An epistemological paradigm shift was called a scientific revolution by epistemologist and historian of science Thomas Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. A scientific revolution occurs, according to Kuhn, when scientists encounter anomalies which cannot be explained by the universally accepted paradigm within which scientific progress has thereto been made. The paradigm, in Kuhn’s view, is not simply the current theory, but the entire worldview in which it exists, and all of the implications which come with it. It is based on features of landscape of knowledge that scientists can identify around them. There are anomalies for all paradigms, Kuhn maintained, that are brushed away as acceptable levels of error, or simply ignored and not dealt with… Rather, according to Kuhn, anomalies have various levels of significance to the practitioners of science at the time…
When enough significant anomalies have accrued against a current paradigm, the scientific discipline is thrown into a state of crisis, according to Kuhn. During this crisis, new ideas, perhaps ones previously discarded, are tried. Eventually a new paradigm is formed, which gains its own new followers, and an intellectual "battle" takes place between the followers of the new paradigm and the hold-outs of the old paradigm… Sometimes the convincing force is just time itself and the human toll it takes, Kuhn said, using a quote from Max Planck: "a new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it." After a given discipline has changed from one paradigm to another, this is called, in Kuhn’s terminology, a scientific revolution or a paradigm shift. It is often this final conclusion, the result of the long process, that is meant when the term paradigm shift is used colloquially: simply the change of worldview, without reference to the specificities of Kuhn’s historical argument…
A common misinterpretation of paradigms is the belief that the discovery of paradigm shifts and the dynamic nature of science [with its many opportunities for subjective judgments by scientists] is a case for relativism: the view that all kinds of belief systems are equal. Kuhn vehemently denies this interpretation and states that when a scientific paradigm is replaced by a new one, albeit through a complex social process, the new one is always better, not just different. These claims of relativism are, however, tied to another claim that Kuhn does at least somewhat endorse: that the language and theories of different paradigms cannot be translated into one another or rationally evaluated against one another — that they are incommensurable.
There is no argument that the change in Psychiatry marked by the 1980 DSM-III was a dramatic paradigm shift – one that will likely be an example in some future text-book to illustrate the phenomenon. But unlike Einstein’s 1905 paper, On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies, Spitzer’s classification was hardly the final word and remains problematic even after extensive revision. The paradigm shift was actually in what it didn’t contain – psychoanalysis or any other references to the "mind." That had something to do with the classification of the Major Affective Disorders, because it required removing Depressive Neurosis, the most common diagnosis in Psychiatry prior to the DSM-III. But it doesn’t explain why the DSM-III didn’t contain the wisdom of the day which made a distinction between Melancholia [endogenous, endogenomorphic, etc.] and other less severe Depressions, since we all think they are descriptively separable on clinical grounds [it’s even in the narrative of the DSM-III]. From this footnote…
[Melancholia] A term from the past, in this manual used to indicate a typically severe form of depression that is particularly responsive to somatic therapy. The clinical features that characterize this syndrome have been referred to as "endogenous." Since the term "endogenous" implies, to many, the absence of precipitating stress, a characteristic not always associated with this syndrome, the term "endogenous" in not used in DSM-III.
… one might think they were afraid that they would be letting a little psychodynamic thinking leak in. There’s another non-explanation explanation:
For example, there has been a continuing controversy as to whether or not severe depressive disorder and mild depressive disorder differ from each other qualitatively [discontinuity between diagnostic entities] or quantitatively [a difference on a severity continuum]. The inclusion of Major Depression With and Without Melancholia as separate categories in DSM-III is justified by the clinical usefulness of the distinction. This does not imply a resolution of the controversy as to whether or not these conditions are in fact quantitatively or qualitatively different."
Throughout three revisions, Major Depression remains very close to where it started thirty years ago even though the psychoanalysis issue seems long past.
