straw, Wood added: "To use force without security council authority would amount to a crime of aggression". Straw, now justice secretary, replied: "I note your advice but I do not accept it."}

^{Wood told the inquiry: "He took the view that I was being very dogmatic and that international law was pretty vague and that he wasn’t used to people taking such a firm position. When he had been at the Home Office, he had often been advised things were unlawful but he had gone ahead anyway and won in the courts."}

^{Wood said it was "probably the first and only occasion" that a minister rejected his legal advice in this way. "The problem for the government as a whole was they needed advice even if they didn’t want it," Wood told the inquiry.}