listening…

Posted on Wednesday 2 November 2011


DSM 5 Against Everyone Else
Its Research Types Just Don’t Understand The Clinical World
DSM5 in Distress: Psychology Today
by Allen J. Frances, M.D.
November 1, 2011

Strikingly, there seems to be virtually no support for DSM 5 outside the very narrow circle of the several hundred experts who have created it and the leadership of the American Psychiatric Association [APA] which stands to reap large profits from its publication. There is no group and precious few individuals outside of APA who have anything good to say about DSM 5. And even within the DSM 5 work groups and the APA governance structures, there is widespread discontent with the process and considerable disagreement about the product…

There is obviously a huge, growing, and so far totally unbridgeable gulf between the researchers who have prepared DSM 5 and the clinicians who will have to use it. The experts, if they see patients at all, tend to do so only in the ivory tower of university research clinics. Clinicians have to apply the DSM under more difficult real life circumstances and often have a much clearer understanding of how it can be misused – with loose diagnosis often leading to excessive use of medication…

The experts are well intentioned and are making very bad decisions for the purest of reasons. Their conflict of interest is purely intellectual, not financial. Experts overvalue their pet diagnoses and their own research – and greatly underappreciate how an idea that works well in their own research setting may be disastrously misunderstood and misused in clinical practice…

If DSM 5 remains at war with its users, it won’t be used. Why buy an expensive book if it is likely to be more harmful than helpful when the official ICD-10-CM codes will be freely available on the internet. DSM 5′ s stubborn refusal to abandon risky suggestions is a foolish gamble not only for clinicians and patients, but also with its own future.

As Dr. Frances continues to wield his well placed hammer, he repeatedly throws in things like, "The experts are well intentioned and are making very bad decisions for the purest of reasons. Their conflict of interest is purely intellectual, not financial." I expect that he’s trying to neutralize the idea in the minds of many that psychiatrists are simply crooks in league with the pharmaceutical industry. That’s an uphill climb, because we’ve had more than our share of people who fit the bill, and an even larger number who may not be crooks, but who have been way too close to industry [and well paid for their time]. It is unlikely that his simple declaration will change that perception. So I’m not sure that purity would be my main metaphor for describing the motives of the neo-framers – "the purest of reasons" or "purely intellectual"].

And another thing, the first paragraph of this article [in Psychology Today] reads:
So far, opposition to DSM 5 has been expressed by the following organizations: British Psychological Society; American Counseling Association; Society for Humanistic Psychology [APA Division 32]; Society for Community Research and Action: Division of Community Psychology [APA Division 27]; Society for Group Psychology & Psychotherapy[ APA Division 49]; Developmental Psychology [APA Division 7]; UK Council for Psychotherapy; Association for Women in Psychology; Constructivist Psychology Network; Society for Descriptive Psychology; and the Society of Indian Psychologists.
There’s something of a monotony about these groups who are up in arms about the DSM-5 [and probably its predecessors if the truth were spoken] – the word Psychology [and its near synonyms]. In a later paragraph, Frances adds:
The users are more than 500,000 thousand mental heath clinicians [and probably, on an occasional basis, about an equal number of primary care physicians]. Of the mental health workers, about 202,000 are social workers; 120,000 are mental health counselors; 93,000 are psychologists; 75,000 are psychiatric nurses; 55,000 are marriage & family therapists; 38,000 are psychiatrists; and an unknown additional number are occupational therapists, educators, experts in forensics, researchers etc.
And from the leadership of his opposition:
Neuroscience, Clinical Evidence, and the Future of Psychiatric Classification in DSM-5
by David J. Kupfer, M.D. and Darrel A. Regier, M.D., M.P.H.
American Journal of Psychiatry 2011 168:672-674.

