Often when one sees a person who is in some kind of acute emotional crisis and you try to take a history about what was going on around the time things began to happen, you run into a brick wall. You know something must’ve happened in their life that set things off, but they resist exploration of the period – often angrily. They want to deal with their current emotional turmoil as if it has no story. Usually, fighting the good fight against the their resistance leads to some conflict that they found unresolvable at the time, one they may not have even registered consciously.
Looking at the time line of the lead-up to the Invasion of Iraq, it appears to me that this same principle applies to international politics as well [US Congressional/DoJ Actions in blue]:
| 09/14/2002 | BUSH’s SPEECH AT THE UN |
| President Bush accuses Iraq of ignoring the previous 16 UN Resolutions of the UN requiring inspections of his weapons programs and says that Saddam Hussein has begun producing weapons of mass destruction again. | |
| 10/02/2002 | US CONGRESS: AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ |
| 10/23/2002 | OLC DOJ: AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT UNDER DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW TO USE MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ |
| The President possesses constitutional authority to use military force against Iraq to protect United States national interests. This independent constitutional authority is supplemented by congressional authorization in the form of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution. Using force against Iraq would be consistent with international law because it would be authorized by the United Nations Security Council or would be justified as anticipatory self-defense. | |
| 11/08/2002 | UNSR 1441 |
| The UN Security Council unanimously passes this "last chance" resolution demanding that Iraq comply with international monitoring of his military programs with inspections. |
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| 11/08/2002 | OLC DOJ: EFFECT OF A RECENT UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW TO USE MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ |
| United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 does not alter the legal authority, under international law, granted by existing U.N. Security Council resolutions to use force against Iraq. | |
| 11/27/2002 | INSPECTIONS RESUME |
| Hussein reluctantly agrees and the inspectors return to Iraq for the first time since being expelled. |
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| 12/–/2002 | IRAQ’s REPORT |
| Iraq submits a 12000 page inventory of its weaponry to the UN. |
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| 12/07/2002 | OLC DOJ: WHETHER FALSE STATEMENTS OR OMISSIONS IN IRAQ’S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION DECLARATION WOULD CONSTITUTE A “FURTHER MATERIAL BREACH” UNDER U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1441 |
| False statements or omissions in Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction declaration would by themselves constitute a “further material breach” of United Nations Security Counsel Resolution 1441. | |
| 12/19/2002 | POWELL RESPONDS |
| Powell complains that the Iraq Report is fraudulent and declares that Iraq has committed a "material breach" in lying in their report. |
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| 12/20/2002 | BLIX ASKS FOR OUR EVIDENCE |
| Chief Inspector Blix asks Powell for his evidence but it is not convincing. |
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| 01/27/2003 | INSPECTOR BLIX’s REPORT |
| Blix reported that Iraq had cooperated on a practical level with monitors, but had not demonstrated a "genuine acceptance" of the need to disarm unilaterally. Blix also reported the discovery of over 3,000 pages of weapons program documents in the home of an Iraqi citizen, suggesting an attempt to "hide" them from inspectors and apparently contradicting Iraq’s earlier claim that it had no further documents to provide. In addition, a total of 16 Iraqi scientists had refused to be interviewed by inspectors. | |
| 02/05/2003 | POWELL’s SPEECH AT THE UN |
| On February 5, 2003, Powell appeared before the UN to "prove" the urgency to engage a war with Iraq. Powell also claimed that Iraq harbored a terrorist network headed by al-Qaeda operative Abu Musab al-Zarqaw. Powell also showed photos of what he said was a poison and explosives training camp in northeast Iraq, operated by the group. | |
| 02/24/2003 | 2nd RESOLUTION INTRODUCED AT THE UN |
| The US and UK introduced a second resolution in the UN to find Iraq out of compliance and authorize the use of force, but withdrew it when it became clear that several permanent members of the Security Council would veto it. |
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| 03/07/2003 | INSPECTOR BLIX’s 2nd REPORT |
| "One can hardly avoid the impression that after a period of somewhat reluctant cooperation, there’s been an acceleration of initiatives from the Iraqi side since the end of January. This is welcome. But the value of these measures must be soberly judged by how many question marks they actually succeed in straightening out." | |
| 03/20/2003 | US and UK BEGIN BOMBING IRAQ |
The world was legitimately fed up with Saddam Hussein and went along with President Bush’s rejoinder to take action. His bellicosity was apparently good diplomacy at the time. Saddam Hussein grumbled but went along with things, pushing back as expected. Powell called his hand, Hans Blix called his hand, as expected.
Within a month, the US and UK introduced a resolution to find Iraq in non-compliance and the UN Security Council aligned on the other side of the fence. That’s when the opinion of Lord Goldsmith I’ve been talking about became so crucial. That’s when the US and UK went rogue and engaged in an unlawful invasion of Iraq – finding no weapons of mass destruction and no ties with al Qaeda.
What happened between Hans Blix’s First Report and the introduction of the second UN resolution that changed things so much – that turned the UN Security Council 180°? You saw it just like I did – Colin Powell’s speech to the UN. It was, at best, conjecture – more accurately, bullshit. And it was there for the world to see.
In the daylight, what this time line says makes mincemeat of Lord Goldsmith’s testimony yesterday. He says that on reflection, he came to see the first UN resolution as definitive, not requiring a second resolution. He decided that the UN Security Council had meant that if Iraq didn’t comply, force was authorized. If that were the case, why did the US and UK even introduce a second Resolution? But a more absurd argument he made was even more telling. He explained his own changing opinions based on intervening events. He talked about that a lot. And yet his decision was that the UN meant something on 11/18/2001 that was binding, and he ignored intervening events like Colin Powell’s absurd speech and the world’s awakening to the fact that we were lying through our teeth. He ignored the fact that Blix was reporting that Hussein was complying. He ignored the fact that the UN Security Council was aligned to veto the use of force, and was robbed of the chance by the US and UK withdrawing the second resolution. Intervening events were an okay reason for him to change his mind, but not for anyone else…
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[…] that the war was legal has also been summarized below [“regime change”…, impatience? imprudence? impudence?…]. I don’t want to even bother going through it again. It’s too tortured and flawed. But […]