It matters for two reasons. First, they shot a number of biological researchers in the foot by essentially relegating the object of their research to a fifth digit add-on diagnosis. And second, they opened the door for drug companies to radically expand their markets for any drug they could get approved as an anti-depressant – leading to a lot of really questionable clinical trials and unethical, misleading marketing. This was an active decision over objections from people one might have thought were in the framer’s camp.
And, as I [and many before me] have mentioned, they expanded, complexified, and revised Mania diagnoses into the multiple flavors of Bipolar Disorder without reasons that have any scientific rhyme – a change that continues to confound to the present. After the DSM-III came, we went through "chemical imbalance" and "Bipolar" epidemics making it hard not to be suspicious that this was another drug promo decision. If it was on solid evidence-based grounds, that evidence hasn’t been widely disseminated.
As I mentioned in my last post, the "shifted to" paradigm relies on biology, not in the abstract but in reality – biological underpinnings to mental illnesses and biological treatments. The former are elusive and the latter… well, they haven’t worked out so well as was hoped, in spite of topping the charts in sales [being widely prescribed by non-psychiatrists]. And the new paradigm requires that the leading edge be always moving forward, because anything that can be turned into a simple "algorithm" can [and will] be done by primary care physicians.
So maybe the framers of the DSM-III had no intention of ushering in an era of increasingly corrupt and/or trivial science, but they facilitated that development by restricting the psychiatric paradigm to biology and counting on a steady stream of scientific discoveries to carry the day. And maybe they enabled the development of the whole Clinical Research Industry that specializes in finding its "evidence" in large studies with small differences [resulting in small efficacy in the pill bottle]. And maybe they pushed psychiatrists into an alliance with the pharmaceutical industry because that’s where the necessary biological treatments usually originate. And perhaps the proliferation of flim-flam men in high places [KOLs] in psychiatry has something to do with needing people with the charisma to "keep the dream alive." And worst of all, maybe the emphasis on keeping the new treatments flowing and the high premium on "translational science" [speeding up the movement from bench to the drugstore] has been at the expense of encouraging and developing careful and creative researchers who would best be left alone to move in their own directions at their own pace.
It’s obviously time for another shift in psychiatry. But this time, it’s not some change in scientific paradigm or ideology. It’s time for a renewed focus on the people who seek our help and their individual illnesses, along with a commitment to the time honored ethical stance of medicine which too many of us have abandoned. That includes a clean and amicable break with the pharmaceutical and device industry. The marriage was doomed from the start. It was more like incest – taboo for good reason…
The hubris of Spitzer and his group who authored DSM-III lay precisely in their conceit that they had effected a paradigm shift. The essential model they adopted was already 10 years old when DSM-III appeared – it was the model of the Feighner (Washington University, St. Louis) Diagnostic Criteria.
It can hardly be said that things got better with DSM-III, either for clinical management or for clinical research. Thus, Kuhn’s criterion was never met by DSM-III. Clinical diagnosis became a quagmire of undifferentiated depressive complaints, with no guidance for selecting treatment approaches. Clinical research took a path that ended in the wasteful and fruitless aberrations of STAR*D and CO-MED on the one hand and in the degeneration of the clinical trials industry on the other hand.
To repeat, Spitzer and the American Psychiatric Association have a lot to answer for. For that matter, so does NIMH under its current and former directors.
I think that’s correct [the part about the paradigm shift]. The actual shift they effected or at least verified was “psychiatry is not psychoanalysis.” Rather than produce a diagnostic classification that allowed for the emergence of a new paradigm or set of paradigms, they chose one that was idiosyncratic and expelled almost everyone else as well. I don’t actually understand how that happened. Were the Saint Louis people the only ones with an alternative? I doubt that. Was Spitzer a devotee? None of that is yet clear to me. But I accept that the “shift” in 1980 was a shift away from something, not to a spontaneously emerging alternative. Were the analysts really that powerful back then? I wasn’t yet there enough at the time to know the answer…