In the initial stages of development of the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,we expected that some of the limitations of the current psychiatric diagnostic criteria and taxonomy would be mitigated by the integration of validators derived from scientific advances in the last few decades. Throughout the last 25 years of psychiatric research, findings from genetics, neuroimaging, cognitive science, and pathophysiology have yielded important insights into diagnosis and treatment approaches for some debilitating mental disorders, including depression, schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder. In A Research Agenda for DSM-V, we anticipated that these emerging diagnostic and treatment advances would impact the diagnosis and classification of mental disorders faster than what has actually occurred…

The seminal article by Robins and Guze on diagnostic validity, which proposed a classification of psychiatric illnesses based not on psychodynamic, a priori hypotheses but rather on external, empirical indicators, built a direct pathway to DSM-III. Their proposed classification steps included identifying core clinical features, conducting differential diagnosis to separate the condition from similar disorders, gathering laboratory data, assessing temporal stability of the diagnosis, and determining familial aggregation of the disorder. The resultant explicit criteria featured in DSM-III and subsequent editions have significantly improved our understanding of psychiatric disorders, but they did not come without a price. While diagnostic reliability has thrived, large-scale epidemiological studies have underscored the inefficiency of DSM’s criteria in accurately differentiating diagnostic syndromes, especially in community samples. With reification of the criteria through revised editions of DSM-III-R and DSM-IV, proliferation of diagnostic comorbidities and overreliance on the "not otherwise specified" category have continued…
While I don’t personally agree with "Throughout the last 25 years of psychiatric research, findings from genetics, neuroimaging, cognitive science, and pathophysiology have yielded important insights into diagnosis and treatment approaches for some debilitating mental disorders, including depression, schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder" and think they’re closer to the mark with, "… we anticipated that these emerging diagnostic and treatment advances would impact the diagnosis and classification of mental disorders faster than what has actually occurred," that’s not my direction in this particular post. Kupfer and Regier go on to say, "The seminal article by Robins and Guze on diagnostic validity, which proposed a classification of psychiatric illnesses based not on psychodynamic, a priori hypotheses but rather on external, empirical indicators, built a direct pathway to DSM-III" comes closer to the part I want to talk about. Anyone alive during those days knows that the DSM-III essentially ended the influence of the psychoanalysts in the medical specialty of psychiatry. In fact, ending that influence was an active overt and covert goal of the revision. The result was essentially to expel psychoanalysis from psychiatry altogether, and it was successful. As I am both a psychiatrist and a psychoanalyst, anything I might say about that would be suspect – a conflict of interest. And if we’ve learned anything in these last few decades, just declaring a conflict of interest doesn’t make it go away. Even I would be suspicious of what I had to say. But I can say some things  that I do trust about the consequences of that revision.

I agree with the idea of "a classification of psychiatric illnesses based not on psychodynamic, a priori hypotheses." Unfortunately, in the DSM-III, they didn’t just throw out psychoanalytic theories, they threw out a psychodynamic thread in psychiatry that belonged to psychiatry itself, not psychoanalysis. It was a rich tradition that the analysts certainly influenced, but so did Adolf Meyer, Harry Stack Sullivan and countless others who taught us how to talk with and listen to our patients [no apologies for the influence of the analysts intended]. So, the framers of the DSM-III threw out psychodynamic psychiatry too – the baby with the bathwater. In fact, they essentially threw out "the mind" altogether. That was a huge mistake – probably an irredeemable mistake. And they said they created "a classification of psychiatric illnesses based not on psychodynamic, a priori hypotheses but rather on external, empirical indicators," but that’s not true either. They created a classification based on another "a priori hypotheses," that all mental illness is biologic. It would’ve been okay for them to say all mental illness that psychiatrists are going to treat is biological. Or it would’ve been fine for them to say that our classification was only going to include known or suspected biological conditions [it would’ve been a very small book]. They said neither. They tried to hold on to the whole ball of wax. So they talked "external, empirical indicators" but lived biology, and they preached evidence-based medicine but practiced expert opinion [or at least the opinion of declared experts].

