I seem to have more interest in the Chilcot Iraq Inquiry in England than most Americans. Maybe it’s because we lived there for a few years, but it’s also because of my preoccupation with our invasion of Iraq. Last week, they interviewed Sir John Holmes who was the British Ambassador to France during the lead-up to the Invasion. I guess I forget how young the UN is, since it spans most of my lifetime, but it’s only 65 years old, and has only encompassed the whole world recently [since the fall of World Communism].
The situation of Hussein’s Iraq has been a challenge for the UN since he came to power. After his Party’s Coup in 1968, Hussein consolidated the Baathist power for a decade before becoming the President, then almost immediately went to war with Iran. Following that war, he invaded Kuwait and was expelled by UN Forces in the First Gulf War in 1991. Thereafter, he resisted the UN Ceasefire terms whenever he could, becoming the paradigm for the rogue states – states that seemed to ignore the UN unless forced.
The UN authority is still being negotiated, but currently only has to do with conflicts between states – not what happens within a given state. So it’s unclear how the world deals with a state that is potentially dangerous, but hasn’t yet attacked anyone. Likewise, there’s still conflict about how to deal with states with internal wars or conflicts. For example, when Kosovo erupted in a war involving human rights abuses, NATO intervened [the first "humanitarian war"] rather than the UN. And so the UN has struggled with how to address pugilistic nations like Iraq [or Bush’s "Axis of Evil" – Iraq, Iran, and North Korea]. Which brings us to the Invasion of Iraq.
When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the UN acted swiftly [UNSCR 678] and after several attempts to obtain a peaceful withdrawal, the Coalition of UN forces went to war. In that short war, it was discovered that Saddam Hussein was moving towards building weapons of mass destruction – nuclear, chemical, and biologic weapons of mass destruction. Disarmament and cooperation with subsequent weapons inspections were made part of the cease fire conditions. In essence, the UN [and us] were using his pugilism in Kuwait to justify regulating a rogue state, and he resisted at every possibility. And so the UN kept passing resolutions and sanctions, some of which hurt the Iraqi people [but not Hussein]. In the US, the PNAC wanted us to invade unilaterally. Instead, Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation act, funding groups opposing Hussein. In 1998, we bombed Iraq’s military facilities, stretching UN 678 to justify our action. Like I said, the world hasn’t yet figured out how to deal with rogue states. But there was no disagreement among the world powers that Iraq was a rogue state, though there was little information about how dangerous Hussein really was. As things played out, the US, the UK, and France represented three different positions on how to deal with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in particular, and rogue states in general.
The United States:
Throughout the Clinton years, the neoconservatives languished at the American Enterprise Institute longing for the golden days of Ronald Reagan and vast military spending. They honestly believed that Reagan had ended the Cold War and World Communism. A splinter group, The Project for the New American Century, essentially discounted the UN and proposed that the US become the world’s sole superpower – taking care of rogue states unilaterally and preemptively. They actually spoke of American Exceptionalism [whatever that means] in public. "we need to accept responsibility for America’s unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles." Regime Change in Iraq was to be our assertion of this made up principle.
So when 911 came along, the Bush Administration began planning to invade Iraq. They decided to justify the invasion by saying Hussein had reconstituted his weapons of mass destruction [piggy-backing off of UN 678] and that he was allied with al Qaeda in the attack on New York [aggression towards another state]. Neither charge was true. But Regime Change is not a valid Casus Belli [Case for War]. Our government was dismissive of the UN, and only sought UN approval at the behest of the UK. So the United States represented one extreme – The UN is too slow and too weak. We’ll just take care of the problem.
France:
The policy of President Chirac occupied the opposite pole. According to Sir John, Chirac sought "to prevent war with Iraq because he did not believe that it was justified. He believed it would be a very dangerous venture, that it would have all sorts of implications for stability in the region, that the likelihood of Iraq breaking up on the Middle East peace process on the West’s image in the Islamic world in general." Chirac held "the belief that the kind of foreign policy which was being represented and articulated by President Bush was a unilateralist vision of the world which he could not share, thought was dangerous, and based on a lack of knowledge of the world and that he was therefore returning to counter by setting out an alternative, multipolar vision of the world, which was very much the French vision at the time." These were thoughtful, and ultimately correct ideas.
Chirac did not insist on air-tight wording in UN 1441 because he "didn’t want to be in a position where military action in the modern world could only be authorised by the Security Council. They, like us, had taken the position that of course Security Council authorisation is much the best, but there may be circumstances – of course, Kosovo had been an example – where military action can be justified if there is sufficient international support, even without a Security Council Resolution." Some more sensible thinking, in my opinion.
Finally, he became a strong opponent of a UN Resolution for invading Iraq when he saw that it was "as simply a means of legitimising the war, and they were simply not going to go along with that." "We will not go along with anything that does not give the inspectors time to do their work." In simpler terms, he saw through the US Charade and would have no part of it. Good for him. Good for the UN. And good for the world. Sir John makes it perfectly clear that had there been a legitimate Casus Belli, like WMD found by the inspectors or Iraq expelling the inspectors, France would have joined in military action against Iraq.
England:
I would see the British position as closer to that of the US. They were impatient too and wanted to depose Saddam Hussein no matter what. They just had a harder time finding a way to rationalize doing it. There were British heros along the way [certainly more than we had in the US]. Somehow, the Downing Street Memo made it into the public domain. Katherine Gun, a translator leaked a Memo that documented the US bugging the UN Security Council members. Elizabeth Wilmhurst resigned in protest to Lord Goldsmith’s legitimizing the invasion. Robin Cook resigned from his positions as Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons in protest against the invasion of Iraq. Dr. David Kelly, weapons inspector, ultimately lost his life by blowing a whistle shortly after the invasion.
My preoccupation with the Invasion of Iraq is not because I miss the point that Saddam Hussein was a dangerous person and a threat to the world. The only thing that limited him was a strong counter-force. At first, I thought Bush’s confrontation of the problem of rogue states was probably a good thing – insisting that the UN recognize the problem [though I admit, the phrase "Axis of Evil" gave me the willies]. It seemed like it was time for the UN to step up to the plate and figure out how to approach rogue states in the absence of a direct interstate aggressive act. But then things went very wrong – very wrong indeed.
Anyone who gave it any thought could see that Bush was headed for war no matter what. Anyone reading the PNAC web site could see that there was a move afoot to move our foreign policy back to the days of the Roman Empire. Anyone reading the Congressional Authorization for the use of force in Iraq could see that Congress wanted us to work through the UN. Anyone looking at the UN Resolution 1441 could see that it didn’t automatically authorize the use of force. Anyone looking at the OLC DOJ Memos negating Congress and the UN were absurd, except that no one saw those Memos or the Presidential Signing Statements that accompanied and neutralized the Acts of Congress. But we all know that now, just as we know that what French President Chirac of France predicted is exactly what happened [we owe France an apology].
Nice piece here too.
Robin Cook (also) lost his life.