Chilcot Inquiry: the British Ambassador to France

Posted on Wednesday 7 July 2010

    Saddam Hussein4. Decides that false statements or omissions in the declarations submitted by Iraq pursuant to this resolution and failure by Iraq at any time to comply with, and cooperate fully in the implementation of, this resolution shall constitute a further material breach of Iraq’s obligations and will be reported to the Council for assessment in accordance with paragraphs 11 and 12 below;
    11. Directs the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director-General of the IAEA to report immediately to the Council any interference by Iraq with inspection activities, as well as any failure by Iraq to comply with its disarmament obligations, including its obligations regarding inspections under this resolution;
    12. Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security;
France had veto power in the Security Council, and were adamant that the first resolution [UN 1441] did not automatically authorize the use of force in the case of a breach by Iraq, but the language of the Resolution was vague.
    SIR JOHN HOLMES [British Ambassador to France]:
    Sir John HolmesWell, I think his overriding objective through this period, as I say, was to prevent war with Iraq because he did not believe that it was justified. He believed it would be a very dangerous venture, that it would have all sorts of implications for stability in the region, that the likelihood of Iraq breaking up on the Middle East peace process on the West’s image in the Islamic world in general — and there was a whole series of very strong fears they had about it, which he was the one who felt most strongly and articulated most strongly. Therefore, he particularly was very strongly opposed to any military action against Iraq unless there was no other option…

    I think he [French President Chirac] was also very much influenced in all this, particularly, again, after the Axis of Evil speech, by the belief that the kind of foreign policy which was being represented and articulated by President Bush was a unilateralist vision of the world which he could not share, thought was dangerous, and based on a lack of knowledge of the world and that he was therefore returning to counter by setting out an alternative, multipolar vision of the world, which was very much the French vision at the time… Well, Iraq was the point at which these two visions collided. One was the multilateral route of dealing with the problem. He didn’t deny there was a problem with Iraq, but he didn’t believe that the solution being put forward by the Americans, and to a lesser extent by us, was the right one.
Holmes had an interesting explanation as to why feeling as strongly as they did, the French allowed such vague language to pass in the actual resolution:
    They were a little bit wary about articulating that as clearly as they might have done, and I think that’s because, like us, they had always had this concern, a broader concern, not related to any particular situation, that they didn’t want to be in a position where military action in the modern world could only be authorised by the Security Council. They, like us, had taken the position that of course Security Council authorisation is much the best, but there may be circumstances – of course, Kosovo had been an example – where military action can be justified if there is sufficient international support, even without a Security Council Resolution. So they were a little bit wary, even in these extreme circumstances of Iraq, about declaring that only a Security Council Resolution could authorise it, unlike the Germans who were very much more obviously camped on that position in general and in this particular case.

    Nevertheless, in the particular case of Iraq, they always used a formulation about "It has to be approved by the UN. It has to be legitimised. Only the UN can legitimise action". With that slight wriggle room in their language, which they wanted to preserve for the future, their position was that 1441 of itself could not justify action, nor could anything else, except coming back to the Security Council and discussing it again.
However, as things progressed, the French became a block against the UN authorizing military action, and Chirac made a speech that suggested France would veto a second resolution. Why did they strengthen their resistance?
    … what changed was that, as the military preparations advanced and they could see that that was what was actually driving the timetable rather than anything else, that they saw a second resolution, unless it was very much of the kind that they wanted — and what we were putting down wasn’t what they wanted — as simply a means of legitimising the war, and they were simply not going to go along with that. That’s why they resisted it all the way along and spent so much diplomatic capital, bizarrely in a sense acting against their allies, their main allies, touring Africa to persuade people not to go along with this and ultimately threatening to veto it, because they felt that what was being proposed was not a reasonable exercise; it was simply a way of trying to fit something diplomatically to the military timetable that was underway and was therefore simply a ploy to help the British, which they weren’t prepared to go along with. I think they found it hard to say that in so many words, given the history of 1441, but what they were saying was "We will not go along with anything that does not give the inspectors time to do their work."
What I recall was that after Chirac’s speech, there was a lot of sarcasm about France in the US, jokes about french fries, cowardice, etc.

I seem to have more interest in the Chilcot Iraq Inquiry in England than most Americans. Maybe it’s because we lived there for a few years, but it’s also because of my preoccupation with our invasion of Iraq. Last week, they interviewed Sir John Holmes who was the British Ambassador to France during the lead-up to the Invasion. I guess I forget how young the UN is, since it spans most of my lifetime, but it’s only 65 years old, and has only encompassed the whole world recently [since the fall of World Communism].

