depressing ergo-mania…

Posted on Monday 14 November 2011

One of the most confusing things about the DSM is the seeming permanent category of Major Depressive Disorder through the revisions. Starting with the DSM-III, a variety of previous clinical depressive syndromes were conflated into a single category and there they remain. Formerly, Depressions were fractionated along multiple axes, one being the presence of a precipitating cause – a "because…" Even in situations where there were clinically distinguishing features, those things became "withs…" like Psychosis or Melancholia. Now, in the coming DSM-5, they’re proposing to eliminate one of the few syndromes that has not been engulfed – Bereavement – surviving in the form of an exclusion criteria until now. This is the explanation posted on the DSM-5 web site:

Misconceptions about the proposal to eliminate the grief exclusion criterion from DSM-IV have been presented online and in the media. Writers have expressed fear that the change will lead to automatic diagnosis of individuals who are grieving with Major Depressive Disorder. I would like to provide some background on the grief exclusion and some insight into thinking behind the proposal to remove it for DSM-5 in order to put this change into perspective.

First, the grief exclusion criterion – which states that someone who has experienced a recent bereavement is not eligible for a diagnosis of major depression – was not present in the two major psychiatric diagnostic systems that formed the basis for the DSM-III – the diagnostic manual that is the immediate precursor of our current DSM-IV. Rather, it was added to DSM-III largely on the basis of the work of one of the DSM-III task force members who was then studying grief and was carried forward with little modification into DSM-IV. Second, the other major psychiatric diagnostic system used in the world – the International Classification of Diseases – has never had a grief exclusion criterion for major depression.

Third, a broad range of evidence agreed to by both sides of this debate shows that there are little to no systematic differences between individuals who develop a major depression in response to bereavement and in response to other severe stressors – such as being physical assaulted and raped, being betrayed by a trusted spouse whom you learn has been unfaithful or a beloved child whom you are told is dealing drugs, having your doctor tell you that your breast or prostate biopsy for cancer is positive or the loss of your treasured job. So the DSM-IV position is not logically defensible. Either the grief exclusion criterion needs to be eliminated or extended so that no depression that arises in the setting of adversity would be diagnosable. This latter approach would represent as major shift, unsupported by a range of scientific evidence, in the nature of our concept of depression as epidemiologic studies show that the majority of individuals develop major depression in the setting of psychosocial adversity.

Fourth, the vast majority of individuals exposed to grief and to these other terrible misfortunes do not develop major depression.
That does not mean, and here is the source of much confusion, that they do not grieve. They do. It does not mean that they do not feel terrible pain and loneliness. They do. Depression is a slippery word and we are so used to using it to mean “sad”, “blue”, “upset” or, in this specific case, “grieving.” Major depression – the diagnostic term – is something quite different. Finally, diagnosis in psychiatry as in the rest of medicine provides the possibility but by no means the requirement that treatment be initiated. Watchful waiting is important tool for all skilled clinicians. As a good internist might adopt a watch and wait attitude toward a diagnosable upper respiratory infection assuming that it is unlikely to progress to a pneumonia, so a good psychiatrist, on seeing an individual with major depression after bereavement, would start with a diagnostic evaluation.

If the criteria for major depression are met, then he or she would then have the opportunity to assess whether a conservative watch and wait approach is indicated or whether, because of suicidal ideation, major role impairment or a substantial clinical worsening the benefits of treatment outweigh the limitations. As with the psychiatric response to the other major stressors to which we humans are all too frequently exposed, good clinical care involves first doing no harm, and second intervening only when both our clinical experience and good scientific evidence suggests that treatment is needed.

