{"id":4268,"date":"2010-07-28T15:28:37","date_gmt":"2010-07-28T19:28:37","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/?p=4268"},"modified":"2010-07-28T16:00:24","modified_gmt":"2010-07-28T20:00:24","slug":"4268","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/2010\/07\/28\/4268\/","title":{"rendered":"top of the list&#8230;"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p align=\"justify\">There&#8217;s an opinion piece in the Guardian written by an Iraqi living in England [<a href=\"http:\/\/www.guardian.co.uk\/commentisfree\/2010\/jul\/28\/too-late-blix-iraq-chilcot\" target=\"_blank\"><strong>Chilcot inquiry: too late, Hans Blix: too late<\/strong><\/a>] that faults <strong>Hans Blix<\/strong>, &quot;<em>Back then, he minced his words, providing enough ambiguity for Tony Blair and Jack Straw to push on with their plans to drag Britain into the US-led war.<\/em>&quot; Who knows about that? Everyone has their own perspective for assessing blame for what happened in Iraq. So where does the blame really lie? Who is at fault? Certainly not Dr. Hans Blix or the UK&#8217;s Chilcot Inquiry!                   <\/p>\n<p align=\"justify\">But one doesn&#8217;t spend time trying to partition blame unless there&#8217;s something bad wrong, and there&#8217;s no problem in this case. Almost everything is wrong, including Iraq&#8217;s existence as a state:<\/p>\n<table width=\"98%\" cellspacing=\"0\" cellpadding=\"4\" border=\"0\" align=\"center\">\n<tr>\n<td align=\"justify\"><sub> <strong>Ancient Persia<\/strong> became part of the <strong>Islamic Empire<\/strong> is the <strong><font color=\"#0000ff\">7th Century<\/font><\/strong>, was over-run by the <strong>Mongols<\/strong> in the <strong><font color=\"#0000ff\">13th Century<\/font><\/strong>, was decimated by the <strong>Black Death<\/strong> in the <strong><font color=\"#0000ff\">15th Century<\/font><\/strong>, and was rolled into the <strong>Ottoman Empire <\/strong>in the early <strong><font color=\"#0000ff\">16th Century<\/font><\/strong> where it remained until World War I. After that war, it became the <strong>State of Iraq<\/strong> in <strong><font color=\"#0000ff\">1921<\/font><\/strong> under <strong>British Mandate<\/strong> &#8211; a collection of widely differing and warring ethnic\/Religious groups [Kurds, Assyrians, Shiites, Sunnis] under the British imposed <strong>H\u00c4\u0081shimite Monarchy<\/strong>. The British promoted the minority Sunnis into positions of power. Iraq became independent in <strong><font color=\"#0000ff\">1932<\/font><\/strong>. When there was a coup in <strong><font color=\"#0000ff\">1941<\/font><\/strong>, the British invaded and restored the Monarchy, which lasted until the next coup in <strong><font color=\"#0000ff\">1958<\/font><\/strong> [<strong>Brigadier General <span class=\"mw-redirect\">Abdul Karim Qassim<\/span><\/strong>], which was removed by another in <strong><font color=\"#0000ff\">1963<\/font><\/strong> [<strong>Colonel Abdul Salam Arif<\/strong>]. Finally, the <strong><font color=\"#0000ff\">1968 <\/font><\/strong>coup by the <strong>Arab Socialist <\/strong><span class=\"mw-redirect\"><strong>Baath Party<\/strong><\/span> succeeded in establishing control over Iraq and <strong>Saddam Hussein<\/strong> became President in <strong><font color=\"#0000ff\">1979<\/font><\/strong> [by killing off his rivals]. <em>The H\u00c4\u0081shimite Monarchy persists next door in Jordon; a different version of the Baathists rule Syria; Saudi Arabia has a Sunni Monarchy; and Iran has a Shiite who-knows-what?-ocracy.<\/em><\/sub><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/table>\n<p align=\"justify\">So after their absurd history of outside interference, we can probably put Saddam Hussein next on some kind of blame list. His pugilism has been off the scale, both within Iraq and against his neighbors. But as to his danger <u>to the world<\/u> in 2003? <\/p>\n<div align=\"justify\">Dr. Blix had something to say about&nbsp; <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.iraqinquiry.org.uk\/media\/48849\/20100727pm-blix.pdf#page=92\"><strong>that question<\/strong><\/a>:<\/div>\n<ul>\n<div align=\"justify\"><sup><strong><font color=\"#200020\">DR BLIX:<\/font><\/strong> Yes. We would have been able to clear up some things, but I think Mr Blair is entirely right. We have never got the whole truth, nor do I think it was necessary to get the whole truth. The interesting thing: was Iraq a danger in 2003? They were not a danger. They were practically prostrate and could not &#8211; it would have taken a lot of time to reconstitute in selling oil. <\/sup>  <\/div>\n<\/ul>\n<div align=\"justify\">So why didn&#8217;t Hussein <a href=\"http:\/\/www.iraqinquiry.org.uk\/media\/48849\/20100727pm-blix.pdf#page=95\" target=\"_self\"><strong>cooperate<\/strong><\/a>?