{"id":4263,"date":"2010-07-27T18:27:51","date_gmt":"2010-07-27T22:27:51","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/?p=4263"},"modified":"2010-07-27T19:23:24","modified_gmt":"2010-07-27T23:23:24","slug":"more-blix","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/2010\/07\/27\/more-blix\/","title":{"rendered":"a 1boringoldman exclusive&#8230;"},"content":{"rendered":"<div align=\"justify\">Well, since the <strong>New York Times<\/strong>, the <strong>Washington Post<\/strong>, the <strong>Huffington Post<\/strong>, <strong>Firedoglake<\/strong>, the <strong>Daily KOS<\/strong>, <strong>emptywheel<\/strong>, <strong>Raw Story<\/strong>, and <strong>Talking Points Memo<\/strong> aren&#8217;t yet mentioning <strong>Hans Blix<\/strong>&#8216;s testimony at the <strong>Chilcot Inquiry<\/strong> today, I&#8217;ll turn to the UK papers.<\/div>\n<blockquote>\n<div align=\"center\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.guardian.co.uk\/uk\/2010\/jul\/27\/hans-blix-iraq-war-inquiry\"><strong>Hans Blix: Allies used &#8216;poor&#8217; intelligence ahead of Iraq invasion<\/strong><\/a><br \/>           <sup><em>Former head of UN  weapons inspectors tells Chilcot inquiry &#8216;alarm bells&#8217; should have rung  when his staff failed to find evidence of WMD<\/em><\/sup><br \/>           <strong>guardian.co.uk<\/strong><br \/>           27 July 2010<\/p>\n<div>\n<p align=\"justify\">Britain and the US relied on dubious intelligence sources ahead of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the former head of the United Nations weapons inspectors said today. Giving evidence to the Iraq inquiry, Hans Blix  said it should have set alarm bells ringing in London and Washington  when the inspectors repeatedly failed to turn up any evidence that  Saddam Hussein still had active weapons of mass destruction programmes.<\/p>\n<p align=\"justify\">Blix said he warned the then prime minister Tony Blair  in a February 2003 meeting that Saddam Hussein might not have any  weapons of mass destruction. He told the US secretary of state,  Condoleezza Rice, the same thing. He said: <strong><font color=\"#200020\">&quot;When we reported that  we did not find any weapons of mass destruction they should have  realised, I think, both in London and in Washington, that their sources  were poor. They should have been more critical about that.&quot;<\/font><\/strong> Blix  said that he had privately confided to Blair in autumn 2002 &ndash; before the  inspectors returned to Iraq &ndash; that he thought it &quot;plausible&quot; that  Saddam had weapons of mass destruction.<\/p>\n<p align=\"justify\">However in the weeks  leading up to the invasion in March 2003 &ndash; after the inspectors had  failed to uncover anything significant &ndash; he said that he had cautioned  Blair that there might not be anything. He said that he told Blair: <strong><font color=\"#200020\">&quot;Wouldn&#8217;t it be paradoxical if you were to invade Iraq with 250,000 men and find very little?&quot; <\/font><\/strong>He added: &quot;I gave a warning that things had changed and there might not be so much&quot;&#8230;<\/p>\n<p align=\"justify\">He said that, immediately before the 2003  US-led invasion, his inspectors checked around 30 sites said by British  and US intelligence to contain weapons of mass destruction, but  discovered little more than some old missile engines and a sheaf of  nuclear documents&#8230;he said that he did not believe that Britain and the US had been  entitled to invade Iraq without a further UN security council resolution  specifically authorising military action.<\/p>\n<div align=\"justify\">He accused the administration of US president George Bush of being &quot;high on military&quot; in the wake of the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York in 2001. &quot;They felt that they could get away with it and therefore it was desirable,&quot; he said. <strong><font color=\"#200020\">He  also condemned claims by Britain and the US that Iraq had tried to  acquire raw uranium for its supposed nuclear programme from Niger, based  on a forged document. Blix said: &quot;That was perhaps the first  occasion I became suspicious about the evidence. I think that was the  most scandalous part.&quot;<\/font><\/strong><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/blockquote>\n<p>                <\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<div align=\"center\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.telegraph.co.uk\/news\/worldnews\/middleeast\/iraq\/7912684\/US-was-high-on-military-ahead-of-Iraq-war-says-Hans-Blix.html\"><strong>US was &#8216;high on military&#8217; ahead of Iraq war, says Hans Blix<\/strong><\/a><br \/>        <em><sup>The Bush administration was &quot;high on military&quot; in the months leading up to the    invasion of Iraq, former UN weapons inspector Hans Blix told the Chilcott    Inquiry.