The INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE released on November 20, 2008 details the evolution of our Torture Program at GTMO. Here are a few snippets.
When Psychiatrist Major Paul Burney arrived at Guantanamo Bay in June 2002, he was unaware that he would be assigned to BSCT [Behavioral Science Consultation Team] to support interrogations.
[1]Three of us; [the enlisted psychiatric technician], and I, were hijacked and immediately in processed into Joint Task Force 170, the military intelligence command on the island. It turns out we were assigned to the interrogation element because Joint Task Force 170 had authorizations for a psychiatrist, a psychologist, and a psychiatric technician on its duty roster but nobody had been deployed to fill these positions. Nobody really knew what we were supposed to do for the unit, but at least the duty roster had its positions filled.
They knew nothing of interrogation, so the psychologist contacted a psychologist he had met, LTC Banks who was [unknown to the contacting psychologist] working with SERE. Banks set out to arrange training. BSCT thought they were going there just to learn about interrogation, but their CO wanted them to bring back SERE techniques to try.
[2]At the time, there was a view by some at GTMO that interrogation operations had not yielded the anticipated intelligence, MAJ Burney testified to the Army IG regarding interrogations: "This is my opinion, even though they were giving information and some of it was useful, while we were there a large part of the time we were focused on trying to establish a link between al Qaeda and Iraq and we were not being successful in establishing a link between al Qaeda and Iraq. The more frustrated people got in not being able to establish this link .. , there was more and more pressure to resort to measures that might produce more immediate results."
And then either Paul Wolfowitz was pressuring them or he wasn’t [1boringoldman votes for "was"]:
[2]Mr. Becker [GTMO Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief] told the Committee that during the summer of 2002, the JTF-170 Commander, MG Dunlavey, and his Director for Intelligence (J-2), LTC Phifer, had urged him to be more aggressive in interrogations. Mr. Becker also told the Committee that MG Dunlavey and LTC Phifer repeatedly asked him during this period why he was not using stress positions in interrogations, even though the August 2002 Standard Operating Procedure for JTF170 expressly prohibited the use of the technique. MG Dunlavey told the Committee that he did not recall asking his staff why they were not using stress positions or telling them that they should be more aggressive. Mr. Becker also told the Committee that, on several occasions, MG Dunlavey had advised him that the office of Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz had called to express concerns about the insufficient intelligence production at GTMO. Mr. Becker recalled MG Dunlavey telling him after one of these calls, that the Deputy Secretary himself said that GTMO should use more aggressive interrogation techniques. MG Dunlavey told the Committee that he could not recall ever having a phone call with Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz or his staff.
As JFT-170 BSCT was reaching out for help, Army Intelligence was doing a review, looking for ways to ramp up their interrogations – referring to GTMO as a "America’s ‘Battle Lab’" in the War on Terror. But there were objections:
[3]Britt Mallow, the Commander of the Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF), stated: "MG Dunlavey and later MG Miller referred to GTMO as a "Battle Lab" meaning that interrogations and other procedures there were to some degree experimental, and their lessons would benefit DOD in other places. While this was logical in terms of learning lessons, I personally objected to the implied philosophy that interrogators should experiment with untested methods, particularly those in which they were not trained." and CITF’s Deputy Commander, Mark Fallon, echoed the CITF Commander’s concern. Mr. Fallon stated that CITF did not concur with the Battle Lab concept because the task force "did not advocate the application of unproven techniques on individuals who were awaiting trials. He emphasized that the CITF position was that "there were many risks associated with this concept … and the perception that detainees were used for some ‘experimentation’ of new unproven techniques had negative connotations."
And that’s the way it went. The Army Intelligence people continued pushing for more aggressive interrogation techniques. The clinicians [Major Burney] pushing back, skeptical that they would produce more information – actually predicting they would increase the prisoner’s resistance and be harmful.