<\/div>\n<ul>\n<div align=\"justify\"><sup><strong><font color=\"#200020\">DR BLIX:<\/font><\/strong> No, I am not convinced that Saddam had come to that decision that they would do their utmost to cooperate. He took the strategic decision in 1991 to do away with the weapons of mass destruction, the biological, chemical and the nuclear. So there was a strategic decision but he wouldn&#8217;t admit it publicly. One reason, again, the guess is he didn&#8217;t mind looking dangerous to the Iranians. [<em>I would add &quot;or to the rest of the world.&quot;<\/em>] <\/sup>  <\/div>\n<\/ul>\n<div align=\"justify\">So Hussein is guilty of being an obstructionistic jerk, but that is not a cause for war. And Saddam Hussein was of little danger to the world &#8211; and the question reduces down to whether or not the UN policy of containment was working or not. Here&#8217;s what <strong>Carne Ross<\/strong>, a UK UN Diplomat at the time, said in his <a href=\"http:\/\/www.iraqinquiry.org.uk\/media\/47534\/carne-ross-statement.pdf#page=3\" target=\"_blank\"><strong>recent testimony<\/strong><\/a>:<\/div>\n<ul>\n<div align=\"justify\"><sup>New York [the UN] was in effect the front line of the UK&#8217;s work to sustain international support for controls on Iraq. Although this diplomacy was difficult and tendentious, it was not our view in New York that containment was collapsing either through the ineffectiveness of sanctions or the deterioration of international support. While there were serious sanctions breaches, it was not the UK judgement that these permitted significant rearmament, which was our major concern3. Politically, we noted a renewed French willingness to reunite the Council to pressurize Iraq to comply with the SCRs. In New York, the French ambassador spoke with enthusiasm about a new &ldquo;package&rdquo; to reaffirm the Council&rsquo;s position that Iraq must fulfill all its disarmament obligations. It remained our view, which we explained to all at the UN, that the best method to control the WMD danger was through inspections, and Iraq&rsquo;s compliance with its SCR obligations.<\/sup><\/div>\n<p>                     <\/p>\n<div align=\"justify\"><sup>The UK did not judge that Iraq had the means substantially to rearm, which was the key test of the effectiveness of the containment policy. It is therefore inaccurate to claim, as some earlier witnesses have done, that containment was failing and that sanctions were collapsing (and thus to claim that there was little alternative to military action to deal with the Iraqi threat). Although it required a substantial diplomatic effort, Security Council support for the resolutions had not collapsed. Indeed, had there been more diplomatic effort, above all from the US, this position could have been maintained for some time longer. But as 2002 drew on, it became clear that the US had a different agenda and had waning interest in negotiating a diplomatic way forward at the UN.<\/sup><\/div>\n<\/ul>\n<div align=\"justify\">We now know for sure &#8211; containment had worked fine. In fact we were overdoing it with sanctions that hurt the Iraqi people, not Hussein himself. While Hussein was haggling with the UN and resisting its recurrent sanctions, at the end of the day, the UN containment of Saddam Hussein&#8217;s Iraq was successful. The UN Inspectors had left Iraq when we bombed Iraq in 1998 [<strong>Operation Desert Fox<\/strong>],&nbsp; and <a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_Nations_Special_Commission\"><strong>disbanded<\/strong><\/a> the following year amid allegations that the United States had used the <strong>UNSCOM<\/strong>&#8216;s resources to spy on the Iraqi military [<strong>probably true<\/strong>].