1 Boring Old Man

^{BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Can I just come back to the specific question on Iraq because Mr Blair argued in the Commons on 18 March 2003 that there was a link between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, which constituted what he said was a fundamental assault on our way of life and that a threat of chaos from tyrannical regimes with WMD and extreme terrorist groups with the possibility of the two coming together, represented what he called a real and present danger, and he made similar points to us in his evidence to the Inquiry in January. Did you see a real and present danger of this kind coming from Iraq in 2003?}
^{RT HON GORDON BROWN MP: The evidence that we had – I met the intelligence services on a number of occasions during the course of 2002 and early 2003, and – in addition to my discussions in the Cabinet and in addition to my discussions with Tony Blair himself – I was given information by the intelligence services which led me to believe that Iraq was a threat that had to be dealt with by the actions of the international community. Of course, at all points, we wished the diplomatic route to be successful. So throughout 2002 and early 2003, we were hopeful that the diplomatic route and UNSCR 1441 and the United Nations would bring Iraq to a sense that they had to cooperate and they had to disclose as well as dismantle whatever weapons they had. But the information we had was information given to us by the intelligence authorities.}
^{BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So you would agree with Mr Straw, who, I think, told the Inquiry that the case for military action stood or fell on whether Iraq posed a threat on international peace and security by reasons of his weapons of mass destruction. Would you agree with that?}

Gordon Brown’s predecessor, Tony Blair, is an impassioned man who was dramatic in his testimony, and justified the Invasion of Iraq based on the real threat of WMD’s, though he cryptically said in an interview he would have supported an invasion if he’d known they weren’t there. Later, he wouldn’t be pinned down on that point. In contrast, Gordon Brown is as flat as a pancake with a deep, mumbling voice. Notice that he’s not so focused on the WMD’s, but rather keys in on Hussein’s defiance.  His answers are more measured and thoughtful than Blair’s, more focused on the future of the world, less alarmist about hypothetical apocolyptics. When Baroness Prashar pushes the real and present danger question, he answers:

^{RT HON GORDON BROWN MP: My thesis is this: that persistently Iraq had been asked by the international community to disclose and then dismantle weapons that every country who signed that United Nations Resolution believed that they had; that we had a responsibility to ensure that international law in this case was upheld and the international community would mean very little if we could not, in the case of a country that had systematically — was, in fact, a serial violator of international law — we would have no sense that the political will would be there for future interventions which might be necessary, if we could not show that we could come together to deal with the problem of Iraq. But, of course, what we wanted was a diplomatic route to succeed. And right up to the last minute and right up to the last weekend, I think many of us were hopeful that that diplomatic route could succeed.}
^{BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: So your concern was mainly about the breach of the United Nations Resolutions. It was defiance by Saddam Hussein of those resolutions that you felt was a reason to invade —}
^{RT HON GORDON BROWN MP: Yes, my view has always been, throughout this episode, that the sanctions and then the No Fly Zones and then the tightening of sanctions and then, of course, the demand that Iraq disclose to the international community what it had and what it was doing, this was all about the implementation of a new international set of rules that were necessary in a post-Cold War world; that we had already seen how much instability could be caused by individual states that were either failed states or rogue states, as well as seeing the effect of terrorism and the action of non-state actors in terrorism; that we had essentially failed in Rwanda to take action where it was necessary; we had tried hard in the Balkans to take action that was required; but 14 resolutions of the United Nations had been systematically violated and ignored by Iraq and it was our responsibility to make sure that the international order could work for the future.}

So what’s the flaw in the thinking? He says, "So throughout 2002 and early 2003, we were hopeful that the diplomatic route and UNSCR 1441 and the United Nations would bring Iraq to a sense that they had to cooperate and they had to disclose as well as dismantle whatever weapons they had." He goes on, "that persistently Iraq had been asked by the international community to disclose and then dismantle weapons that every country who signed that United Nations Resolution believed that they had; that we had a responsibility to ensure that international law in this case was upheld and the international community would mean very little if we could not, in the case of a country that had systematically — was, in fact, a serial violator of international law — we would have no sense that the political will would be there for future interventions which might be necessary, if we could not show that we could come together to deal with the problem of Iraq." I agree with all of that in a way. But then, if the point was to show that the world could come together and deal with Saddam Hussein, why in the hell didn’t Mr. Bush and Mr. Blair continue to work in the UN to make it happen? They were off to a great start, but then they ignored the together part.

We’d gotten the Inspectors back into Iraq. Hans Blix was bringing things under control. Under extreme pressure, the Iraqis were beginning to cooperate at last, but instead of continuing on the path Gordon Brown is laying out for us, a path to create a post-Cold War world that was an effective force in dealing with rogue nations, we went off half cocked and invaded Iraq – finding nothing and looking like impetuous fools [which we were]. It was a missed opportunity to make the UN the world policemen we need. Instead, we effectively undermined the very force we should’ve prodded into stepping up to the plate. Without the impetuousness of the neocon Bush Administration [that seemed to be in competition with the UN], this could have been a giant leap forward for the world.

^{SIR RODERIC LYNE: Yes, self-evidently, Iraq had been in  breach of these rules for many years and many UN Resolutions, as you have pointed out, and the international community had responded to that through a range of measures, which you have also referred to, sanctions, No Fly Zones, as well as active measures of deterrence, but my question was: was there a threat of aggression from Iraq that required us to take this military action?}
^{RT HON GORDON BROWN MP: I put it the other way. The diplomatic route appeared to the Cabinet to have reached a conclusion where we could not see the possibility of Saddam Hussein abiding by the rules of the international community. I come back to my original argument. For me, the issue was, we are in a post-Cold War world, we are dealing with instabilities that exist in different parts of the world. If the international community cannot cohere, then we are sending a message to other potential states and other potential aggressors that they are free to do as they will.}

^{So for me, the issue was: are we, as an international community, prepared to follow through the logic of our position, and when the diplomatic route has failed, then we have either got to show ourselves unable to take action because we can’t agree or we have got to be prepared to take the action as necessary.}

^{So for me, the issue goes back to how we, as an international community, will deal with problems where you have rogue states, where you have failed states, where you have obviously non-state actors who are terrorists. And if we cannot find a way of dealing with these problems, then the world will be a very unsafe place for the future.}

^{I am afraid this became a test of whether the international community was prepared to deal with problems in a post-Cold War world where instabilities were becoming more and more apparent.}
^{SIR RODERIC LYNE: So it was that reason rather than the threat of aggression that convinced you?}
^{RT HON GORDON BROWN MP: I have always taken the view that, if we can’t build a strong international community where people abide by the rules that are set, and if we cannot cohere to do so, then we are sending a message to other states and other countries that they are free to do as they will.}