DSM 5 Against Everyone Else
Its Research Types Just Don’t Understand The Clinical World
DSM5 in Distress: Psychology Today
by Allen J. Frances, M.D.
November 1, 2011
…Strikingly, there seems to be virtually no support for DSM 5 outside the very narrow circle of the several hundred experts who have created it and the leadership of the American Psychiatric Association [APA] which stands to reap large profits from its publication. There is no group and precious few individuals outside of APA who have anything good to say about DSM 5. And even within the DSM 5 work groups and the APA governance structures, there is widespread discontent with the process and considerable disagreement about the product…
There is obviously a huge, growing, and so far totally unbridgeable gulf between the researchers who have prepared DSM 5 and the clinicians who will have to use it. The experts, if they see patients at all, tend to do so only in the ivory tower of university research clinics. Clinicians have to apply the DSM under more difficult real life circumstances and often have a much clearer understanding of how it can be misused – with loose diagnosis often leading to excessive use of medication…
The experts are well intentioned and are making very bad decisions for the purest of reasons. Their conflict of interest is purely intellectual, not financial. Experts overvalue their pet diagnoses and their own research – and greatly underappreciate how an idea that works well in their own research setting may be disastrously misunderstood and misused in clinical practice…
If DSM 5 remains at war with its users, it won’t be used. Why buy an expensive book if it is likely to be more harmful than helpful when the official ICD-10-CM codes will be freely available on the internet. DSM 5′ s stubborn refusal to abandon risky suggestions is a foolish gamble not only for clinicians and patients, but also with its own future.
So far, opposition to DSM 5 has been expressed by the following organizations: British Psychological Society; American Counseling Association; Society for Humanistic Psychology [APA Division 32]; Society for Community Research and Action: Division of Community Psychology [APA Division 27]; Society for Group Psychology & Psychotherapy[ APA Division 49]; Developmental Psychology [APA Division 7]; UK Council for Psychotherapy; Association for Women in Psychology; Constructivist Psychology Network; Society for Descriptive Psychology; and the Society of Indian Psychologists.
The users are more than 500,000 thousand mental heath clinicians [and probably, on an occasional basis, about an equal number of primary care physicians]. Of the mental health workers, about 202,000 are social workers; 120,000 are mental health counselors; 93,000 are psychologists; 75,000 are psychiatric nurses; 55,000 are marriage & family therapists; 38,000 are psychiatrists; and an unknown additional number are occupational therapists, educators, experts in forensics, researchers etc.
Neuroscience, Clinical Evidence, and the Future of Psychiatric Classification in DSM-5
by David J. Kupfer, M.D. and Darrel A. Regier, M.D., M.P.H.
American Journal of Psychiatry 2011 168:672-674.In the initial stages of development of the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,we expected that some of the limitations of the current psychiatric diagnostic criteria and taxonomy would be mitigated by the integration of validators derived from scientific advances in the last few decades. Throughout the last 25 years of psychiatric research, findings from genetics, neuroimaging, cognitive science, and pathophysiology have yielded important insights into diagnosis and treatment approaches for some debilitating mental disorders, including depression, schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder. In A Research Agenda for DSM-V, we anticipated that these emerging diagnostic and treatment advances would impact the diagnosis and classification of mental disorders faster than what has actually occurred…
The seminal article by Robins and Guze on diagnostic validity, which proposed a classification of psychiatric illnesses based not on psychodynamic, a priori hypotheses but rather on external, empirical indicators, built a direct pathway to DSM-III. Their proposed classification steps included identifying core clinical features, conducting differential diagnosis to separate the condition from similar disorders, gathering laboratory data, assessing temporal stability of the diagnosis, and determining familial aggregation of the disorder. The resultant explicit criteria featured in DSM-III and subsequent editions have significantly improved our understanding of psychiatric disorders, but they did not come without a price. While diagnostic reliability has thrived, large-scale epidemiological studies have underscored the inefficiency of DSM’s criteria in accurately differentiating diagnostic syndromes, especially in community samples. With reification of the criteria through revised editions of DSM-III-R and DSM-IV, proliferation of diagnostic comorbidities and overreliance on the "not otherwise specified" category have continued…
I agree with the idea of "a classification of psychiatric illnesses based not on psychodynamic, a priori hypotheses." Unfortunately, in the DSM-III, they didn’t just throw out psychoanalytic theories, they threw out a psychodynamic thread in psychiatry that belonged to psychiatry itself, not psychoanalysis. It was a rich tradition that the analysts certainly influenced, but so did Adolf Meyer, Harry Stack Sullivan and countless others who taught us how to talk with and listen to our patients [no apologies for the influence of the analysts intended]. So, the framers of the DSM-III threw out psychodynamic psychiatry too – the baby with the bathwater. In fact, they essentially threw out "the mind" altogether. That was a huge mistake – probably an irredeemable mistake. And they said they created "a classification of psychiatric illnesses based not on psychodynamic, a priori hypotheses but rather on external, empirical indicators," but that’s not true either. They created a classification based on another "a priori hypotheses," that all mental illness is biologic. It would’ve been okay for them to say all mental illness that psychiatrists are going to treat is biological. Or it would’ve been fine for them to say that our classification was only going to include known or suspected biological conditions [it would’ve been a very small book]. They said neither. They tried to hold on to the whole ball of wax. So they talked "external, empirical indicators" but lived biology, and they preached evidence-based medicine but practiced expert opinion [or at least the opinion of declared experts].
