For most of the DSM-III disorders, however, the etiology is unknown. A variety of theories have been advanced, buttressed by evidence – not always convincing – to explain how these disorders came about. The approach taken in DSM-III is atheoretical with regard to etiology or pathophysiological process except for those disorders for which this is well established and therefore included in the definition of the disorder. Undoubtedly, with time, some of the disorders of unknown etiology will be found to have specific biological etiologies, others to have specific psychological causes, and still others to result mainly from a particular interplay of psychological, social, and biological factors. The major justification for the generally atheoretical approach taken in DSM-III with regard to etiology is that the inclusion of etiological theories would be an obstacle to use of the manual by clinicians of varying theoretical orientations, since it would not be possible to present all reasonable etiologic theories for each disorder.
Robert Spitzer, in the DSM-III, p 6.
A long time ago, I took that paragraph at face value, at least the first part. I don’t specifically recall my reaction, but I expect that the second part felt like a rationalization to me. It sure feels that way to me now. While my own focus was primarily in the psychological and social domains, I was interested in the biological too. I don’t recall feeling that there were competitions. Obviously oblivious is how I now think of my naivety in those days. It only gradually dawned on me that people were talking like all mental illness had a biological basis. Back then, they didn’t often say it ["that all mental illness is biologic"], they just talked as if that were true – hardware rather than software. And there was a lot of all going around back then. The behaviorists saw it as all due to faulty learning. Many of the analysts were close to all with their theories. From my perspective, the DSM-III had unmasked deep fault lines in the psychiatry of the time, but miraculously, it cooled off the public crisis. And there was something else unmasked, a rage against psychoanalysis that I didn’t know was there. It’s still pretty easy to find it if you peek just under the surface.
In bygone days, analysts had interpreted that anger as representing many things other than being justified without looking in the mirror to see what was right about it. So by 1980, there weren’t near enough cheeks to turn and the analysts were slammed. I’m mentioning this, because it was part of my attempt at understanding why so many psychiatrists acted as if all mental illness had a biological basis. I thought that might be because they were bound and determined to close the door on anything that smelled slightly Freudian. I went about my business and never had to directly address this all mental illness is biologic question. But there are ample comments in prominent places that suggest that it remains a central belief. They don’t all say all, but they come mighty close:
|
"6. The focus of psychiatric physicians should be on the biological aspects of illness."
|
|
The descriptive approach adopted by the DSM allowed for the development of a classification system that met the field’s need for a common language, without being mired in ideological hypotheses about the causes of psychiatric illness. Questions have been raised by many critics that the DSM’s descriptive approach may have outlived its usefulness and is in fact potentially misleading. Although there is a large body of research that indicates a neurobiological basis for most mental disorders, the DSM definitions are virtually devoid of biology. Instead, DSM-IV definitions are based on clusters of symptoms and characteristics of clinical course… It is our goal to translate basic and clinical neuroscience research relating brain structure, brain function, and behavior into a classification of psychiatric disorders based on etiology and pathophysiology.
|
|
"a behavioral or psychological syndrome that reflects an underlying psychobiological dysfunction."
|
|
"Mental disorders are biological disorders involving brain circuits that implicate specific domains of cognition, emotion, or behavior"
|
It’s a pretty strange story line if they want to sell their DSM-5 to anyone other than like-minded psychiatrists. And it leaves them high and dry as they’ve based their raison d’être on new biological treatments [drugs]. The reaction of other mental health professionals was civil, but hardly supportive. They’re the ones poised to boycott the DSM-5.
The reason this came to mind [other than Insel's RDoC assumptions] was my recent reading about Emil Kraepelin [all ears…, an open question…]. I won’t rehash all of his comments, they’re there to read. But I think he would’ve eliminated the patients we might have considered neurotic or personality disordered from the domain of mental illness altogether – seeing them as more constitutionally defective, particularly in his 1919 paper entitled ‘Psychiatric observations on contemporary issues.’ It was an extremist right-wing view of the kind still debated on our Capital steps today – only Kraepelin’s version had rough the edge that dominated the German Nationalism of that era: Jews, women, soldiers on disability, criminals, neurotics? It’s a common enough attitude even today, but doesn’t have so open an expression as it did 100 years ago in Germany. Kraepelin certainly had nothing to say good about Freud.
Kraepelin didn’t seem to have those kinds of opinions of the institutionalized psychiatric patients of his day. As I wrote that last sentence, I was thinking about patients with the Functional Psychoses like Schizophrenia, Manic Depressive Insanity, and Melancholia. But those weren’t the majority of the patients in the Institutions where he worked – outnumbered by patients with complications of Syphilis and Alcoholism. From
Shepherd:
Basing his stand on his extensive experience of institutional psychiatry, he expressed himself forcibly on the prevention of alcoholism and syphilis, two of the indisputable causes of severe psychosis. In 1895 he advocated total abstinence from alcohol and thenceforward was a tireless, even a fanatical supporter of anti-alcohol campaigns…
"Attention must be focused above all on the fight against all those influences threatening to destroy future generations, in particular hereditary degeneration and genetic influences resulting from alcohol and syphilis"…
I’ve wandered a bit, so to return to the thread, Emil Kraepelin did not see the patients that were then called neurotic as being among the mentally ill. He viewed them as having a "congenitally inferior predisposition." Such patients didn’t make it into his classifications because he didn’t see them as mentally ill. A biologic cause was a requirement to be classified as having a mental disorder. And that’s where the NeoKraepelinians started in the 1970s: "The focus of psychiatric physicians should be on the biological aspects of illness." And for the DSM-5 Task Force: "a behavioral or psychological syndrome that reflects an underlying psychobiological dysfunction." And that’s where Dr. Insel lives: "Mental disorders are biological disorders involving brain circuits that implicate specific domains of cognition, emotion, or behavior." But I believed what Dr. Spitzer said in the DSM-III. I think he believed it too, at least I hope he did: "Undoubtedly, with time, some of the disorders of unknown etiology will be found to have specific biological etiologies, others to have specific psychological causes, and still others to result mainly from a particular interplay of psychological, social, and biological factors." But I don’t think many did. It was window dressing.
That a biologic cause was a requirement to be classified as having a mental disorder helps make sense out of things I haven’t understood. PTSD is the paradigm for an acquired mental illness, yet the literature is full of studies looking for a biological predisposition, some genetic flaw. They were traumatized because they didn’t have something called resiliency. Now, they can’t even leave grief alone. It’s about to be pulled into the world of Major Depression. And if there’s no fit between the biology and the taxonomy, then they’ll go find another taxonomy [the RDoC] – bring the diagnosis to the biomarker rather than the other way around.
I ended an open question… with: "But did Kraepelin’s notion of constitutional inferiority impact his legacy? our current nosology? I don’t know the answer to that and it’s the worst of things for idle speculation. It is an open question." The more I read about Kraepelin, the Social Darwinism of that period, the Eugenics Movement, etc., the more I think his sociopolitical view of people did color his taxonomy and his view of neurotic illness as constitutional weakness. Whether that has transferred up the historical chain is unclear, even if the opinion has stayed the same. But I do wonder how widespread that view is today?
I’ve said this in a variety of ways before, but while we obsess about reliability, and the longed for validity, there is one parameter in this equation that isn’t discussed enough – legitimacy. In Kraepelin’s world, neurotic illness was simply not legitimate…