Using Dr. Frances’ numbers:
  • "The users are more than 500,000 thousand mental heath clinicians [and probably, on an occasional basis, about an equal number of primary care physicians]" = 500,000 to 1,000,000
  • "38,000 are psychiatrists" = 38,000
  • ergo 38,000/500,000 = 7.6%
  • ergo 38,000/1,000,000 = 3.8% 
Do the powers that be in psychiatry really think that the remaining 92.4% to 96.2% of mental health clinicians are going to continue to use a classification of mental illness that essentially denies the mind, behavior, relationships, or society, and remains rigidly committed to biology clothed in "external, emperical indicators"? Of course they aren’t. In fact they shouldn’t. Dr. Frances, a psychiatrist,  is trying to tell other psychiatrists something that desperately needs hearing. It reminds me of an elementary school playground joke:
    This guy is standing on the corner clapping.
    Someone asks, "Why are you clapping?"
    He says, "It keeps the elephants away."
    "But there haven’t been any elephants around here for thousands of years."
    He says, "See, it works! Don’t it?"
They’re still riding high on expelling the psychoanalysts a quarter of a century ago and phobic about holding their ground – the line of Robins and Guze. They’re also in denial that the DSM criteria have been coopted by the pharmaceutical friendlies among them – particularly in the areas of Depression and matters Bipolar. They seem unaware that the proliferation of silly pet disorders looks exactly like what it is – silly. Their proposed changes in the area of personality diagnosis flies in the face of expert opinion and the opinion of declared experts. And so it goes – the unfounded biases towards universal biology, the creation of silly disorders, the failure to resolve the problems with depressive diagnoses, the inattentiveness to the needs of the other mental health specialties, the continuation of the war on Freud and "the mind," an unwillingness to openly acknowledge the corruption that’s arisen from the previous revisions, the reliance on non-clinicians in revising the DSM-5, the unspoken impact of the third party carriers and what they’ll pay for – the list seems like a bottomless pit.

As Dr. Allen Frances says, the DSM-5 crew seems to be fighting with everyone, including Dr. Allen Frances himself. And he is far and away the most forgiving of their adversaries. He seems to actually believe that "The experts are well intentioned and are making very bad decisions for the purest of reasons" and "Their conflict of interest is purely intellectual, not financial." Nobody else is that forgiving [certainly I’m not]. And Frances says that in spite of the nasty things Drs. Schatzberg, Scully, Regier, and Kupfer said about him:
Finally, Dr. Frances opened his commentary with the statement, “We should begin with full disclosure.”  It is unfortunate that Dr. Frances failed to take this statement to heart when he did not disclose his continued financial interests in several publications based on DSM-IV.  Only with this information could the reader make a full assessment of his critiques of a new and different DSM-V.  Both Dr. Frances and Dr. Spitzer have more than a personal “pride of authorship” interest in preserving the DSM-IV and its related case book and study products. Both continue to receive royalties on DSM-IV associated products. The fact that Dr. Frances was informed at the APA Annual Meeting last month that subsequent editions of his DSM-IV associated products would cease when the new edition is finalized, should be considered when evaluating his critique and its timing.
I fully expect the powers that be in the APA [American Psychiatric Association] and its DSM-5 task force to continue to try to ignore and dismiss Dr. Frances and the considerable forces he’s beginning to represent. Sooner or later, I’ll come out of the closet and have a stab at explaining why I think they’re doing that. But for the moment, I’ll say it simply. Psychiatric training was the place I came to learn how to listen, and I got what I wanted. Not long thereafter, psychiatry and lots of psychiatrists lost [or threw away] that skill – the ability to listen. They’re not listening to Dr. Frances in the right way. They hear an old retired guy whose injured because they’re messing with his baby – the now old DSM-IV. Dr. Frances is no injured old guy. He’s a patriot who met the Buddha on the road and realized that a lot of the psychiatry he was part of and that now carries forward is on an arrogant and destructive trajectory heading for sure irrelevance. He wants to do something about that. A lot of the rest of us want to do something about that too. They’re just not listening to the right people in the right way…
  1.  
    Ivan
    November 2, 2011 | 5:26 PM
     

    That attempt by Alan Schatzberg, James Scully, Darrel Regier and David Kupfer to smear Allen Frances was not just contemptible – it was stupid.

  2.  
    Bernard Carroll
    November 2, 2011 | 6:06 PM
     

    In this new defense of DSM-5, Darrel Regier and David Kupfer trot out the tired trope that DSM-III was modeled on the classic Robins-Guze elements of psychiatric diagnosis. Would that it had been! The fact of the matter is that DSM-III and DSM-IV consciously rejected key elements of the Robins-Guze proposal. Only two of the five key elements of Robins-Guze can be found in the DSM-III-IV criteria for, say, major depressive disorder: they are clinical description and delimitation from other disorders. What’s missing is any mention of laboratory variables or course of illness or family history. As for external, empirical indicators, where are they, exactly? All that’s there are subjectively reported symptoms and a few observable signs jumbled up without linking constructs in a disjunctive diagnostic menu.