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"The users are more than 500,000 thousand mental heath clinicians [and probably, on an occasional basis, about an equal number of primary care physicians]" = 500,000 to 1,000,000
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"38,000 are psychiatrists" = 38,000
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ergo 38,000/500,000 = 7.6%
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ergo 38,000/1,000,000 = 3.8%
Finally, Dr. Frances opened his commentary with the statement, “We should begin with full disclosure.” It is unfortunate that Dr. Frances failed to take this statement to heart when he did not disclose his continued financial interests in several publications based on DSM-IV. Only with this information could the reader make a full assessment of his critiques of a new and different DSM-V. Both Dr. Frances and Dr. Spitzer have more than a personal “pride of authorship” interest in preserving the DSM-IV and its related case book and study products. Both continue to receive royalties on DSM-IV associated products. The fact that Dr. Frances was informed at the APA Annual Meeting last month that subsequent editions of his DSM-IV associated products would cease when the new edition is finalized, should be considered when evaluating his critique and its timing.
That attempt by Alan Schatzberg, James Scully, Darrel Regier and David Kupfer to smear Allen Frances was not just contemptible – it was stupid.
In this new defense of DSM-5, Darrel Regier and David Kupfer trot out the tired trope that DSM-III was modeled on the classic Robins-Guze elements of psychiatric diagnosis. Would that it had been! The fact of the matter is that DSM-III and DSM-IV consciously rejected key elements of the Robins-Guze proposal. Only two of the five key elements of Robins-Guze can be found in the DSM-III-IV criteria for, say, major depressive disorder: they are clinical description and delimitation from other disorders. What’s missing is any mention of laboratory variables or course of illness or family history. As for external, empirical indicators, where are they, exactly? All that’s there are subjectively reported symptoms and a few observable signs jumbled up without linking constructs in a disjunctive diagnostic menu.
No wonder clinicians are leery of all the DSMs. As things stand clinicians are prohibited from factoring in an elephant in the living room like past episodes that required ECT when they are assessing a depressed patient. They are not allowed to give diagnostic weight to a loaded family history of bipolar disorder when evaluating a depressed patient. I recall being stupefied when Robert Spitzer told me during the run-up to DSM-III that he could not allow family history to be included among the diagnostic criteria because that would preclude genetic studies of major depression.
When DSM-III appeared there was a good deal of hand waving by Gerald Klerman and Robert Spitzer and Melvin Sabshin at the APA to the effect that DSM-III proposals were simply hypotheses to be tested. The worth of those assurances quickly became evident when we saw the rush to methodologic imperialism in the wake of DSM-III. The fear is that something equally unfortunate will happen when DSM-5 comes along. When there is premature closure, as happened after DSM-III, then we don’t learn anything.
There are many different kinds of not listening. I agree with Dr. Carroll, one of the places they haven’t listened is in their chronically unchanged way of dealing with the many forms of depression. It’s hard for me not to see their resistance to some kind of rational parsing of depression as keeping the target broad for the antidepressant salesmen. I can’t know that, but I just can’t come up with any other reason that makes any sense. It’s not that they haven’t been told…
I admire the articulateness of Allen Frances’s many critiques of the draft DSM-V. As the editor of DSM-IV he might be considered a bit of a gored ox; yet this is really beside the point. For all his shrewdness, Dr Frances and other critics miss one key point in their critiques of the draft DSM-V: It is not just that many of the proposed new diagnoses such as “psychosis risk” are bad ideas. It is that the diagnoses at the very core of the DSM system themselves are artifacts and urgently need to be revised or discarded. In the world of natural illness entities, there is no such thing as schizophrenia as a unitary disease. Nor is there a separate disease called “bipolar disorder.” Nor is there a real entity called major depression. All are made-up diagnoses and in no way correspond to “cutting Nature at the joints,” the supposed objective of the DSM-III Task Force many years ago. So Frances’s critical comments are true, but largely irrelevant to the real problem at hand: getting into the center of the bowl of spaghetti and stirring it about, rather than merely sniping at the strands of spaghetti hanging over the side. There is obviously no possibility of this happening under the current Task Force, a big defeat for those who believe that psychiatric disease-classification has scientific aspects.
Edward (Ned) Shorter
I was on DSM 3 task force–there was no specific anti-psychoanalytic animus-in fact two eminent analysts were specifically invited to attend meetings and contribute-did not work–the hurdle was making diagnoses that did not use unsubstantiated etiological theory. that applied to many promulgated theories-not just analysis.
Carroll’s points are well taken. We had large arguments re including treatment response as guide to DX and Rx. The argument was that DSM was not an encompassing psychiatric textbook and clinicians should be broadly informed.
As i recall the point of the Robins Guze article was that schizophrenia should be divided into good and poor pre-morbid,which has not happened .
Shorter’s point that our DXS are constructs is correct but so what? What are the alternatives?
Don Klein
RE – Shorter’s point that our DXS are constructs is correct but so what? What are the alternatives?
Radical behaviorism has been refined and developed since Skinners time. Now known as Functional Contextualism, and overcoming the hurdle of language and cognition with Relational Frame Theory, it may be that a comprehensive and rigorous Science of Behavior is possible. Please see http://www.contextualpsychology.org and http://www.mindfulnessfortwo.com – this latter site about a book which lays out just such an alternative diagnostic framework. An exciting time for science and human behavior.
Thanks enormously for this blog and comments, and best wishes to all.
Rob Purssey
Functional Contextual Psychiatrist
Brisbane, Australia
http://www.mindfulpsychiatry.com.au