{"id":4047,"date":"2010-04-27T23:13:27","date_gmt":"2010-04-28T03:13:27","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/?p=4047"},"modified":"2010-04-28T12:29:27","modified_gmt":"2010-04-28T16:29:27","slug":"in-big-trouble","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/2010\/04\/27\/in-big-trouble\/","title":{"rendered":"in big trouble&#8230;"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p align=\"justify\">Reading through the <a href=\"http:\/\/sec.gov\/litigation\/complaints\/2010\/comp-pr2010-59.pdf\" target=\"_blank\"><strong>SEC Filing<\/strong><\/a> against Fabrice Tourre and Goldman Sachs, it sure sounded like fraud to me. But I found this article, which fleshed out some of the legal issues in the case and made things clearer [&quot;clearer&quot; is a relative term with me when it comes to matters legal]:<\/p>\n<div align=\"center\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"410\" vspace=\"7\" height=\"230\" border=\"1\" src=\"http:\/\/files.stv.tv\/img\/articles\/173312-bank-and-i-didnt-mislead-anyone-goldmans-tourre-410x230.jpg\" \/>&nbsp;<\/div>\n<blockquote>\n<div align=\"center\"><strong><a href=\"http:\/\/www.dailyfinance.com\/story\/investing\/inside-the-secs-legal-case-against-goldman-sachs\/19443106\/?icid=sphere_blogsmith_inpage_dailyfinance\" target=\"_blank\">Inside the SEC&#8217;s Legal Case Against Goldman Sachs<\/a><br \/>     Daily Finance <\/strong><br \/>     By ABIGAIL FIELD<br \/>     04\/16\/10<\/div>\n<p align=\"justify\">&#8230;Since all of the conduct at issue involves the sale of a security  created and sold by Tourre and Goldman, the two key elements are whether  Goldman\/Tourre made material misstatements or omissions, and whether  they had sufficient intent &#8212; SEC must prove at least recklessness &#8212; to  deceive or defraud. So let&#8217;s look at what the SEC alleges. The commission alleges that Goldman\/Tourre didn&#8217;t tell investors  material information, specifically that the CDO it was selling had been  deliberately constructed out of residential mortgages backed securities  (RMBS) likely to experience &quot;credit events&quot;  (i.e., become worthless or virtually so) at the request of, and with the  active participation of, a Goldman client named Paulson  &amp; Co. That is, Goldman\/Tourre allegedly didn&#8217;t tell purchasers  of the CDO it marketed that the CDO was designed to lose value.<\/p>\n<p align=\"justify\">  What could Goldman say in return? Perhaps that Paulson and Goldman  weren&#8217;t alone in structuring the CDO. Goldman hired ACA Management LLC  (ACA) to evaluate the RMBS securities put into the CDO. Why would ACA  allow the CDO to be structured out of RMBS that were likely to  experience credit events? The problem with this defense is that the SEC alleges, and has at least  email to support it, that Goldman\/Tourre deceived ACA into thinking that  Paulson&#8217;s interests were aligned with the potential CDO investors  rather than diametrically opposed to them. ACA apparently believed that  Paulson was investing a significant amount of money in the riskiest  slice of the CDO, something that couldn&#8217;t have been further from the  truth.       <\/p>\n<div align=\"justify\">Why does the SEC claim the RMBS were chosen precisely because they were  likely to lose value?<\/div>\n<ul>\n<li>\n<div align=\"justify\">First, the SEC says Paulson approached Goldman specifically to  create a way for Paulson to bet against RMBS, meaning Paulson was  looking to make money on RMBS that lost value.<\/div>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<div align=\"justify\">Second, according to the SEC, Paulson invested in credit default  swaps (CDSs, a form of credit insurance) on the CDO it helped Goldman  issue, positioning itself to make money if the mortgage securities  underlying the CDO defaulted &#8212; those same securities that Paulson  helped select.<\/div>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<div align=\"justify\">Third, within six months of the deal closing, 83% of the  underlying securities had been downgraded, and less than a year later,  99% had.<\/div>\n<\/li>\n<li>\n<div align=\"justify\">Fourth, the complaint includes email supporting this narrative.  In all, the CDO buyers lost about $1 billion, and Paulson made about $1  billion. Goldman made $15 million.<\/div>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<div align=\"justify\">What does it mean for omitted information to be material? In 1988&#8217;s <strong><a href=\"http:\/\/supreme.justia.com\/us\/485\/224\/case.html\" target=\"_blank\"><em>Basic Inc. v.  Levinson<\/em><\/a><\/strong>, the U.S. Supreme Court explained: &quot;an omitted fact is  material if there is a substantial likelihood that its disclosure would  have been considered significant by a reasonable investor.&quot; If the SEC  really can prove that Goldman\/Tourre structured the CDO so that the CDO  would lose value, benefiting Paulson &amp; Co. &#8212; even going so far as  to allow Paulson to participate in structuring the CDO so that outcome  could be virtually assured &#8212; and if the SEC can show that  Goldman\/Tourre failed to disclose that information to investors, it&#8217;s  hard to imagine a more material omission. <\/div>\n<p>     <\/p>\n<div align=\"justify\">  The SEC has to show that Goldman\/Tourre intended to deceive, or at least  were reckless about deceiving, investors by failing to disclose the  material information. Common sense suggests the mere fact that no one  would likely buy a CDO if they knew that it had been deliberately  designed to lose value might be enough to prove that the failure to  disclose the information was a deliberate effort to deceive investors.  