1 Boring Old Man

Hans Blix: Allies used ‘poor’ intelligence ahead of Iraq invasion
^{Former head of UN weapons inspectors tells Chilcot inquiry ‘alarm bells’ should have rung when his staff failed to find evidence of WMD}
guardian.co.uk
27 July 2010

Britain and the US relied on dubious intelligence sources ahead of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the former head of the United Nations weapons inspectors said today. Giving evidence to the Iraq inquiry, Hans Blix said it should have set alarm bells ringing in London and Washington when the inspectors repeatedly failed to turn up any evidence that Saddam Hussein still had active weapons of mass destruction programmes.

Blix said he warned the then prime minister Tony Blair in a February 2003 meeting that Saddam Hussein might not have any weapons of mass destruction. He told the US secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, the same thing. He said: "When we reported that we did not find any weapons of mass destruction they should have realised, I think, both in London and in Washington, that their sources were poor. They should have been more critical about that." Blix said that he had privately confided to Blair in autumn 2002 – before the inspectors returned to Iraq – that he thought it "plausible" that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction.

However in the weeks leading up to the invasion in March 2003 – after the inspectors had failed to uncover anything significant – he said that he had cautioned Blair that there might not be anything. He said that he told Blair: "Wouldn’t it be paradoxical if you were to invade Iraq with 250,000 men and find very little?" He added: "I gave a warning that things had changed and there might not be so much"…

He said that, immediately before the 2003 US-led invasion, his inspectors checked around 30 sites said by British and US intelligence to contain weapons of mass destruction, but discovered little more than some old missile engines and a sheaf of nuclear documents…he said that he did not believe that Britain and the US had been entitled to invade Iraq without a further UN security council resolution specifically authorising military action.

He accused the administration of US president George Bush of being "high on military" in the wake of the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York in 2001. "They felt that they could get away with it and therefore it was desirable," he said. He also condemned claims by Britain and the US that Iraq had tried to acquire raw uranium for its supposed nuclear programme from Niger, based on a forged document. Blix said: "That was perhaps the first occasion I became suspicious about the evidence. I think that was the most scandalous part."

US was ‘high on military’ ahead of Iraq war, says Hans Blix
^{The Bush administration was "high on military" in the months leading up to the invasion of Iraq, former UN weapons inspector Hans Blix told the Chilcott Inquiry.}
telegraph.co.uk
27 Jul 2010

Dr Blix spoke of his disquiet at the US national security strategy published in September 2002, which set out the White House’s belief in its right to launch pre-emptive attacks. He told the official inquiry into the war against Saddam Hussein’s regime that he was convinced a second UN resolution was needed to authorise military action. He said: "The US in 2002, that time you refer to, threw it [the UN process] overboard. I think they were high on military at the time. They said, ‘we can do it’."

Dr Blix added that the progress to war with Iraq was "almost unstoppable" by early 2003 and the UK was "a prisoner on that train". He told the inquiry: "Once they went up to 250,000 men and March was approaching, I think it was unstoppable or almost unstoppable – the (US) president could have stopped it, but almost unstoppable.

"After March the heat would go up in Iraq and it would be difficult to carry out warfare." He added: "The whole military timetable was, as rightly said, not in sync with the diplomatic timetable. "The diplomatic timetable would have allowed more inspections. (The) UK wanted more inspections. The military timetable did not permit that"…

Dr Blix said he was in favour of resolution 1441, passed on November 8 2002, which declared Iraq in "material breach" of its obligations to disarm and paved the way for the return of weapons inspectors. "The declaration, I felt, might give Iraq a chance for a new start," he said…

DR BLIX: We see how Mr Goldsmith, Lord Goldsmith now, wriggled about and how he himself very much doubted that it was adequate, but eventually said, "Well, if you accumulate all these things, then that gives a plausible …" – he was not quite sure that it would have stood up in an international tribunal. Most of your legal advisers did not think so either. Nevertheless he gave the green light to it.

DR BLIX: The interesting thing: was Iraq a danger in 2003? They were not a danger. They were practically prostrate and could not – it would have taken a lot of time to reconstitute by selling oil. What they got instead was a long period of anarchy. I think one conclusion I am inclined to draw is that anarchy can be worse than tyranny.

DR BLIX: …the Iraqis apparently had destroyed anthrax and buried the remnants in a place near Saddam’s palaces. This needs to be checked but I read it somewhere. They didn’t dare to admit that this had been so close to us. So I doubt very much they would have dared to go along and fulfil that condition.

SIR JOHN CHILCOT: Because they would not have dared to admit it to Saddam himself?

DR BLIX: Precisely, because of fear he would say, "What have you been doing?" That would have been hard.

DR BLIX: No, I am not convinced that Saddam had come to that decision that they would do their utmost to cooperate. He took the strategic decision in 1991 to do away with the weapons of mass destruction, the biological, chemical and the nuclear. So there was a strategic decision but he wouldn’t admit it publicly. One reason, again, the guess is he didn’t mind looking dangerous to the Iranians.

SIR RODERIC LYNE: Did you feel that it gave Iraq a realistic possibility of meeting the requirements of the resolution?
DR BLIX: Yes, except that it was very hard for them to declare any weapons when they didn’t have any.