    No wonder clinicians are leery of all the DSMs. As things stand clinicians are prohibited from factoring in an elephant in the living room like past episodes that required ECT when they are assessing a depressed patient. They are not allowed to give diagnostic weight to a loaded family history of bipolar disorder when evaluating a depressed patient. I recall being stupefied when Robert Spitzer told me during the run-up to DSM-III that he could not allow family history to be included among the diagnostic criteria because that would preclude genetic studies of major depression.

    When DSM-III appeared there was a good deal of hand waving by Gerald Klerman and Robert Spitzer and Melvin Sabshin at the APA to the effect that DSM-III proposals were simply hypotheses to be tested. The worth of those assurances quickly became evident when we saw the rush to methodologic imperialism in the wake of DSM-III. The fear is that something equally unfortunate will happen when DSM-5 comes along. When there is premature closure, as happened after DSM-III, then we don’t learn anything.

  3.  
    November 2, 2011 | 7:19 PM
     

    There are many different kinds of not listening. I agree with Dr. Carroll, one of the places they haven’t listened is in their chronically unchanged way of dealing with the many forms of depression. It’s hard for me not to see their resistance to some kind of rational parsing of depression as keeping the target broad for the antidepressant salesmen. I can’t know that, but I just can’t come up with any other reason that makes any sense. It’s not that they haven’t been told…

  4.  
    Edward Shorter
    November 3, 2011 | 10:04 AM
     

    I admire the articulateness of Allen Frances’s many critiques of the draft DSM-V. As the editor of DSM-IV he might be considered a bit of a gored ox; yet this is really beside the point. For all his shrewdness, Dr Frances and other critics miss one key point in their critiques of the draft DSM-V: It is not just that many of the proposed new diagnoses such as “psychosis risk” are bad ideas. It is that the diagnoses at the very core of the DSM system themselves are artifacts and urgently need to be revised or discarded. In the world of natural illness entities, there is no such thing as schizophrenia as a unitary disease. Nor is there a separate disease called “bipolar disorder.” Nor is there a real entity called major depression. All are made-up diagnoses and in no way correspond to “cutting Nature at the joints,” the supposed objective of the DSM-III Task Force many years ago. So Frances’s critical comments are true, but largely irrelevant to the real problem at hand: getting into the center of the bowl of spaghetti and stirring it about, rather than merely sniping at the strands of spaghetti hanging over the side. There is obviously no possibility of this happening under the current Task Force, a big defeat for those who believe that psychiatric disease-classification has scientific aspects.

    Edward (Ned) Shorter

  5.  
    Don Klein
    November 5, 2011 | 8:36 AM
     

    I was on DSM 3 task force–there was no specific anti-psychoanalytic animus-in fact two eminent analysts were specifically invited to attend meetings and contribute-did not work–the hurdle was making diagnoses that did not use unsubstantiated etiological theory. that applied to many promulgated theories-not just analysis.
    Carroll’s points are well taken. We had large arguments re including treatment response as guide to DX and Rx. The argument was that DSM was not an encompassing psychiatric textbook and clinicians should be broadly informed.
    As i recall the point of the Robins Guze article was that schizophrenia should be divided into good and poor pre-morbid,which has not happened .
    Shorter’s point that our DXS are constructs is correct but so what? What are the alternatives?

    Don Klein

  6.  
    Rob Purssey
    November 7, 2011 | 9:39 AM
     

    RE – Shorter’s point that our DXS are constructs is correct but so what? What are the alternatives?

    Radical behaviorism has been refined and developed since Skinners time. Now known as Functional Contextualism, and overcoming the hurdle of language and cognition with Relational Frame Theory, it may be that a comprehensive and rigorous Science of Behavior is possible. Please see http://www.contextualpsychology.org and http://www.mindfulnessfortwo.com – this latter site about a book which lays out just such an alternative diagnostic framework. An exciting time for science and human behavior.

    Thanks enormously for this blog and comments, and best wishes to all.

    Rob Purssey
    Functional Contextual Psychiatrist
    Brisbane, Australia
    http://www.mindfulpsychiatry.com.au

Sorry, the comment form is closed at this time.