We say that the reason that new drugs are given such a generous period of patent-exclusivity is to compensate the pharmaceutical company for its long and expensive research and development process taken at great risk. But ever since the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, universities and/or their faculty can be granted unencumbered patents even if federal funding was used for research and development. Naurex was such a company that arose in the university; received grant and venture capital to develop GLYX-13; obtained the drug patent; then sold itself with the patent rights to Allergan for $560 M [well below the estimated cost of developing a new drug from scratch]. Allergan’s task is getting FDA Approval and marketing the drug at today’s inflated prices. In this increasingly common scenario, Allergan is more in the role of being a drug broker than scientific innovator or developer [or even much of a risk taker]. The government [of the people] pays part of the freight, assumes some of the risk, patents and approves the drug, and the costs [including the lobbying expenses] are rolled into the exorbitant price the people [remember them?] pay for the drug.
“The government [of the people] pays part of the freight, assumes some of the risk, patents and approves the drug, and the costs [including the lobbying expenses] are rolled into the exorbitant price the people [remember them?] pay for the drug.”
….device, treatment or therapy:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2sQ2gEX7Nfo
I suspect Bayh-Dole has also shifted university priorities toward near-term profitability and away from basic research. Over the longterm, I doubt it’s healthy for science to be steered by technology transfer offices.