However, the SEC alleges more than that.&nbsp; The SEC claims that to make the CDO attractive to the market,  Goldman\/Tourre brought in ACA and deceived ACA about Paulson&#8217;s interests  in order to persuade ACA to put its name on the securities. Those  actions, if true, suggest a very deliberate effort to misrepresent the  process for selecting the underlying securities, and thus the potential  value of the CDO being sold&#8230;<\/div>\n<\/blockquote>\n<div align=\"justify\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"108\" vspace=\"3\" hspace=\"4\" height=\"81\" border=\"1\" align=\"right\" src=\"http:\/\/t3.gstatic.com\/images?q=tbn:sJyDnuVeZbqy9M:http:\/\/newsimg.bbc.co.uk\/media\/images\/47727000\/jpg\/_47727949_009183605-1.jpg\" \/>Today, there was a follow-up article by the same lawyer. It seems that Tourre&#8217;s and his pals&#8217; testimony today was under oath, so it&#8217;s relevant in the SEC case. There are a number of places where he&#8217;s in a bind, because if they can prove he or they lied today, they&#8217;ve added some perjury to the mix. It comes down to did Tourre deceive ACA about Paulsen&#8217;s going short? Tourre said, &quot;No&quot; today, but if you read the indictments, that &quot;no&quot; seems very questionable. And then there are some other inconsistencies.  <\/div>\n<blockquote>\n<div align=\"center\"><strong><a href=\"http:\/\/www.dailyfinance.com\/story\/the-impact-of-the-tourre-panel-on-the-sec-goldman-case\/19456087\/\" target=\"_blank\">The Impact of the Tourre Panel on the SEC  Goldman Case<\/a><br \/>   Daily Finance<\/strong><br \/>   By ABIGAIL FIELD<br \/>   04\/27\/10<\/div>\n<p align=\"justify\">The Securities and Exchange Commission got  some gifts from today&#8217;s grilling Fabrice Tourre. Most important for the  SEC is that everything he said was under oath. Now he&#8217;s locked into his  positions, and he made some pretty  sweeping statements. If the SEC can find documents or witnesses  that contradict <strong><a href=\"http:\/\/hsgac.senate.gov\/public\/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&#038;Hearing_id=f07ef2bf-914c-494c-aa66-27129f8e6282\" target=\"_blank\">today&#8217;s  testimony<\/a><\/strong>, the SEC gains a powerful lever in its case against  Goldman Sachs.  <\/p>\n<p align=\"justify\"><u><strong>The Risk of Testifying Under Oath<\/strong><\/u>: Tourre is at the center of <a href=\"http:\/\/sec.gov\/litigation\/complaints\/2010\/comp-pr2010-59.pdf\">the  SEC&#8217;s case<\/a>, particularly the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dailyfinance.com\/story\/investing\/inside-the-secs-legal-case-against-goldman-sachs\/19443106\/\" target=\"_blank\"><strong>allegation  that Goldman deceived ACA<\/strong> <\/a>into believing Paulson was long in the  Abacus deal instead of short. Since the issue is so crucial to the SEC&#8217;s  case, and the SEC&#8217;s complaint makes clear it thinks Tourre did the  deceiving, I can only imagine the SEC is confident in its evidence on  the point. Given that, Tourre&#8217;s money quote was: &quot;I never told ACA&#8230;  that Paulson &amp; Company&#8230; would take any long position in the  deal&#8230;. I recall informing ACA that Paulson&#8217;s fund was expected to buy  credit protection on some of the senior tranches&#8230;. This necessarily  meant that Paulson was expected to take some short exposure in the  deal.&quot; In response to Senator Coburn&#8217;s direct questions, Tourre doubled  down and insisted he never suggested that Paulson was an equity investor  and reiterated that he had communicated that Paulson was buying  protection, and thus going short.&nbsp; If the SEC really can prove Tourre deceived ACA, his testimony today  gave the SEC a powerful weapon to compel cooperation: threaten a perjury  prosecution. And if Tourre does flip, Goldman&#8217;s in trouble.<\/p>\n<p align=\"justify\"><u><strong>On the Issue of Who Chose the Abacus Securities<\/strong><\/u>: In Goldman&#8217;s public statements, Goldman has claimed that IKB, one of the  buyers of the Abacus CDO, also had input into the underlying  securities. Tourre reiterated that point in his written testimony, which  he read into the record under oath: &quot;Paulson&#8217;s fund made suggestions to  ACA, as did IKB and Goldman Sachs.&quot; Under questioning by Senator  McCaskill, however, Tourre said that IKB &quot;wasn&#8217;t in the room&quot; when  Paulson and ACA were selecting the securities for the CDO. <\/p>\n<p align=\"justify\">Exhibit 119 is perhaps a little helpful to Goldman on this issue, in  that it shows that IKB made at least one request regarding the content  of the securities portfolio &#8212; to remove securities serviced by two  particularly notorious subprime lenders &#8212; but the email suggests Tourre  was more concerned with Paulson&#8217;s view than IKB&#8217;s: &quot;&#8230;Paulson will  likely not agree to this unless we tell them nobody will buy these bonds  if we don&#8217;t make that change.