<\/sup><\/em><br \/>        <strong>telegraph.co.uk<\/strong><br \/>  27 Jul 2010         <\/div>\n<p align=\"justify\"> Dr Blix spoke of his disquiet at the US national security strategy published    in September 2002, which set out the White House&#8217;s belief in its right to    launch pre-emptive attacks. He told the official inquiry into the war against Saddam Hussein&#8217;s regime that    he was convinced a second UN resolution was needed to authorise military    action. He said: <strong><font color=\"#200020\">&quot;The US in 2002, that time you refer to, threw it [the UN    process] overboard. I think they were high on military at the time. They    said, &#8216;we can do it&#8217;.&quot;  <\/font><\/strong><\/p>\n<p align=\"justify\"> Dr Blix added that <strong><font color=\"#200020\">the progress to war with Iraq    was &quot;almost unstoppable&quot; by early 2003 and the UK was &quot;a    prisoner on that train&quot;<\/font><\/strong>. He told the inquiry: &quot;Once they went up to 250,000 men and March was    approaching, I think it was unstoppable or almost unstoppable &#8211; the (US)    president could have stopped it, but almost unstoppable.  <\/p>\n<p align=\"justify\"> &quot;After March the heat would go up in Iraq and it would be difficult to    carry out warfare.&quot; He added: &quot;The whole military timetable was, as rightly said, not in sync    with the diplomatic timetable. &quot;The diplomatic timetable would have allowed more inspections. (The) UK    wanted more inspections. The military timetable did not permit that&quot;&#8230;  <\/p>\n<div align=\"justify\"> Dr Blix said he was in favour of resolution 1441, passed on November 8 2002,    which declared Iraq in &quot;material breach&quot; of its obligations to disarm and    paved the way for the return of weapons inspectors. &quot;The declaration, I felt, might give Iraq a chance for a new start,&quot; he    said&#8230;<\/div>\n<\/blockquote>\n<div align=\"justify\">[<a href=\"http:\/\/www.iraqinquiry.org.uk\/media\/48849\/20100727pm-blix.pdf\" target=\"_blank\"><strong><font color=\"#200020\">transcript<\/font><\/strong><\/a>] Dr. Hans Blix will be 82 years old tomorrow, yet he has the mind of a quick-witted young adult. He&#8217;s playful and thoughtful, and brushes aside silly or obtuse questions. He has the air of someone who has been around for a long time and is sure of himself [I was sure of him too]. Whenever the Bush Administration or any of its members came up, he spoke of them [I think correctly] as close-minded and determined to go to war no matter what. He never mentioned Cheney or Rumsfeld. I gather that most of his dealings were with Condoleeza Rice. His one mention of John Bolton was [I think correctly] almost as a clown. He had the Bush Administration&#8217;s number and it showed in everything he said.<\/div>\n<p>     <\/p>\n<div align=\"justify\">He was more forgiving of the British and seemed to feel they were operating in good faith until the last several weeks before the invasion when he repeatedly used his locomotive metaphor, &quot;<em>the UK was a prisoner on that train<\/em>.&quot; He candidly commented about <a href=\"http:\/\/www.iraqinquiry.org.uk\/media\/48849\/20100727pm-blix.pdf\" target=\"_blank\"><strong>Lord Goldsmith&#8217;s foxhole conversion<\/strong><\/a> on the legality:<\/div>\n<blockquote>\n<div align=\"justify\"><strong>DR BLIX: <\/strong>We see how Mr Goldsmith, Lord Goldsmith now, <em>wriggled about<\/em> and how he himself very much doubted that it was adequate, but eventually said, &quot;Well, if you accumulate all these things, then that gives a plausible &#8230;&quot; &#8211; he was not quite sure that it would have stood up in an international tribunal. Most of your legal advisers did not think so either. Nevertheless he gave the green light to it.<\/div>\n<\/blockquote>\n<div align=\"justify\">He seemed to have a real understanding of Iraq. There were some things I hadn&#8217;t heard. Iraq was, in fact, in very bad shape:<\/div>\n<blockquote>\n<div align=\"justify\"><strong>DR BLIX: <\/strong>The interesting thing: was Iraq a danger in 2003? They were not a danger. They were practically prostrate and could not &#8211; it would have taken a lot of time to reconstitute by selling oil. What they got instead was a long period of anarchy. I think one conclusion I am inclined to draw is that anarchy can be worse than tyranny.