The situation of Hussein’s Iraq has been a challenge for the UN since he came to power. After his Party’s Coup in 1968, Hussein consolidated the Baathist power for a decade before becoming the President, then almost immediately went to war with Iran. Following that war, he invaded Kuwait and was expelled by UN Forces in the First Gulf War in 1991. Thereafter, he resisted the UN Ceasefire terms whenever he could, becoming the paradigm for the rogue states – states that seemed to ignore the UN unless forced.

The UN authority is still being negotiated, but currently only has to do with  conflicts between states – not what happens within a given state. So it’s unclear how the world deals with a state that is potentially dangerous, but hasn’t yet attacked anyone. Likewise, there’s still conflict about how to deal with states with internal wars or conflicts. For example, when Kosovo erupted in a war involving human rights abuses, NATO intervened [the first "humanitarian war"] rather than the UN. And so the UN has struggled with how to address pugilistic nations like Iraq [or Bush’s "Axis of Evil" – Iraq, Iran, and North Korea]. Which brings us to the Invasion of Iraq.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the UN acted swiftly  [UNSCR 678] and after several attempts to obtain a peaceful withdrawal, the Coalition of UN forces went to war. In that short war, it was discovered that Saddam Hussein was moving towards building weapons of mass destruction – nuclear, chemical, and biologic weapons of mass destruction. Disarmament and cooperation with subsequent weapons inspections were made part of the cease fire conditions. In essence, the UN [and us] were using his pugilism in Kuwait to justify regulating a rogue state, and he resisted at every possibility. And so the UN kept passing resolutions and sanctions, some of which hurt the Iraqi people [but not Hussein]. In the US, the PNAC wanted us to invade unilaterally. Instead, Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation act, funding groups opposing Hussein. In 1998, we bombed Iraq’s military facilities, stretching UN 678 to justify our action. Like I said, the world hasn’t yet figured out how to deal with rogue states. But there was no disagreement among the world powers that Iraq was a rogue state, though there was little information about how dangerous Hussein really was. As things played out, the US, the UK, and France represented three different positions on how to deal with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in particular, and rogue states in general.

The United States:

George W. BushThroughout the Clinton years, the neoconservatives languished at the American Enterprise Institute longing for the golden days of Ronald Reagan and vast military spending. They honestly believed that Reagan had ended the Cold War and World Communism. A splinter group, The Project for the New American Century, essentially discounted the UN and proposed that the US become the world’s sole superpower – taking care of rogue states unilaterally and preemptively. They actually spoke of American Exceptionalism [whatever that means] in public. "we need to accept responsibility for America’s unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles." Regime Change in Iraq was to be our assertion of this made up principle.

Richard CheneySo when 911 came along, the Bush Administration began planning to invade Iraq. They decided to justify the invasion by saying Hussein had reconstituted his weapons of mass destruction [piggy-backing off of UN 678] and that he was allied with al Qaeda in the attack on New York [aggression towards another state]. Neither charge was true. But Regime Change is not a valid Casus Belli [Case for War]. Our government was dismissive of the UN, and only sought UN approval at the behest of the UK. So the United States represented one extreme – The UN is too slow and too weak. We’ll just take care of the problem.

France:

Jacques ChiracThe policy of President Chirac occupied the opposite pole. According to Sir John, Chirac sought "to prevent war with Iraq because he did not believe that it was justified. He believed it would be a very dangerous venture, that it would have all sorts of implications for stability in the region, that the likelihood of Iraq breaking up on the Middle East peace process on the West’s image in the Islamic world in general." Chirac held "the belief that the kind of foreign policy which was being represented and articulated by President Bush was a unilateralist vision of the world which he could not share, thought was dangerous, and based on a lack of knowledge of the world and that he was therefore returning to counter by setting out an alternative, multipolar vision of the world, which was very much the French vision at the time." These were thoughtful, and ultimately correct ideas.

Chirac did not insist on air-tight wording in UN 1441 because he "didn’t want to be in a position where military action in the modern world could only be authorised by the Security Council. They, like us, had taken the position that of course Security Council authorisation is much the best, but there may be circumstances – of course, Kosovo had been an example – where military action can be justified if there is sufficient international support, even without a Security Council Resolution." Some more sensible thinking, in my opinion.