&quot; A Goldman person asked Tourre what he  should tell IKB in response to its request, and Tourre replied that IKB  should be told that Goldman &quot;was taking its feedback into account and  once we have gotten more feedback from accounts across the cap structure  we will decide what the best cours[e] of action is&quot;.<\/p>\n<p align=\"justify\">In a preview of how Tourre will respond to questions about some of the  documents cited by the SEC in its complaint, Senator Levin asked Tourre  about documents in which Tourre referred to the securities as having  been chosen by &quot;ACA\/Paulson.&quot; Tourre said the documents &quot;could have been  more accurate;&quot; in the interests of speed he&#8217;d written down only  ACA\/Paulson, but he should have written ACA\/Paulson\/Goldman Sachs\/IKB.  I&#8217;m not sure a jury will find that self-serving explanation as  persuasive as a document written contemporaneously.<\/p>\n<p align=\"justify\"><strong><u>Goldman&#8217;s Common Sense Defense Further Undermined<\/u>: <\/strong>One of Goldman&#8217;s main talking points &#8212; that  it lost a lot of money on the Abacus deal and so couldn&#8217;t have been  structuring it to fail was shot down by Tourre when he conceded that  Goldman had always intended to sell the part it ended up holding on to;  that is, at the time its structured and did the deal, Goldman had no  intention of holding a long position. I wonder if, after that under oath  statement, Goldman will continue pushing this talking point. Or rather,  I wonder if journalists will let Goldman keep pushing that talking  point.<\/p>\n<p align=\"justify\"><u><strong>&quot;Ratings-Based Buyers&quot;<\/strong><\/u> <u> <strong>Undermined &quot;Big Boys&quot;  Defense<\/strong><\/u>: Goldman&#8217;s  &quot;big boys&quot; defense &#8212; the idea that IKB and ACA were sophisticated  investors who knew what they were buying with Abacus &#8212; was at least  implicitly undermined by Tourre&#8217;s comments about a proposed list of  customers to focus on in the next year to pick up additional revenue.  Tourre wrote: &quot;this list might be a little skewed towards sophisticated  hedge funds with which we should not expect to make too much money since  (a) most of the time they will be on the same side of the trade as we  will, and (b) they know exactly how things work and will not let us work  for too much $$$, vs. buy-and-hold rating-based buyers who we should be  focused on a lot more to make incremental $$$ next year &#8230;&quot;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<div align=\"justify\">  According to Tourre&#8217;s email, then, some &quot;big boy&quot; buyers relied heavily  on the ratings assigned to securities and didn&#8217;t know exactly how things  worked, and Goldman could and should exploit their weakness for profit.  Asked about the email at the hearing, Tourre predictably denied that&#8217;s  what the email meant, but again, I&#8217;m not sure a jury would find his  explanation as persuasive as his plain English email.<\/div>\n<\/blockquote>\n<div align=\"justify\">Fabrice Tourre, the central figure in this case was a 28 year old Wall Street whiz kid at the time of this billion dollar deal. In his emails to the girl back home, he seemed to be aware of his odd position. One wonders how he&#8217;s going to play out as a central figure in this little drama [his &#8216;smirk&#8217; doesn&#8217;t help]. But back to the central thread, testifying today under oath, at the least, gives the SEC a picture of how Goldman is going to play this case and a running start on how to prosecute. Not very smart. That&#8217;s pretty consistent with my impression when I watched. They seemed mighty young, a lot of them, and mighty reckless in their arrogance. It felt like they&#8217;ve lived in the rarified environment of the GS building wheeling and dealing billions, and they weren&#8217;t particularly well advised about how to act out here with the rest of us. I think this little boy might be in really big trouble&#8230;  <\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Reading through the SEC Filing against Fabrice Tourre and Goldman Sachs, it sure sounded like fraud to me. But I found this article, which fleshed out some of the legal issues in the case and made things clearer [&quot;clearer&quot; is a relative term with me when it comes to matters legal]: &nbsp; Inside the SEC&#8217;s [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_bbp_topic_count":0,"_bbp_reply_count":0,"_bbp_total_topic_count":0,"_bbp_total_reply_count":0,"_bbp_voice_count":0,"_bbp_anonymous_reply_count":0,"_bbp_forum_subforum_count":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4047","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-politics"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4047","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4047"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4047\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4047"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4047"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4047"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}