1 Boring Old Man

^{The decision not to deploy American forces to go after bin Laden or block his escape was made by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his top commander, Gen. Tommy Franks, the architects of the unconventional Afghan battle plan known as Operation Enduring Freedom. Rumsfeld said at the time that he was concerned that too many U.S. troops in Afghanistan would create an anti-American backlash and fuel a widespread insurgency. Reversing the recent American military orthodoxy known as the Powell doctrine, the Afghan model emphasized minimizing the U.S. presence by relying on small, highly mobile teams of special operations troops and CIA paramilitary operatives working with the Afghan opposition. Even when his own commanders and senior intelligence officials in Afghanistan and Washington argued for dispatching more U.S. troops, Franks refused to deviate from the plan. There were enough U.S. troops in or near Afghanistan to execute the classic sweep-and-block maneuver required to attack bin Laden and try to prevent his escape.}

^{After bin Laden’s escape, some military and intelligence analysts and the press criticized the Pentagon’s failure to mount a full-scale attack despite the tough rhetoric by President Bush. Franks, Vice President Dick Cheney and others defended the decision, arguing that the intelligence was inconclusive about the Al Qaeda leader’s location. But the review of existing literature, unclassified government records and interviews with central participants underlying this report removes any lingering doubts and makes it clear that Osama bin Laden was within our grasp at Tora Bora}

^{Reversing the recent American military orthodoxy known as the Powell doctrine, the Afghan model emphasized minimizing the U.S. presence by relying on small, highly mobile teams of special operations troops and CIA paramilitary operatives working with the Afghan opposition. Even when his own commanders and senior intelligence officials in Afghanistan and Washington argued for dispatching more U.S. troops, Franks refused to deviate from the plan. There were enough U.S. troops in or near Afghanistan to execute the classic sweep-and-block maneuver required to attack bin Laden and try to prevent his escape.}

^{On November 21, 2001, President Bush put his arm on Defense Secretary Rumsfeld as they were leaving a National Security Council meeting at the White House. ‘‘I need to see you,’’ the president said. It was 72 days after the 9/11 attacks and just a week after the fall of Kabul. But Bush already had new plans. According to Bob Woodward’s book, Plan of Attack, the president said to Rumsfeld: ‘‘What kind of a war plan do you have for Iraq? How do you feel about the war plan for Iraq?’’ Then the president told Woodward he recalled saying: ‘‘Let’s get started on this. And get Tommy Franks looking at what it would take to protect America by removing Saddam Hussein if we have to.’’ Back at the Pentagon, Rumsfeld convened a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to draft a message for Franks asking for a new assessment of a war with Iraq.}

^{In his memoir, American General, Franks later described getting the November 21 telephone call from Rumsfeld relaying the president’s orders while he was sitting in his office at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida. Franks and one of his aides were working on air support for the Afghan units being assembled to push into the mountains surrounding Tora Bora. Rumsfeld said the president wanted options for war with Iraq. Franks said the existing plan was out of date and that a new one should include lessons about precision weapons and the use of special operations forces learned in Afghanistan. ‘‘Okay, Tom,’’ Rumsfeld said, according to Franks. ‘‘Please dust it off and get back to me next week.’’ Franks described his reaction to Rumsfeld’s orders this way: ‘‘Son of a bitch. No rest for the weary.’’}

So what was my nagging thought? To paraphrase Joseph Wilson, "Based on my experience with the administration in the months leading up to the war, I have little choice but to conclude that" they thought that killing or capturing bin Laden at Tora Bora might put and end to things and undermine their excuse to invade Iraq. And while I am almost embarrassed to suggest such a paranoid thought, it’s consistent with how they operated. In fact, it’s so consistent that I believe it is the likely possibility.

"Franks and one of his aides were working on air support for the Afghan units being assembled to push into the mountains surrounding Tora Bora" when he got the call from Rumsfeld. And while that’s consistent with the notion of "small, highly mobile teams of special operations troops and CIA paramilitary operatives working with the Afghan opposition," it’s also suspect. Why else would President Bush approach his Defense Secretary in the hall after a NSC meeting [where they surely discussed Tora Bora] instead of putting his thoughts about Iraq on the agenda for the meeting? "Uh Oh. If we get bin Laden, there goes our excuse to get Hussein."

• Ignoring the loud warnings of an al Qaeda attack: I suspect a small al Qaeda attack would’ve been fine with them as an excuse to invade Iraq. While what they got [9/11] was unanticipated, they were looking for something – something more like the U.S.S. Cole.
• Allowing bin Laden to escape at Tora Bora: With bin Laden still in play, the War on Terror was living and well. Had we snagged bin Laden, I doubt they could’ve ever sold their Iraq invasion.
• Misinterpreting the Iraq prewar intelligence: That one is easy. They were combing the world for a reason to hit Iraq. What they found was super-flimsy, but you go with what you’ve got.
• Not paying attention to the war in Afghanistan: Afghanistan was never the point in the first place. There’s no oil in Afghanistan to speak of. And there weren’t many "superpower points" awarded for Afghanistan.