Finally, he became a strong opponent of a UN Resolution for invading Iraq when he saw that it was "as simply a means of legitimising the war, and they were simply not going to go along with that." "We will not go along with anything that does not give the inspectors time to do their work." In simpler terms, he saw through the US Charade and would have no part of it. Good for him. Good for the UN. And good for the world. Sir John makes it perfectly clear that had there been a legitimate Casus Belli, like WMD found by the inspectors or Iraq expelling the inspectors, France would have joined in military action against Iraq.

England:

In reading Sir John’s testimony, I think he saw England’s position as attempting to negotiate between the polarities represented by the US and the French:
    Essentially, yes, and I think the initial indications from the new US administration, from Colin Powell in particular, they were prepared to go down that track and, of course, everything did change after 9/11, but at that stage, they were cooperating. They were very tough-minded about it, and we were, as always, somewhere between the French and the Americans, trying to get people into the right position.
Tony BlairBut in listening to the testimony in the earlier Chilcot Inquiry, that middle position may well be in Sir John’s fantasy rather than a fact. They sounded a lot more internally conflicted than that to me. Prime Minister Tony Blair was very "with" President Bush at each of their meetings. Blair’s main ally appeared to be Foreign Secretary Jack Straw. They were mainly on the side of Regime Change but constrained by the voice of Lord Peter Goldsmith, Attorney General, and fought for a compromise that would allow for the invasion, but with the UN’s blessings. ILord Peter Goldsmith wouldn’t call that "between." They knew directly of the US deceit, "Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime’s record." [Downing Street Memo]. British Intelligence was pushing the Niger Yellowcake Uranium story and claimed to have corroboration [impossible, since it was patently untrue].

I would see the British position as closer to that of the US. They were impatient too and wanted to depose Saddam Hussein no matter what. They just had a harder time finding a way to rationalize doing it. There were British heros along the way [certainly more than we had in the US]. Somehow, the Downing Street Memo made it into the public domain.  Katherine Gun, a translator leaked a Memo that documented the US bugging the UN Security Council members. Elizabeth Wilmhurst resigned in protest to Lord Goldsmith’s legitimizing the invasion. Robin Cook resigned from his positions as Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons in protest against the invasion of Iraq. Dr. David Kelly, weapons inspector, ultimately lost his life by blowing a whistle shortly after the invasion.

Downing Street MemoKatherine GunElizabeth WilmshurstRobin CookDr. David Kelly


My preoccupation with the Invasion of Iraq is not because I miss the point that Saddam Hussein was a dangerous person and a threat to the world. The only thing that limited him was a strong counter-force. At first, I thought Bush’s confrontation of the problem of rogue states was probably a good thing – insisting that the UN recognize the problem [though I admit, the phrase "Axis of Evil" gave me the willies]. It seemed like it was time for the UN to step up to the plate and figure out how to approach rogue states in the absence of a direct interstate aggressive act. But then things went very wrong – very wrong indeed.

Anyone who gave it any thought could see that Bush was headed for war no matter what. Anyone reading the PNAC web site could see that there was a move afoot to move our foreign policy back to the days of the Roman Empire. Anyone reading the Congressional Authorization for the use of force in Iraq could see that Congress wanted us to work through the UN. Anyone looking at the UN Resolution 1441 could see that it didn’t automatically authorize the use of force. Anyone looking at the OLC DOJ Memos negating Congress and the UN were absurd, except that no one saw those Memos or the Presidential Signing Statements that accompanied and neutralized the Acts of Congress. But we all know that now, just as we know that what French President Chirac of France predicted is exactly what happened [we owe France an apology].

I think that the biggest tragedy in this story, bigger even than the lost lives, tarnished reputation, and wasted treasure is that the UN is no closer now to a policy to deal with rogue states than it was in 2003. If anything, the debacle of the Iraq Invasion moved the UN backwards. The war that was going to make the US the "sole superpower" backfired so there’s some question of our "power" period. We have, in fact, come to be viewed as a rogue state ourselves – probably because we acted like one. So now the UN has lost the opportunity to deal with Iraq carefully and effectively – and along the way lost a chance to develop a policy for the future that works to prevent future similar problems. In the end, the US and the UK damaged the world order rather than working to preserve it – undermined the UN rather than strengthening it. If anything good came from the Iraq Invasion, I’m damned if I know what it is…
  1.  
    dc
    July 11, 2010 | 12:59 AM
     

    Nice piece here too.

    Robin Cook (also) lost his life.

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