For example:
| THE JANUARY 18, 2010 TESTIMONY OF JOHNATHAN POWELL, PRIME MINISTER TONY BLAIR’S CHIEF OF STAFF |
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| MR JONATHAN POWELL: I think American opinion, or, rather, American policy shifted relatively gradually during that period. At the beginning, they were focused entirely on Afghanistan and the campaign in Afghanistan. By the time you get to December, you have speeches being made in the Senate calling for action on Iraq, Senators Lieberman and McCain wrote to the President demanding action on Iraq. We started sensing that something was happening. David Manning went to Washington in December and talked on Condi Rice and received assurances from her there were no immediate plans for action in Iraq, but said the administration had asked for a full review of the options before them. When he went back again in January, he again asked Condi and she said they were considering options but no plan had been made. So, really, I think it was February and March that they started to get into more concrete plans. BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Concrete plans for what? MR JONATHAN POWELL: For considering how they would actually deal with Iraq. You remember there was the State of the Union speech in which he talked about the Axis of Evil, and, again, David spoke to Condi Rice on 14 February to make sure the Americans would not plunge into any plans before the Prime Minister met the President at Crawford and received an assurance that they wouldn’t. The first facetoface encounter we had on this was with VicePresident Dick Cheney, who came to Number 10 on 1 March 2002. He was on his way for a Middle East tour and he wanted to discuss Iraq with us before he discussed it with Middle East leaders. The Prime Minister warned him of the law of unintended consequences. If you are going to deal with something like Iraq, you have to think ahead about what might happen and that you do not expect. BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: What was Dick Cheney’s view at the time? What was he proposing? MR JONATHAN POWELL: Dick Cheney was proposing to go and consult the Middle East leaders on what should be done in Iraq, to see what their tolerance would be for action. He said at the end of the meeting BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: But the action was about regime change? MR JONATHAN POWELL: The action was about yes, about replacing Saddam, and, at the end of the meeting, he said that a coalition would be nice, but not essential. |
March 2002! That was before they had even fabricated the evidence they were going to use to justify invading, before the Niger Forgeries were even around to think about. Here is a time-line from that period:
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December 18, 2001: Ibn Sheikh al-Libi captured. After being tortured, al-Libi made up stories about Al Qaeda ties to Iraq.
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December 27, 2001: Rumsfeld announces plans to hold detainees at Gitmo.
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January 20, 2002: Bybee to Abu Gonzales memo specifying that common article 3 of the Geneva Convention does not apply to “an armed conflict between a nation-state and a transnational terrorist organization.”
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January 25, 2002: Gonzales memo for Bush recommends against applying the Geneva Convention to enemy detainees.
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January 2002: Supplemental Public Affairs Guidance on Detainees affirms Geneva Convention wrt media photographs.
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February 2, 2002: William Taft argues for the application of Geneva Conventions.
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February 7, 2002: Bush memo on Geneva Conventions.
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February 12, 2002: Jessen sends paper on al Qaeda resistance capabilities to JPRA commander Randy Moulton.
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Before February 22, 2002: After the interrogation team declares al-Libi compliant, Cheney orders him to be waterboarded again.
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February 22, 2002: DIA voices doubts about al-Libi’s claims of Iraq-al Qaeda ties.
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March 28, 2002: Abu Zubaydah taken into custody.
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March 29, 2002: James Mitchell closes consulting company, Knowledge Works, in NC.
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March 31, 2002: Abu Zubaydah flown to Thailand.
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April 2002: CIA OGC lawyers begin conversations with John Bellinger and John Yoo/Jay Bybee on proposed interrogation plan for Abu Zubaydah. Bellinger briefed Condi, Hadley, and Gonzales, as well as Ashcroft and Chertoff.
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April 3, 2002: CIA officer making notes on interrogation of Abu Zubaydah.
On March 1, 2002, they had only the coerced evidence from al-Libi – aleady in doubt. Just another link in the story that the Invasion of Iraq was preconceived – facilitated by, but not caused by 9/11…
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