<\/div>\n<p align=\"justify\">I documented our recent history with Iraq in a recent post [<strong><a href=\"http:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/2010\/07\/25\/cheneys-war-on-the-un\">Cheney&rsquo;s <em>Kampf<\/em> and the war on the UN&hellip;<\/a><\/strong>] and implied that Iraq was just a stepping stone in the Neoconservative plan for the US to become the world&#8217;s <strong><font color=\"#200020\">sole superpower<\/font><\/strong> and essentially replace the UN &#8211; motivated partly by maintaining order, but more by expanding economic markets and gaining access to resources. I actually believe what I said to be true. Also, I&#8217;ve always said that <strong>Karl Rove<\/strong> came the closest to telling the truth about the Neoconservative\/Administration&#8217;s motives in focusing on Iraq. It was <u>not<\/u> because Saddam Hussein was dangerous:<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<div align=\"center\"><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.foxnews.com\/story\/0,2933,340428,00.html\"><strong>MARCH 20, 2008<\/strong><\/a><\/div>\n<p align=\"justify\"><strong>ROVE:<\/strong>  Well, remember, we removed, as you said, Saddam Hussein in 22 days. But  then the enemy, the Al Qaeda extremists, decided to make the central  battlefield in the global war on terror. This will be worth that if we  win. If we win we will have dealt the enemy a huge blow in a battlefield  they chose to confront us on.<\/p>\n<div align=\"justify\">And  it will send a powerful message throughout the Islamic world. I think  Bernard Lewis of Princeton is accurate. <strong><font color=\"#200020\">That the Muslim world is waiting  to see who is going to win the conflict. Is it going to be the West or  is it going to be Al Qaeda? And by winning, we will send a powerful  message that the momentum is on our side. And it will rally the Muslim  world to us. It will also create a huge influence in the Middle East.  Think about the creation of the democracy in the historic center of the  Middle East with the third-largest oil reserves in the world. If we have  a functioning democracy in Iraq, that&#8217;s an ally in the war on terror, a  counterweight to mullahs Iran and to Assad in Syria, this will create a  very hopeful center of reform and energy for reform throughout the  Middle East.<\/font><\/strong><\/div>\n<\/blockquote>\n<div align=\"justify\">Rove left off just one little detail, the part about <strong><font color=\"#200020\">becoming the sole superpower, replacing the UN, and dominating the world<\/font><\/strong>. Hans Blix didn&#8217;t say that either. But he did say a lot:<\/div>\n<ul>\n<div align=\"justify\"><sup><a href=\"http:\/\/www.iraqinquiry.org.uk\/media\/48849\/20100727pm-blix.pdf#page=25\" target=\"_self\"><strong>DR BLIX:<\/strong><\/a> Without a Security Council authorisation. As you say, the Americans, to them, it was indifferent. They had already a doctrine that said: why should we have a permission slip from the Security Council? So they didn&#8217;t need it.<\/sup><\/div>\n<p>   <\/p>\n<div align=\"justify\"><sup><a href=\"http:\/\/www.iraqinquiry.org.uk\/media\/48849\/20100727pm-blix.pdf#page=20\" target=\"_blank\"><strong>DR BLIX:<\/strong><\/a> No. There is this big discussion as to whether a second resolution would be required. I for my part thought that to me it was clear that a second resolution was required. I have seen from some of the testimony that some of the British felt that it was desirable, but it was not absolutely indispensable&#8230;&nbsp; I think it was Ambassador Meyer who said there were the three groups. There were the Americans on the one side who said, &quot;No, nothing is needed&quot;. There were others who said, &quot;You need a second resolution&quot;, and the British were somewhere in between.<\/sup><\/div>\n<p>   <\/p>\n<div align=\"justify\"><sup><a href=\"http:\/\/www.iraqinquiry.org.uk\/media\/48849\/20100727pm-blix.pdf#page=27\" target=\"_blank\"><strong>DR BLIX:<\/strong><\/a> Well, I think there was at least implied from the US side that if the Security Council doesn&#8217;t agree with  us and go along with our view, then it sentences itself to irrelevance. I think that&#8217;s a very presumptuous  attitude. I think the US at the time was high on  military. They felt they could get away with it and  therefore it was desirable to do so.<\/sup><\/div>\n<p>   <\/p>\n<div align=\"justify\"><sup><a href=\"http:\/\/www.iraqinquiry.org.uk\/media\/48849\/20100727pm-blix.pdf#page=39\" target=\"_blank\"><strong>DR BLIX:<\/strong><\/a> I don&#8217;t think that anyone would have been  satisfied unless they had come up with a report that,  &quot;Here are the weapons&quot;. Certainly the Americans would  not have been satisfied with anything less than that and  I was also perhaps unfairly saying this is a deficiency  in the document. They had the difficulty. They could  not declare something very much because they didn&#8217;t have  it very much.<\/sup><\/div>\n<p>   <\/p>\n<div align=\"justify\"><sup><strong><a href=\"http:\/\/www.iraqinquiry.org.uk\/media\/48849\/20100727pm-blix.pdf#page=51\" target=\"_blank\">DR BLIX:<\/a><\/strong> I think what was really important about this  business of sites given was that when we reported that,  no, we did not find any weapons of mass destruction,  they should have realised I think, both in London and in  Washington, that their sources were poor.