<\/div>\n<\/blockquote>\n<div align=\"justify\">And one of the reasons the scientists were hesitant to talk to the inspectors was that they didn&#8217;t want Hussein to know how much they had destroyed:<\/div>\n<blockquote>\n<div align=\"justify\"><strong>DR BLIX:<\/strong> &#8230;the Iraqis apparently had destroyed anthrax and buried the remnants in a place near Saddam&#8217;s palaces. This needs to be checked but I read it somewhere. They didn&#8217;t dare to admit that this had been so close to us. So I doubt very much they would have dared to go along and fulfil that condition.   <\/p>\n<div align=\"justify\"><strong>SIR JOHN CHILCOT:<\/strong> Because they would not have dared to admit it to Saddam himself?   <\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div align=\"justify\"><strong>DR BLIX:<\/strong> Precisely, because of fear he would say, &quot;What have you been doing?&quot; That would have been hard.<\/div>\n<\/blockquote>\n<div align=\"justify\">And one of the reasons Hussein was so secretive is that he didn&#8217;t want Iran to know how vulnerable he was:  <\/div>\n<blockquote>\n<div align=\"justify\"><strong>DR BLIX:<\/strong> No, I am not convinced that Saddam had come to that decision that they would do their utmost to cooperate. He took the strategic decision in 1991 to do away with the weapons of mass destruction, the biological, chemical and the nuclear. So there was a strategic decision but he wouldn&#8217;t admit it publicly. One reason, again, the guess is he didn&#8217;t mind looking dangerous to the Iranians.  <\/div>\n<\/blockquote>\n<div align=\"justify\">And our insistence that Hussein pony up and declare his weapons wasn&#8217;t exactly easy for him:  <\/div>\n<blockquote>\n<div align=\"justify\"><strong>SIR RODERIC LYNE:<\/strong> Did you feel that it gave Iraq a realistic possibility of meeting the requirements of the resolution?<br \/>  <strong>DR BLIX:<\/strong> Yes, except that it was very hard for them to declare any weapons when they didn&#8217;t have any.  <\/div>\n<\/blockquote>\n<div align=\"justify\">But most of all &#8211; throughout Blix&#8217;s testimony, I had the feeling that he knew what our government was up to back when it was happening. He knew all of our arguments and refuted them instantly, as if it was knowledge he&#8217;s always had. He saw the objections of the Russians, the Chinese, and the French as wisdom rather than some kind of obstructionism, and it appeared as if he had thought that way at the time. He didn&#8217;t say that the Niger Forgeries were part of a trick exactly [but he came very close ]. And he seemed to think that had he had just one more months to make inspections, he would have been able to undercut the last flimsy remnants of our argument, and that&#8217;s why we went to war in March [so as not to be derailed]. I liked the fact that he avoided the term &quot;the Americans.&quot; He almost always referred to the &quot;Bush Administration,&quot; some symbolic recognition that we were being run by a cabal rather than that we are all a bunch of lunatics [at least that&#8217;s what I wanted him to think]. It seems an odd thing to say, but he sounded like a &quot;grown-up&quot; talking about the actions of a bunch of rationalizing adolescents [which he was].<\/div>\n<p>  <\/p>\n<div>Why isn&#8217;t this news in the US? Does everyone already know it? Are we so wrapped up in the Recession that we&#8217;ve forgotten the Invasion of Iraq? Are we ashamed? Or maybe tired of talking about Iraq? It strikes me as very odd. I just put Blix into Google News and found no US paper that was coveringe his testimony &#8211; not one. I guess this is a <strong>1boringoldman exclusive<\/strong>&#8230; <\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Well, since the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Huffington Post, Firedoglake, the Daily KOS, emptywheel, Raw Story, and Talking Points Memo aren&#8217;t yet mentioning Hans Blix&#8216;s testimony at the Chilcot Inquiry today, I&#8217;ll turn to the UK papers. Hans Blix: Allies used &#8216;poor&#8217; intelligence ahead of Iraq invasion Former head of UN weapons [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_bbp_topic_count":0,"_bbp_reply_count":0,"_bbp_total_topic_count":0,"_bbp_total_reply_count":0,"_bbp_voice_count":0,"_bbp_anonymous_reply_count":0,"_bbp_forum_subforum_count":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4263","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-politics"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4263","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4263"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4263\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4263"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4263"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4263"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}