[4]Experts in the field of interrogation indicate the most effective interrogation strategy is a rapport-building approach. Interrogation techniques that rely on physical or adverse consequences are likely to garner inaccurate information and create an increased level of resistance… There is no evidence that the level of fear or discomfort evoked by a given technique has any consistent correlation to the volume or quality of information obtained… The interrogation tools outlined could affect the short term and/or long term physical and/or mental health of the detainee. Physical and/or emotional harm from the above techniques may emerge months or even years after their use. It is impossible to determine if a particular strategy will cause irreversible harm if employed…
Actually, the people from SERE that BSCT visited thought that SERE techniques were not a good choice for interrogations:
[5]The use of physical pressures brings with it a large number of potential negative side effects… When individuals are gradually exposed to increasing levels of discomfort, it is more common for them to resist harder. That is one of the reasons we use it [in SERE school] – to increase the resistance posture of our soldiers. If individuals are put under enough discomfort, i.e. pain, they will eventually do whatever it takes to stop the pain. This will increase the amount of information they tell the interrogator, but it does not mean the information is accurate. In fact, it usually decreases the reliability of the information because the person will say whatever he believes will stop the pain… Because of the danger involved, very few SERE instructors are allowed to actually use physical pressures…everything that is occurring [in SERE school] is very carefully monitored and paced… Even with all these safeguards, injuries and accidents do happen. The risk with real detainees is increased exponentially. My strong recommendation is that you do not use physical pressures …[If GTMO does decide to use them] you are taking a substantial risk, with very limited potential benefit.
I won’t go on and on. Obviously the way it came out, the SERE/Yoo Memo techniques prevailed. It’s a very interesting read, this document. They had so many opportunities to change gears, and they just didn’t do it.
I’m a Psychiatrist, and I read what the BSCT Psychiatrist, Major Burney, said with pride. He didn’t moralize and he was obviously trying to help. He repeatedly advised the people at GTMO that they were headed in the wrong direction based on his clinical expertise. They were lucky to have him, but just couldn’t listen. This ship was being piloted from another bridge that he had no access to, that wouldn’t have listened had he been able to address them.
I obviously reproduced this testimony to highlight the emboldened text from Major Burney: "…while we were there a large part of the time we were focused on trying to establish a link between al Qaeda and Iraq and we were not being successful in establishing a link between al Qaeda and Iraq. The more frustrated people got in not being able to establish this link .. , there was more and more pressure to resort to measures that might produce more immediate results."
Like Frank Rich said:
But we also must contemplate the possibility that it did so not just out of a sincere, if criminally misguided, desire to ‘protect’ us but also to promote an unnecessary and catastrophic war. Instead of saving us from ‘another 9/11,’ torture was a tool in the campaign to falsify and exploit 9/11 so that fearful Americans would be bamboozled into a mission that had nothing to do with Al Qaeda.
I left Gitmo about the same time MAJ Paul Burney was arriving. I served as the ranking Army Medical Department officer from February to June 2002, but with Joint Task Force 160, then the separate task force in charge of incarceration. I was the JDOG (Joint Detainee Operations Group) Medical Officer. My boss, LTC William Cline was the JDOG Commander for most of the time we were there. There were several detainees, one of whom we repatriated, that were determined by JTF 170 to be of no intelligence value after a time. Prison plays games with your head, and by the time MAJ Burney arrived we had already gone through many incidents, such as thirst and hunger strikes, “riots,” detainees attacking guards, detainees banging their heads against walls and floors, suicide threats and attempts, etc. There was plenty for a psychiatrist and a psychologist to do. I tell the real story of medical and dentantion operations in my new book called, “Saving Grace at Guantanamo Bay: A Memoir of a Citizen Soldier.” If you are interested, the URL for the book is http://www.strategicpublishinggroup.com/title/SavingGraceAtGuantanamoBay.html
Sincerely, Montgomery J. Granger, Major, Medical Service, USAR (Ret.)