<\/sup><\/div>\n<p>   <\/p>\n<div align=\"justify\"><sup><a target=\"_self\" href=\"http:\/\/www.iraqinquiry.org.uk\/media\/48849\/20100727pm-blix.pdf#page=68\"><strong>DR BLIX:<\/strong><\/a> No. I thought that Straw was giving up around 10th March. They tried the benchmark approach, which I approved. I mean, I saw it as something hopeful, but&#8230; So when it was seen then that the US will not go along with any prolongation of inspections and there would be an invasion, I think that was the moment when it was discovered that the cluster document indicated that inspections were meaningless.<\/sup><\/div>\n<p>   <\/p>\n<div align=\"justify\"><sup><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.iraqinquiry.org.uk\/media\/48849\/20100727pm-blix.pdf#page=73\"><strong>DR BLIX:<\/strong><\/a> I have never questioned the good faith of Mr Blair  or Bush or anyone else. I think to question the good  faith, it will &#8212; you need to have very substantial  evidence and I do not have that. On some occasions when  I talked to Blair on the telephone, 20 February,  I certainly felt that he was absolutely sincere in his  belief.  What I questioned was the good judgment,  particularly with Bush, but also in Blair&#8217;s judgment. <\/sup><\/div>\n<p>   <\/p>\n<div align=\"justify\"><sup><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.iraqinquiry.org.uk\/media\/48849\/20100727pm-blix.pdf#page=87\"><strong>DR BLIX:<\/strong><\/a> The first reflection that occurs to me is that if the British Prime Minister or Bush had come to their parliaments and said, &quot;Well, we are not sure that there are weapons of mass destruction but we fear they could reconstitute&quot;, I can&#8217;t imagine they would have got an authorisation to go to war for that purpose.<\/sup><\/div>\n<p>   <\/p>\n<div align=\"justify\"><sup><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.iraqinquiry.org.uk\/media\/48849\/20100727pm-blix.pdf#page=90\"><strong>DR BLIX:<\/strong><\/a> Those who were 100 per cent convinced there were weapons of mass destruction, if they had less than zero per cent knowledge where they were, that would have been helpful.<\/sup><\/div>\n<p>   <\/p>\n<div align=\"justify\"><sup><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.iraqinquiry.org.uk\/media\/48849\/20100727pm-blix.pdf#page=92\"><strong>DR BLIX:<\/strong><\/a> We would have been able to clear up some things, but I think Mr Blair is entirely right. We have never got the whole truth, nor do I think it was 11 necessary to get the whole truth. The interesting thing: was Iraq a danger in 2003? They were not a danger. They were practically prostrate and could not &#8212; it would have taken a lot of time to reconstitute in selling oil. <\/sup><\/div>\n<p>   <\/p>\n<div align=\"justify\"><sup><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.iraqinquiry.org.uk\/media\/48849\/20100727pm-blix.pdf#page=106\"><strong>DR BLIX:<\/strong><\/a> So inspectors can give something that the intelligence cannot, and intelligence can also give to  the inspector something. It is a quality control for  those who have intelligence to say, &quot;What do the  inspectors say? Does this tally?&quot; If it doesn&#8217;t tally,  I think they should be alerted and they say, &quot;Hey, there  may be something wrong&quot;. There may vice versa also be  quality control on the inspectors. &quot;Have you missed  this?&quot;  In a way that was the message of Colin Powell when  he came before the Security Council and said &#8212; he was  very courteous about us, but said, &quot;Listen, this is what  we have found now&quot;. Implicitly he said thereby, &quot;These  guys, the inspectors, they never found this&quot;. So their  intelligence was superior. It was not. We were more  critical.  We also had the fortune of not being taken in by  defectors and people who came with their stories. So  that is the important &#8212; yes, there is important lessons  in this. <\/sup><\/div>\n<p>   <\/p>\n<div align=\"justify\"><sup><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.iraqinquiry.org.uk\/media\/48849\/20100727pm-blix.pdf#page=111\"><strong>DR BLIX:<\/strong><\/a>  The other reflection I have is a broader one about  the going to war. I am delighted that I think your  intention is to draw lessons from the Iraq war rather  than anything else, and I think that when can states go  to war still remains a vitally important issue, and the  UN Charter in 1945 took a giant leap forward in this and  said, &quot;No, it is prohibited to do except in the case of  self defence and armed attack or authorisation by the  Security Council&quot;.  