{"id":2963,"date":"2009-02-25T22:57:13","date_gmt":"2009-02-26T03:57:13","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/?p=2963"},"modified":"2009-02-25T23:04:36","modified_gmt":"2009-02-26T04:04:36","slug":"an-important-article","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/2009\/02\/25\/an-important-article\/","title":{"rendered":"fraud<\/strong><\/font>…"},"content":{"rendered":"
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The Two Documents Everyone Should Read to Better Understand the Crisis<\/a><\/strong>
By William K. Black
Associate Professor, University of Missouri [Kansas City]
Senior regulator during S&L debacle<\/div>\n

As a white-collar criminologist and former financial regulator much of my research studies what causes financial markets to become profoundly dysfunctional. The FBI has been warning of an "epidemic" of mortgage fraud<\/strong><\/font> since September 2004. It also reports that lenders initiated 80% of these fraud<\/strong><\/font>s. When the person that controls a seemingly legitimate business or government agency uses it as a "weapon" to defraud<\/strong><\/font> we categorize it as a "control fraud<\/strong><\/font>"." Financial control fraud<\/strong><\/font>s’ "weapon of choice" is accounting. Control frauds cause greater financial losses than all other forms of property crime –combined. Control fraud<\/strong><\/font> epidemics can arise when financial deregulation and desupervision and perverse compensation systems create a "criminogenic environment."<\/p>\n

The FBI correctly identified the epidemic of mortgage control fraud<\/strong><\/font> at such an early point that the financial crisis could have been averted had the Bush administration acted with even minimal competence. To understand the crisis we have to focus on how the mortgage fraud<\/strong><\/font> epidemic produced widespread accounting fraud<\/strong><\/font>.<\/p>\n

Don’t ask; don’t tell: book profits, "earn" bonuses and closet your losses<\/strong><\/u><\/div>\n
The first document everyone should read is by S&P, the largest of the rating agencies. The context of the document is that a professional credit rater has told his superiors that he needs to examine the mortgage loan files to evaluate the risk of a complex financial derivative whose risk and market value depend on the credit quality of the nonprime mortgages "underlying" the derivative. A senior manager sends a blistering reply with this forceful punctuation: <\/div>\n
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    Any request for loan level tapes is TOTALLY UNREASONABLE!!! Most investors don’t have it and can’t provide it. [W]e MUST produce a credit estimate. It is your responsibility to provide those credit estimates and your responsibility to devise some method for doing so.<\/strong><\/div>\n<\/ul>\n
    Fraud<\/strong><\/font> is the principal credit risk of nonprime mortgage lending. It is impossible to detect fraud without reviewing a sample of the loan files. Paper loan files are bulky, so they are photographed and the images are stored on computer tapes. Unfortunately, "most investors" (the large commercial and investment banks that purchased nonprime loans and pooled them to create financial derivatives) did not review the loan files before purchasing nonprime loans and did not even require the lender to provide loan tapes…<\/div>\n

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    The results were disconcerting<\/strong><\/u><\/div>\n
    A rating agency (Fitch) first reviewed a small <\/em>sample of nonprime loan files after <\/em>the secondary market in nonprime loan paper collapsed and nonprime lending virtually ceased. The second document everyone should read is Fitch’s report on what they found. <\/div>\n
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      Fitch’s analysts conducted an independent analysis of these files with the benefit of the full origination and servicing files. The result of the analysis was disconcerting at best, as there was the appearance of fraud<\/strong><\/font> or misrepresentation in almost every file. Fraud<\/strong><\/font> was not only present, but, in most cases, could have been identified with adequate underwriting, quality control and fraud<\/strong><\/font> prevention tools prior to the loan funding. Fitch believes that this targeted sampling of files was sufficient to determine that inadequate underwriting controls and, therefore, fraud<\/strong><\/font> is a factor in the defaults and losses on recent vintage pools. <\/div>\n<\/ul>\n
      Fitch also explained why these forms of mortgage fraud<\/strong><\/font> cause severe losses. <\/div>\n
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        For example, for an origination program that relies on owner occupancy to offset other risk factors, a borrower fraud<\/font>ulently stating its intent to occupy will dramatically alter the probability of the loan defaulting. When this scenario happens with a borrower who purchased the property as a short-term investment, based on the anticipation that the value would increase, the layering of risk is greatly multiplied. If the same borrower also misrepresented his income, and cannot afford to pay the loan unless he successfully sells the property, the loan will almost certainly default and result in a loss, as there is no type of loss mitigation, including modification, which can rectify these issues.<\/div>\n<\/ul>\n
        The widespread claim that nonprime loan originators that sold their loans caused the crisis because they "had no skin in the game" ignores the fundamental causes. The ultra sophisticated buyers knew the originators had no skin in the game. Neoclassical economics and finance predicts that because they know that the nonprime originators have perverse incentives to sell them toxic loans they will take particular care in their due diligence to detect and block any such sales. They assuredly would never buy assets that the trade openly labeled as fraud<\/strong><\/font>ulent, after receiving FBI warnings of a fraud<\/strong><\/font> epidemic, without the taking exceptional due diligence precautions. The rating agencies’ concerns for their reputations would make them even more cautious. Real markets, however, became perverse — "due diligence" and "private market discipline" became oxymoronic…<\/div>\n
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          the FBI accurately described mortgage fraud<\/strong><\/font> as "epidemic"<\/div>\n<\/li>\n
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          nonprime lenders are overwhelmingly responsible for the epidemic<\/div>\n<\/li>\n
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          the fraud<\/strong><\/font> was so endemic that it would have been easy to spot if anyone looked<\/div>\n<\/li>\n
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          the lenders, the banks that created nonprime derivatives, the rating agencies, and the buyers all operated on a "don’t ask; don’t tell" policy<\/div>\n<\/li>\n
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          willful blindness was essential to originate, sell, pool and resell the loans<\/div>\n<\/li>\n
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          willful blindness was the pretext for not posting loss reserves<\/div>\n<\/li>\n
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          both forms of blindness made high (fictional) profits certain when the bubble was expanding rapidly and massive (real) losses certain when it collapsed<\/div>\n<\/li>\n
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          the worse the nonprime loan quality the higher the fees and interest rates, and the faster the growth in nonprime lending and pooling the greater the immediate fictional profits and (eventual) real losses<\/div>\n<\/li>\n
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          the greater the destruction of wealth, the greater the (fictional) profits, bonuses, and stock appreciation<\/div>\n<\/li>\n
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          many of the big banks are deeply insolvent due to severe credit losses<\/div>\n<\/li>\n
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          those big banks and Treasury don’t know how insolvent they are because they didn’t even have the loan files<\/div>\n<\/li>\n
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          a "stress test" can’t remedy the banks’ problem — they do not have the loan files<\/div>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/blockquote>\n
          My comments on this important article by a Senior Regulator are in the highlighting. There was nothing passive about the Sub-Prime Lending and the Housing Bubble. It was active fraud<\/strong><\/font>… <\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

          The Two Documents Everyone Should Read to Better Understand the Crisis By William K. Black Associate Professor, University of Missouri [Kansas City] Senior regulator during S&L debacle As a white-collar criminologist and former financial regulator much of my research studies what causes financial markets to become profoundly dysfunctional. The FBI has been warning of an […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_bbp_topic_count":0,"_bbp_reply_count":0,"_bbp_total_topic_count":0,"_bbp_total_reply_count":0,"_bbp_voice_count":0,"_bbp_anonymous_reply_count":0,"_bbp_forum_subforum_count":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-2963","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-politics"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2963","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2963"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2963\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2963"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2963"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2963"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}