COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
By John F. Kerry
NOVEMBER 30, 2009
Removing the Al Qaeda leader from the battlefield eight years ago would not have eliminated the worldwide extremist threat. But the decisions that opened the door for his escape to Pakistan allowed bin Laden to emerge as a potent symbolic figure who continues to attract a steady flow of money and inspire fanatics worldwide. The failure to finish the job represents a lost opportunity that forever altered the course of the conflict in Afghanistan and the future of international terrorism, leaving the American people more vulnerable to terrorism, laying the foundation for today’s protracted Afghan insurgency and inflaming the internal strife now endangering Pakistan…
This failure and its enormous consequences were not inevitable. By early December 2001, Bin Laden’s world had shrunk to a complex of caves and tunnels carved into a mountainous section of eastern Afghanistan known as Tora Bora. Cornered in some of the most forbidding terrain on earth, he and several hundred of his men, the largest concentration of Al Qaeda fighters of the war, endured relentless pounding by American aircraft, as many as 100 air strikes a day. One 15,000-pound bomb, so huge it had to be rolled out the back of a C-130 cargo plane, shook the mountains for miles. It seemed only a matter of time before U.S. troops and their Afghan allies overran the remnants of Al Qaeda hunkered down in the thin, cold air at 14,000 feet.
The decision not to deploy American forces to go after bin Laden or block his escape was made by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and his top commander, Gen. Tommy Franks, the architects of the unconventional Afghan battle plan known as Operation Enduring Freedom. Rumsfeld said at the time that he was concerned that too many U.S. troops in Afghanistan would create an anti-American backlash and fuel a widespread insurgency. Reversing the recent American military orthodoxy known as the Powell doctrine, the Afghan model emphasized minimizing the U.S. presence by relying on small, highly mobile teams of special operations troops and CIA paramilitary operatives working with the Afghan opposition. Even when his own commanders and senior intelligence officials in Afghanistan and Washington argued for dispatching more U.S. troops, Franks refused to deviate from the plan. There were enough U.S. troops in or near Afghanistan to execute the classic sweep-and-block maneuver required to attack bin Laden and try to prevent his escape. It would have been a dangerous fight across treacherous terrain, and the injection of more U.S. troops and the resulting casualties would have contradicted the risk-averse, ‘‘light footprint’’ model formulated by Rumsfeld and Franks. But commanders on the scene and elsewhere in Afghanistan argued that the risks were worth the reward.
According to Bob Woodward’s book, Plan of Attack, the president said to Rumsfeld: ‘‘What kind of a war plan do you have for Iraq? How do you feel about the war plan for Iraq?’’ Then the president told Woodward he recalled saying: ‘‘Let’s get started on this. And get Tommy Franks looking at what it would take to protect America by removing Saddam Hussein if we have to.’’ Back at the Pentagon, Rumsfeld convened a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to draft a message for Franks asking for a new assessment of a war with Iraq. The existing operations plan had been created in 1998 and it hinged on assembling the kind of massive international coalition used in Desert Storm in 1991.
In his memoir, American General, Franks later described getting the November 21 telephone call from Rumsfeld relaying the president’s orders while he was sitting in his office at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida. Franks and one of his aides were working on air support for the Afghan units being assembled to push into the mountains surrounding Tora Bora. Rumsfeld said the president wanted options for war with Iraq. Franks said the existing plan was out of date and that a new one should include lessons about precision weapons and the use of special operations forces learned in Afghanistan.
Looking back on Iraq and our invasion allows us to see what a non-danger Saddam Hussein really was. We knew that already after the Gulf War when we routed him in a short time in the 1990-1991 Desert Storm operation. Why they were so insistent on invading Iraq again remains obscure: oil exploration? to assert the U.S. as the sole superpower? paranoia? so little Bush could be like big Bush? Whatever the thinking, they radicalized a force in Iraq unlike anything Hussein could’ve ever mustered. History screams that invading Iraq was a mistake in its own right. Now Kerry’s Report makes it clear that the focus on Iraq probably colored Rumsfeld’s decision at Tora Bora, multiplying the damage. And we already know that the focus on invading Iraq [that antedated Bush and Cheney’s inauguration] was the nidus for an even earlier mistake – ignoring al Qaeda in the days before 9/11 in spite of insistent warnings from the C.I.A. and Richard Clarke. And we further realize now that the problem of the isurgency in Iraq has preoccupied us for years, leading us to make yet another bad call – allowing the War in Afghanistan to smolder on the back burner [underfunded and undermanned] while the Taliban regrouped in Pakistan and returned with a vengeance. It’s hard to imagine a bigger tangle. The preconceived Project for the New American Century plan to invade Iraq and effect the beloved "Regime Change" has distorted rational thought from the start – resulting in a cascade of misadventures stretching back over more than a decade.
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