Mental Illness — Comprehensive Evaluation or Checklist?
by Paul R. McHugh, M.D., and Phillip R. Slavney, M.D.
New England Journal of Medicine 2012 366:1853-1855.
The debate over revising the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is of more than intramural interest, for the way in which the promised fifth edition (DSM-5) resolves the debate will shape the nature and scope of psychiatric services for years to come. Now established as the master reference work for U.S. psychiatrists, the DSM initially emerged, like the companion volume for internists, the International Classification of Diseases, with a public health interest in the incidence and prevalence of illnesses. But with its third edition in 1980, the DSM began prescribing how clinicians should identify psychiatric disorders. The editors of the DSM-III justified this move by noting that the likelihood of diagnostic agreement between any two psychiatrists about the same patient was scarcely better than that achievable by chance. They attributed much of the difficulty to sectarian discord among proponents of psychodynamic, behavioral, and neurobiologic explanations of mental illness. And they concluded that the diagnostic muddle could be cleared up if psychiatrists put aside disputes over causes and instead identified disorders by their symptoms, signs, and clinical course.The DSM-III produced a revolution in psychiatry. The manual identified every condition with lists of diagnostic criteria; its editors presumed that causes, mechanisms, and rational treatments of the conditions would emerge through investigative efforts that, supported by these reliable definitions, drew from the boundless explanatory resources of the biopsychosocial body of knowledge. Revolutions solve some problems — but usually raise others that are unintended and unexpected. The DSM revolution was no exception. The diagnostic approach based on clinical appearances, one akin to using a naturalist’s field guide, proved to be a tactical success in that it stilled sectarian conflict, but a strategic failure in that it offered no way of making sense of mental disorders — that is, no better answer to the question “What are they?” than a multitude of examples. Undeniably, the DSM-III brought some gains to psychiatric practice, including consistency of diagnosis, uniformity in therapeutic regimens, and confidence in clinical research based on the reliable inclusionary and exclusionary criteria that DSM diagnoses can provide to investigators. Many psychiatrists who recollect the discord within psychiatry before the DSM-III find these gains sufficient. In their view, the subsequent revised editions corrected the flaws that remained.
Yet the publication of a fifth revision of the DSM — now promised in 2013 — has been repeatedly postponed, mainly because fundamental problems tied to the approach of the DSM-III proved hard to solve. A most serious problem, common to field guides, is the difficulty of separating entities that are similar in appearance. For example, psychiatrists using the DSM diagnosis “major depression” tend to mingle bereaved patients with both those afflicted by classic melancholia and those demoralized by circumstances…
Many issues of concern derive from another change in practice that the DSM-III inadvertently encouraged. Its emphasis on manifestations persuaded psychiatrists to replace the thorough “bottom-up” method of diagnosis, which was based on a detailed life history, painstaking examination of mental status, and corroboration from third-party informants, with the cursory “top-down” method that relied on symptom checklists. Checklist diagnoses cost less in time and money but fail woefully to correspond with diagnoses derived from comprehensive assessments. They deprive psychiatrists of the sense that they know their patients thoroughly.
Moreover, a diagnostic category based on checklists can be promoted by industries or persons seeking to profit from marketing its recognition; indeed, pharmaceutical companies have notoriously promoted several DSM diagnoses in the categories of anxiety and depression. Together these problems expose a critical issue of design in the DSM. By forgoing thought about causation in identifying psychiatric disorders, the manual promotes a rote-driven, essentially rule-of-thumb approach to the diagnosis and treatment of patients — and there is no obvious way of escaping the practice…
Sorry, the comment form is closed at this time.