1 Boring Old Man

This morning, the Chilcot Inquiry is interviewing Lord Goldsmith, England’s Attorney General at the time [one thing I’ve relearned in listening is why I didn’t go to Law School]. Rather than detail this interview [something I’m not sure I could do if I wanted to], I’d rather address what I’ve heard about the position of the United States. In the Congressional Authorization for the use of force, Congress said "through the United Nations" and "enforce all relevant United Nations Security Resolutions."

As was their custom, the Bush Administration quickly invalidated the Authority of the Congress and the call to work through the Authority of the UN with a John Bybee Memo from the DoJ:

So in negotiating the UN 1441, the bottom line US position was that there was no further need for UN Security Council Action. If Saddam was not in compliance, that fact authorized the use of force. After UN 1441 was adopted, the Administration went further – both invalidating the UN resolution and weakening the requirement for compliance, with John Yoo’s OLC blessing:

From Lord Goldsmith’s perspective, getting President Bush to go to the UN at all was an accomplishment, though the OLC documents [and everything else] make it clear that the US was hell bent to invade Iraq no matter what. The British had rejected "regime change" outright as a Casus Belli. Their conflict was over whether the UN needed to pass a second resolution specifically authorizing the use of force after UN 1441. That second resolution was never passed. Lord Goldsmith gave an official opinion that the second resolution was not necessary, coming down on the side of the "revivalist argument" – that the old UN resolutions were sufficient given Iraq’s further non-compliance after UN 1441. He gave that opinion only days before "Shock and Awe." He is giving his logic in making that decision today [and they’ve broken for lunch]. At this point, it is clear that the US is guilty of the Crime of Aggression – by any criteria. There is, of course, no court that addresses such crimes in the international arena.

Lord Goldsmith met senior US officials and lawyers – including national security adviser Condoleezza Rice and senior State Department legal adviser Will Taft – in Washington on February 10. He said they had all been clear that President George Bush’s one "red line" in the negotiations on 1441 was that they should not "concede a veto" to the French on military action – something which they were adamant had not happened.

"It was hard to believe that, given what I had been told about the one red line that President Bush had, that all these experienced lawyers and negotiators in the United States could actually have stumbled into doing the one thing they had been told must not happen," he said. Two days later, in discussion with his legal assistant in London, he finally came to the conclusion that a second resolution was not necessary and he should revise his earlier draft opinion.

1. Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq’s failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA, and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991);

2. Decides, while acknowledging paragraph 1 above, to afford Iraq, by this resolution, a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations under relevant resolutions of the Council; and accordingly decides to set up an enhanced inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified completion the disarmament process established by resolution 687 (1991) and subsequent resolutions of the Council;

4. Decides that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations and will be reported to the Council for assessment in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 below;

11. Directs the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations, including its obligations regarding inspections under this resolution;

12. Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security;