Well, here in the case of Iraq you can see how the  UK in the summer 2002 or the spring 2002 said, &quot;Yes, we  might, but it has to be through the UN power&quot;.  Self-defence against an armed attack was out. Regime  change was out. Straw was adamantly opposed to a  regime change. Authorisation by the UN, yes, that&#8217;s the  path. So they insist upon 1441 and they get it, but it is  a gamble. 1441 is if they had shown or if the Iraqis  had continued to obstruct, as it was expected, then they  could have asked the Security Council for a second  resolution and said, &quot;Look, they are obstructing and we  now ask for authorisation&quot;.  They never knew whether they would get that.  Eventually they had to come with I think very  constrained legal explanations. We see how  Mr Goldsmith, Lord Goldsmith now, wriggled about and how  he himself very much doubted that it was adequate, but  eventually said, &quot;Well, if you accumulate all these  things, then that gives a plausible &#8230;&quot; &#8212; he was not  quite sure that it would have stood up in  an international tribunal. Most of your legal advisers  not think so either. Nevertheless he gave the green  light to it.  I think it shows the UK was wedded to the UN rules  and tried to go by them, eventually failed and was  a prisoner on the American train, but it is true at the  same time that this rule against going to war is under  strain. <\/sup><\/div>\n<p>   <\/p>\n<div align=\"justify\"><sup><a target=\"_blank\" href=\"http:\/\/www.iraqinquiry.org.uk\/media\/48849\/20100727pm-blix.pdf#page=113\"><strong>DR BLIX:<\/strong><\/a>  I am of the firm view that it was an illegal war.  I think the vast majority of international lawyers feel  that way.  This can be discussed, but I don&#8217;t think &#8212; there  can be cases where it is doubtful. Maybe it was  permissible to go to war. Iraq in my view was not one  of those.<\/sup><\/div>\n<\/ul>\n<div align=\"justify\">I think this one is the most telling, &quot;<strong><font color=\"#200020\">I have never questioned the good faith of Mr Blair  or Bush or anyone  else. I think to question the good  faith, it will &#8211; you need to have  very substantial  evidence and I do not have that.<\/font><\/strong>&quot; I would propose that Dr. Hans Blix is being a perspecacious UN Diplomat here. He realizes that he should be careful not to speak without solid evidence. But in these examples, he&#8217;s making it abundantly clear who is obstructing the UN, and it&#8217;s not Saddam Hussein. It&#8217;s the United States of America, that&#8217;s who. And I think the &quot;<strong><font color=\"#200020\">it will &#8211;<\/font><\/strong>&quot; is the beginning of a sentence that might read, &quot;<strong><font color=\"#200020\">it will<\/font><\/strong>&quot;<em> take more<\/em> &quot;<strong><font color=\"#200020\">substantial  evidence<\/font><\/strong>&quot; <em>than I currently have to say that Bush was not acting in good faith <\/em>&quot;<strong><font color=\"#200020\">and I do not have that<\/font><\/strong>&quot; <em>yet<\/em>.<\/div>\n<p>               <\/p>\n<div align=\"justify\">So, do we belong on the Iraq blame list? Damned right we do! Somewhere near the top because&nbsp; unlike the others, we ought to know better&#8230;<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>There&#8217;s an opinion piece in the Guardian written by an Iraqi living in England [Chilcot inquiry: too late, Hans Blix: too late] that faults Hans Blix, &quot;Back then, he minced his words, providing enough ambiguity for Tony Blair and Jack Straw to push on with their plans to drag Britain into the US-led war.&quot; Who [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_bbp_topic_count":0,"_bbp_reply_count":0,"_bbp_total_topic_count":0,"_bbp_total_reply_count":0,"_bbp_voice_count":0,"_bbp_anonymous_reply_count":0,"_bbp_forum_subforum_count":0,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-4268","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-politics"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4268","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4268"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4268\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4268"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4268"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/1boringoldman.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4268"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}