Here’s the operative logic train:
  • "there are little to no systematic differences between individuals who develop a major depression in response to bereavement and in response to other severe stressors"
  • "epidemiologic studies show that the majority of individuals develop major depression in the setting of psychosocial adversity"
  • "the vast majority of individuals exposed to grief and to these other terrible misfortunes do not develop major depression"
Dr. Kendler’s interpretation of these data goes like this:
    since: most depressed people have major psychosial stressors of similar magnitude to a significant interpersonal loss
    and
    since: there’s no clinical difference between the bereaved and the otherwise stressed
    ergo: grief is not unique so the exclusion needs to be removed.
In former times, this same logic train lead us down a different path:
    since: "the vast majority of individuals exposed to breavement and to these other terrible misfortunes do not develop major depression"
    ergo: there is a kind of person that develops clinical depression in response to psychosocial stressors
    and
    since: "epidemiologic studies show that the majority of individuals develop major depression in the setting of psychosocial adversity"
    ergo: there is a kind of person [in the minority] with clinical depression that doesn’t have psychosocial stressors
    ergo: In this way of interpreting the clinical information, there are three kinds of people:
    • people who are neither clinically depressed nor become clinically depressed in the face of psychosocial adversity [most] [normal]
    • people who have developed clinical depression in the face of psychosocial adversity [some] [exogenous depression]
    • people who have developed clinical depression without a history of psychosocial adversity [few] [endogenous depression]
I have obviously simplified my logic [as has Dr. Kendler] because my intent is not to write a treatise on the varieties of human depression. There are plenty of those available that include a much broader discussion of other clinical findings that speak to the idea of fractionating depression in our diagnostic scheme. I’ve mentioned only one – the history of a precipitating cause. There are many things to consider. But I’m on a different tack at the moment. But I will address one medical point, "Is history a valid descriptive in medical diagnosis?" Sure. In fact history is a mainstay in diagnosis. If a person presents with jaundice and a distended abdomen, one of the first questions asked is about the patient’s use of alcohol to differentiate alcoholic cirrhosis from other causes of liver disease. History matters. That’s why we take histories.

My point is that ever since the DSM-III was a gleam in Robert Spitzer’s eye, people have been howling about the lumping of all depression into one great big category. Many articles in our current literature call MDD a "heterogeneous" group and explain the wimpy responses to medications or the brisk response to placebos on that basis. We’ve had thirty years of lumping but the people who study depression still talk about Melancholia as a unique depression, including the DSM framers who concede a "with" in our criteria. Even people who are solidly Biological/DSMers like Dr. Alan Schatzberg [who defends the DSM-5 revision] has focused his fame and fortune on "psychotic depression" as a unique entity.

My take on all of this is that Dr. Kendler is the one with the "misconception" about why there’s so much alarm about removing the bereavement exclusion in the DSM-5. It’s about something other than what he responds to in the statement reproduced here. The category Major Depressive Disorder cries out for revision sure enough. It’s probably the most "revisable" category in the whole manual. But it needs to be carefully fractionated rather than broadened further. The thought that the only thing his work group can think of to do with their last ten years is piddle with the exclusion clause when the main category needs a long overdue overhaul is simply infuriating.

So we’re left to speculate why. Are they afraid the psychoanalysts and psychotherapists will raise their ugly heads and suggest that the kind of people who develop clinical depression in response to stressors will suggest a mind/personality explanation again? I can set his mind to rest. We still think that way after thirty years. When I see a depressed person, I take a history first off, and a family history, and a history of previous stresses, etc. And what I learn has a lot to do with my diagnostic formulation and what I recommend. He doesn’t have to worry that I’m going to try to take over the APA because I think that way. I get it that my ancestors made a mistake putting psychoanalysis into the DSM-II. Point taken. But the DSMs also have hampered research on the "endogenous depressions" by lumping them into oblivion. What most of us suspect is that they won’t seriously revise the DSM Depression category because it will decrease the target population for the clinical trials and the medications, putting a damper on the current biological/medication fervor in psychiatry. That’s a legitimate concern. It would likely have that effect. And for a thousand other reasons, a damper on the current biological/medication fervor in psychiatry might be the best thing to happen in the last thirty years. But that’s not my reason for being infuriated by the behavior of the DSM depression work group.

