1 Boring Old Man

The despots of the Twentieth Century weren’t terribly different from those that came before them. Kaiser Wilhelm II, German Emperor and King of Prussia made a fine mess of things with World War I  taking his cousin-in-law Czar Nicholas II of Russia down in the process, effectively bringing the age of the Old World Monarchies to a close by the end of the war. And their successors, Adolph Hilter and Joseph Stalin, fared no better with their ideologic Dictatorships, but they sure both gave the world a run for its money in the process. The late-coming despot of the 20th Century was blowhard Saddam Hussein of Iraq, easily handled in the First Gulf War when he made his foray into Kuwait.

I suppose that that First Gulf War gave us a false sense of confidence – being such a walk in the Park compared to World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. We hadn’t yet understood the resolve of the Islamic Fundamentalists or their radical arm, Al Qaeda, under Osama Bin Laden. But the thing we had least prepared ourselves for was despotism in our own country.

If it seems a reach to call George W. Bush and Dick Cheney despots, I’d suggest you haven’t been paying attention. Sure, they went to Congress for approval of at least some of their decisions. But so did Hitler and Stalin. And like Hitler and Stalin, they had complete control over a majority in Congress which voted for their policies and programs en masse until 2006. But more than their control of the Legislative Branch, they expanded the powers of their offices beyond recognition, finding loopholes like Signing Statements to invalidate legislation they didn’t like. They exerted unprecedented authority over the Judiciary by appointments – turning the Department of Justice into the political arm of their Party. Their megalomaniacal interpretation of Executive Priviledge and War Powers just added to their concentration of power. It was a coups d’etat that used our existing agencies of government to recreate one more to their liking – again mirroring the techniques of Adolph Hilter and Joseph Stalin. They even went after the vote itself, though they’ve managed to keep most of the details under wraps. And finally, they used secrecy under the guise of National Security to over-ride basic American Principles like privacy and the Geneva Conventions. In more ways than I can ennumerate, Bush and Cheney have been despots [whether they donned the garb like their predecessors or not].

What motivates people to do such things? Or, for that matter, what motivates the financial despots like the billion dollar a year Hedge Fund Managers or a crook like Bernard Madoff to amass such an enormous amount of power? Friedrich Nietzsche actually thought that the "will to power" was a central ingredient in man’s psyche  – even more powerful than the "will to live" [survival]. For Hegel, it was the primal motivation tamed only when an individual learns that he values his life more than power – the master/slave dichotome. When one member of a fight to the death surrenders, he becomes a slave and enters into a civilized discourse with others based on trade and negotiation rather than power. And we are warned by the old saying, "absolute power corrupts, absolutely." Psychoanalysts have varied in their formulations about people driven to achieve positions of power. There have been Instinct Theories – the Aggressive Instinct – something in all of us that sounds like Nietzsche or Hegel. More recently, the hypotheses revolve around Narcissism, an overvaluing of one’s self [as, perhaps, a reaction to a private or unconscious insecurity]. These latter ideas suggest that a strong "will to power" is always pathological – something aberrant, a sickness, out of the mainstream of normal development.

If anything, the American system of government was constructed with a strong system of separation of power and checks and balances to prevent people like Bush and Cheney from taking over our country – men driven to power for its own sake. Either we’ve been lucky previously, or these men were very creative in finding ways to subvert the intent of our Founders. They changed to direction of the country with an eye on world domination, much as the despots of the last century. And, speaking of megalomania, they even wrote down what they had in mind in advance:

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

June 3, 1997

American foreign and defense policy is adrift. Conservatives have criticized the incoherent policies of the Clinton Administration. They have also resisted isolationist impulses from within their own ranks. But conservatives have not confidently advanced a strategic vision of America’s role in the world. They have not set forth guiding principles for American foreign policy. They have allowed differences over tactics to obscure potential agreement on strategic objectives. And they have not fought for a defense budget that would maintain American security and advance American interests in the new century. We aim to change this. We aim to make the case and rally support for American global leadership. As the 20th century draws to a close, the United States stands as the world’s preeminent power. Having led the West to victory in the Cold War, America faces an opportunity and a challenge: Does the United States have the vision to build upon the achievements of past decades? Does the United States have the resolve to shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests? We are in danger of squandering the opportunity and failing the challenge. We are living off the capital — both the military investments and the foreign policy achievements — built up by past administrations. Cuts in foreign affairs and defense spending, inattention to the tools of statecraft, and inconstant leadership are making it increasingly difficult to sustain American influence around the world. And the promise of short-term commercial benefits threatens to override strategic considerations. As a consequence, we are jeopardizing the nation’s ability to meet present threats and to deal with potentially greater challenges that lie ahead.   We seem to have forgotten the essential elements of the Reagan Administration’s success: a military that is strong and ready to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign policy that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States’ global responsibilities. Of course, the United States must be prudent in how it exercises its power. But we cannot safely avoid the responsibilities of global leadership or the costs that are associated with its exercise. America has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. If we shirk our responsibilities, we invite challenges to our fundamental interests. The history of the 20th century should have taught us that it is important to shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire. The history of this century should have taught us to embrace the cause of American leadership. Our aim is to remind Americans of these lessons and to draw their consequences for today. Here are four consequences: we need to increase defense spending significantly if we are to carry out our global responsibilities today and modernize our armed forces for the future; we need to strengthen our ties to democratic allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values; we need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad; we need to accept responsibility for America’s unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles. Such a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity may not be fashionable today. But it is necessary if the United States is to build on the successes of this past century and to ensure our security and our greatness in the next.

Elliott Abrams    Gary Bauer    William J. Bennett    Jeb Bush Dick Cheney    Eliot A. Cohen    Midge Decter    Paula Dobriansky    Steve Forbes Aaron Friedberg    Francis Fukuyama    Frank Gaffney    Fred C. Ikle Donald Kagan    Zalmay Khalilzad    I. Lewis Libby    Norman Podhoretz Dan Quayle    Peter W. Rodman    Stephen P. Rosen    Henry S. Rowen Donald Rumsfeld    Vin Weber    George Weigel    Paul Wolfowitz