Remember that a lot of the Bush and Cheney comments justifying Torture and other things were direct references to Abu Zubaydah, the Saudi Jihadist captured March 28, 2002 in Pakistan.
I wanted to return to the government’s filing on Abu Zubaydah backing off the key claims on which our torture system is based. A year ago, the government filed its factual return to justify the detention of Abu Zubaydah. In response, AZ’s lawyers asked for a bunch more information, such as evidence that AZ was not a member of al Qaeda and didn’t know about 9/11 before it happened. This document, which is the government’s response to that request, argues that AZ is not entitled to the information, because the government’s factual return did not allege that AZ was a member of al Qaeda or knew about 9/11. In other word, the government is arguing that, in spite of all the times that government officials up to and including the President have made such claims, the government is no longer doing so, and so AZ doesn’t need to refute such claims, and therefore isn’t entitled to information that would refute them…
If you read the Bybee Two OLC Memo [written by John Yoo, August 1, 2002], which specifically reflects on the techniques proposed for use on Zubaydah [rationalizing that they are not torture], the Memo documents a much different story of his importance:
The factual return about Abu Zubaydah is mostly Redacted, but he gist of things is that another detainee, Amhad Ressam was the source for most the allegations against Abu Zubaydah detailed in the that report. In December 2008, Ressam recanted all of the testimony he had given previously – so who knows what of it might be true? So while it is doubtful that Abu Zubaydah was ever the great find they thought he was at the time, that’s not the point of all this recent flurry of interest in the case. It has to do with the OLC Torture Memos that were generated about his interrogation. Zubaydah was captured on March 28, 2002. He was severly wounded during the capture. He was interrogated by F.B.I. Agent Ali Soufan using rapport building until some time in June of 2002 when he was replaced by C.I.A. Interrogators. The Memos written by the OLC approving his torture [enhanced interrogation techniques] were submitted on August 1, 2002. Attached to one on those Memos was a Psychological Evaluation dated June 24, 2002. It said:
In addition, he showed strong signs of sympathetic nervous system arousal (possibly fear) when he experienced the initial “confrontational” dislocation of expectation [] during an interrogation session. Due to his incredibly strong resolve, expertise in civilian warfare, resistance to interrogation techniques (the latter two which he trained hundreds of others on) this experience was one of the few that led to him providing significant actionable intelligence.
A later copy of it was different [Abu Zubaydah Experienced “Hard” Dislocation After Session 63]. It said:
In addition, he showed strong signs of sympathetic nervous system arousal (possibly fear) when he experienced the initial “hard” dislocation of expectation intervention following session 63. Due to his incredibly strong resolve, expertise in civilian warfare, resistance to interrogation techniques [the latter two which he trained hundreds of others on)]this experience was one of the few that led to him providing significant actionable intelligence.
Obviously, some kind of coersive technique was already being used when this psychological evaluation was transcribed – well before the official OLC Memos. The explanation given later was:
CIA IG: Zubaydah’s Torture Preceded John Yoo’s Torture Memo
The Public RecordBy Jason Leopold
Sep 13th, 2009The Bush administration gave its initial clearance for CIA interrogators to brutalize an al-Qaeda “high-value detainee” through verbal guidance and didn’t follow up with a formal legal opinion until “months later,” the CIA’s former inspector general said.
In an interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel, ex-CIA Inspector General John Helgerson confirmed what has long been suspected, that the abusive interrogation of al-Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah in 2002 began well before the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel cobbled together a controversial legal opinion justifying acts that are commonly regarded as torture.
Der Spiegel’s reporter posed a question to Helgerson that assumed Zubaydah’s torturous interrogation had predated the Aug. 1, 2002, legal memo from OLC attorneys John Yoo and Jay Bybee. “Did the lawyer who signed the memorandum simply authorize a technique months after this technique had already been applied?” reporter Britta Sandberg asked Helgerson. Helgerson told Sandberg that “basically” her assumption was correct and added, “There was some legal advice given orally to the CIA that had then been followed up by memorandums months later”…
I’m skeptical that this is true, though it’s unprovable that it didn’t happen. But a central point now is whether Abu Zubaydah’s exposure to Enhanced Interrogation Techniques harmed him. In the Psychological Evaluation of June 24, 2002, he’s a feisty, chipper guy – sort of full of himself. In his lawyer’s description of him on April 30, 2009 he’s someone else entirely:
… Abu Zubaydah’s mental grasp is slipping away. Today, he suffers blinding headaches and has permanent brain damage. He has an excruciating sensitivity to sounds, hearing what others do not. The slightest noise drives him nearly insane. In the last two years alone, he has experienced about 200 seizures. But physical pain is a passing thing. The enduring torment is the taunting reminder that darkness encroaches. Already, he cannot picture his mother’s face or recall his father’s name. Gradually, his past, like his future, eludes him.
They were wrong about Zubaydah’s importance. That sounds like a simple mistake. But whatever their reason for torturing him aside, they "broke" him, probably irreversibly. In Yoo’s Torture Memo, he said that wasn’t going to happen. Yoo had no valid credentials or reason to make that assessment. In fact, he said it wasn’t Torture at all. Yoo was wrong on all counts. Wrong about the Law. Wrong about the techniques. Wrong about the impact of the techniques. And I suspect he knew that when he wrote the Memo…
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