My reason is that they’re not doing their jobs…


Note: Dr. Kendler is a distinguished psychiatrist [CV676 articles and a number of accolades] and I mean him no disparagement by this post. He’s the messenger. But I think the work group itself is way off the mark. In fact, were I in an environment vs heredity argument, I would likely quote a recent relatively elegant paper Kendler and others authored about monozygotic twins [8 pairs] that comes down on the side of environment using some sophisticated analyses [The impact of environmental experiences on symptoms of anxiety and depression across the life span].
  1.  
    PaulRobert
    November 15, 2011 | 3:35 AM
     

    My logic would have been:
    since: most depressed people have major psychosial stressors of similar magnitude to a significant interpersonal loss
    and
    since: there’s no clinical difference between the bereaved and the otherwise stressed
    ergo: grief is not unique so a more generalised exclusion needs to be added.

    … but then I suppose it would be reintroducing aetiology (endo- vs exogeny). Although, as you pointed out, maybe that’s not so much of a problem any more; “Pluripotent Dopamine Sensitization Risk Syndrome.”
    I’ve just discovered your blog and, like so many others, want to let you know how much I enjoy your writing.

  2.  
    Bernard Carroll
    November 15, 2011 | 11:47 AM
     

    The formulation offered by PaulRobert has merit. The entire category of adjustment disorders has largely been bypassed in practice, even though these remain in DSM-III-IV. Much of that results from orthodox rigidity about DSM-III-IV criteria.

    The orthodox rigidity stems from a misconception about the diagnostic criteria. They are necessary for the diagnosis but they are not in themselves sufficient for the diagnosis. They are not suited for making diagnoses but rather for ensuring that the clinical diagnoses given to patients conform to a minimum descriptive syndromal standard. So, a person recently bereaved might well display sufficient symptoms for a DSM-III-IV diagnosis of major depression, but that does not require that the diagnosis of major depression be applied, as Paula Clayton established. The same logic can be followed when the symptoms arise in the context of other significant stresses like losing a job or breaking up with a partner. We seem to have lost sight of the fact that the clinical diagnosis comes first and that the diagnostic criteria are an administrative cross-check. See PMID: 6376481.

    Adding another layer of complexity and nuance, Donald Klein elegantly parsed the reverse situation, for which he coined the term endogenomorphic depression. That refers to a typical major depression that does occur in the context of a major life stress. See: PMID: 4420562. What is decisive in arriving at the diagnosis is the preponderance of the clinical evidence for an endogenous-like depressive episode versus a reactive-like adjustment disorder, with the clear understanding that a good many cases will be ambiguous – which is why we also need to give diagnostic weight to the course of illness and to family history of mood episodes, and why we try to develop biomarkers. None of this clinical process is captured in DSM-III-IV.

  3.  
    Peggi
    November 15, 2011 | 1:09 PM
     

    So, given what you wrote on your November 13th posting, we will now include the bereaved in a category that increases the likelihood that they will not only be bereaved, but they will now be taking a medicine that it may be difficult for them to stop taking. Which sounds like addiction in my simple mind. So, their loved one isn’t coming back AND now they’re addicted to medication that may have very unpleasant side effects. What a great plan.

  4.  
    Bernard Carroll
    November 15, 2011 | 2:02 PM
     

    Yes. As one blogger posted somewhere recently about her unemployment-related dysphoric symptoms – I don’t need a pill, I need a job!

  5.  
    PaulRobert
    November 15, 2011 | 9:53 PM
     

    [The diagnostic criteria] are necessary… but… not in themselves sufficient for the diagnosis
    As true as that is Bernard, I would argue that, very often, clinicians and researchers view meeting the criteria as a diagnosis. (Just as they often view thresholds on standardised intruments – BDI, BAI, HAM-D, DASS, etc. – as diagnostic rather than as screening tools or severity measures.)

    While I can understand the political motives of Spitzer et al for removing aetiology in DSM III (overcoming conflicting theoretical frames in psychiatry, unifying the profession, moving its diagnostic practice to be more ‘medical’, etc.), I think this is the fundamental cause of diagnostic inflation by pathologising normal life.

  6.  
    Bernard Carroll
    November 15, 2011 | 10:38 PM
     

    Yes. That is my point. That is the misconception.

  7.  
    November 17, 2011 | 12:07 PM
     

    “epidemiologic studies show that the majority of individuals develop major depression in the setting of psychosocial adversity”

    My simple-minded take on their reasoning is that bad situations make people sad, sadness is all the same, let’s throw some drugs at it.

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