Jonathan Steele tells us [Iraq’s missing witnesses, 2 August] that the Chilcot inquiry in its report will not be providing any definitive judgment on the legality of the Iraq war in 2003 because "it [the inquiry] is not a court of law". While it is indisputably true that any civil or criminal liability for going to war would be a matter exclusively for courts with the jurisdiction and power to determine any legal responsibility, the public inquiry is not debarred from stating authoritatively the status of the invasion of Iraq under international law. More specifically, the inquiry in its primary function of finding all the relevant facts must not be inhibited from doing so, even if, in its findings, it would be inferring blameworthiness on the part of any person, corporate or personal. That would be a legitimate secondary function for the inquiry.
If, for example, John Chilcot and his fellow panel members conclude that, in the weeks before the invasion, the attorney general [Peter Goldsmith QC] had unequivocally told the Blair cabinet that to go to war with Iraq would be illegal under international law without further coverage from a UN resolution, they should say so, without qualification. It would be just as important that, should they find also that between 7 and 17 March 2003 Goldsmith appeared to change his opinion and advice to cabinet, and, if so, why he did, the inquiry should say so. And they should indicate whether he was right or wrong on either occasion. Nothing along these lines would in any way constitute a usurpation of the function of any court which may or may not in the future be entrusted with the task of determining civil or criminal liability for the war. But the public interest in a thorough examination and unbiased report demands no less than a determination of legality at any stage in the process leading up to and involving the invasion.
We know that the British Cabinet knew that the US was "fixing" the intelligence to fit the WMD/al Qaeda scenario from the leaked Downing Street Memos, yet they testified as if this was a real concern. We know what the UN said in UN 1441, and we heard how they rationalized their way around it from their own mouths. We don’t need Chilcot to define the truth. Any sensible person watching could see what happened.
And we don’t need for the Chilcot panel to tell us if what they did was right or wrong. We heard them talk about it themselves, and we know it was wrong [some of them even said it]. And we learned things, like when Carne Ross told us convincingly that the sanctions were working fine before the War. There was no need to invade – we’d already succeeded. And we learned from their descriptions of the US goings on that the only slightly redeemable character was President Bush, and he didn’t go the distance. Blair talked him into the "UN route," but Bush also caved when it became apparent that the UN was not going to rubber stamp our war of aggression. We learned that the French under Chirac were sensible and opposed the invasion for all the right reasons. We learned that the UN was not being wimpy or ineffective, it was being careful and right. We saw what a diplomat was supposed to be like in the person of Hans Blix. We saw the strength of the women in their government – Elizabeth Wilmshurst, Clare Short, Baroness Manningham-Buller, panelist Baroness Usha Prashar – solid players every one.
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