For seven years I have remained silent about the false claims magnifying the effectiveness of the so-called enhanced interrogation techniques like waterboarding. I have spoken only in closed government hearings, as these matters were classified. But the release last week of four Justice Department memos on interrogations allows me to shed light on the story, and on some of the lessons to be learned.
One of the most striking parts of the memos is the false premises on which they are based. The first, dated August 2002, grants authorization to use harsh interrogation techniques on a high-ranking terrorist, Abu Zubaydah, on the grounds that previous methods hadn’t been working. The next three memos cite the successes of those methods as a justification for their continued use.
It is inaccurate, however, to say that Abu Zubaydah had been uncooperative. Along with another F.B.I. agent, and with several C.I.A. officers present, I questioned him from March to June 2002, before the harsh techniques were introduced later in August. Under traditional interrogation methods, he provided us with important actionable intelligence.
We discovered, for example, that Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. Abu Zubaydah also told us about Jose Padilla, the so-called dirty bomber. This experience fit what I had found throughout my counterterrorism career: traditional interrogation techniques are successful in identifying operatives, uncovering plots and saving lives.
There was no actionable intelligence gained from using enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah that wasn’t, or couldn’t have been, gained from regular tactics. In addition, I saw that using these alternative methods on other terrorists backfired on more than a few occasions — all of which are still classified. The short sightedness behind the use of these techniques ignored the unreliability of the methods, the nature of the threat, the mentality and modus operandi of the terrorists, and due process.
Defenders of these techniques have claimed that they got Abu Zubaydah to give up information leading to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, a top aide to Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, and Mr. Padilla. This is false. The information that led to Mr. Shibh’s capture came primarily from a different terrorist operative who was interviewed using traditional methods…
The debate after the release of these memos has centered on whether C.I.A. officials should be prosecuted for their role in harsh interrogation techniques. That would be a mistake. Almost all the agency officials I worked with on these issues were good people who felt as I did about the use of enhanced techniques: it is un-American, ineffective and harmful to our national security…
My reason for not thinking that the "torture worked" argument matters very much is that it’s an obvious evasion of our questions. When someone is saying that "it wasn’t torture" and that "the torture worked" at the same time, there’s something very wrong. Even more absurd, Cheney argues that there’s still a threat, so we should keep Dick Cheney is playing with fire. There are lots of Ali Soufans out there who have plenty to say about all of this, and Cheney staying in the public spotlight is going to bring them out into the open [where they belong]. Remember how we felt in that Hearing when James Comey told his story about the late night attempt to get the delirious John Ashcroft to sign off on extending their secret programs? Remember Harry Markopolos testifying about the S.E.C. in the Madoff Hearings? We believe those guys. If Ali Soufan gets on the stand, we’ll have a similar reaction. Right now, Cheney is blowing it like Joseph McCarthy blew it in the 50’s. He doesn’t know when to stop.
Check out Paul Krugman’s op-ed, it’s a very liberating read and 99% of the comments are too.
The other disconnect in their faux-reasoning is to claim, on the one hand, that waterboarding isn’t really torture because we do it to our own military in training; and on the other hand it is so bad that it breaks prisoners and gets results.
How can it be “not so bad” and “it works” at the same time?
A courageous patriot, Air Force Reserve Colonel Steven Kleinman was interviewed on NPR. His dad was a POW during the last World War and the target of “reprehensible” treatment. Col. Kleinman is himself an experienced intelligence officer and was sent to Iraq on that account. Among other things, he pulled rank and caused certain interrogations to be ended. He informed underlings and his superior officers of violations of Geneva Convention. He became the “most unpopular officer” in Iraq and even endured veiled threats to his life and safety.
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103421778
Bottom line from Col. Kleinman’s point of view is that the tactics we are all pondering on these past days don’t work worth a tinker’s damn from an intelligence perspective.