| 09/25/01 John C. Yoo |
The President’s Constitutional Authority To Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them: Concludes that the Commander in Chief Clause vests the President with plenary authority to use military force abroad. "We conclude that the President has broad constitutional power to use military force. Congress has acknowledged this inherent executive power in both the War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973), codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (the "WPR"), and in the Joint Resolution passed by Congress on September 14, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). Further, the President has the constitutional power not only to retaliate against any person, organization, or State suspected of involvement in terrorist attacks on the United States, but also against foreign States suspected of harboring or supporting such organizations. Finally, the President may deploy military force preemptively against terrorist organizations or the States that harbor or support them, whether or not they can be linked to the specific terrorist incidents of September 11." The power to initiate military hostilities rests “exclusively” with the President. “In the exercise of his plenary power to use military force, the President’s decisions are for him alone and are unreviewable.” |
| 09/25/01 John C. Yoo |
Constitutionality of Amending Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to Change the “Purpose” Standard for Searches: Concludes that changing “purpose” to “significant purpose” would not violate the Fourth Amendment. The memo is criticized and partly repudiated in Steven Bradbury’s 1/15/09 memo re status of certain OLC opinions. |
| 10/23/01 John C. Yoo |
Authority for Use of Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities Within the United States not be subject to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment . . . .” The memo is criticized and partly repudiated in Steven Bradbury’s 10/6/08 memo: Concludes that, “the President has both constitutional and statutory authority to use the armed forces in military operations, against terrorists, within the United States. We believe that these operations generally would Subject of litigation in ACLU v. DOJ, 06-cv-0214 (D.D.C.), and existence disclosed in a 10/18/07 declaration filed by Steven Bradbury in that case. |
| 11/05/01 John Yoo |
Authority of the Deputy Attorney General Under Executive Order 12333: This memo extends the Attorney General’s authority under section 2.5 of Exec. Order no. 12333 to the Deputy Attorney General, allowing him to approve use of surveillance techniques for which a warrant would be required for law enforcement purposes. |
| 11/06/01 Patrick F. Philbin |
Legality of the Use of Military Commissions to Try Terrorists: Argues that the President may establish military commissions without consulting Congress. |
| 01/22/02 Jay S. Bybee John Yoo |
Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees ("Treaties and Laws Memorandum") to long-term detention at the U.S. navy base at Guantanamo Bay and trial by military commissions. Addresses treatment of detainees captured in Afghanistan with respectto long-term detention at the U.S. Navy base at Guantanamo Bay and trial by military commissions. Concludes that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to al Qaeda members. Also concludes that the President has authority to deny the Taliban militia POW status. Finds that because customary International law constitutes neither federal law nor a treaty recognized under the Supremacy Clause, CIL does not bind the President or restrict the actions of the U.S. military. |
| 02/07/02 George W. Bush |
Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees In this memo, the President concludes that (1) none of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions apply to the conflict with al Qaeda, (2) the President has authority to suspend obligations under the Geneva Conventions with regard to Afghanistan, (3) Common Article 3 does not apply to al Qaeda or Taliban detainees, and (4) Taliban and al Qaeda detainees do not qualify as prisoners of war. |
| 02/07/02 Jay Bybee |
Status of Taliban Forces Under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 This memo finds that the President has sufficient grounds to conclude that the Taliban militia are not entitled to POW status under the 1949 Geneva Convention (III) Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War because the Taliban have no organized command structure, do not have distinctive uniform, and do not consider themselves bound by the Geneva Conventions. It also finds that it is not necessary for the government to convene Article 5 tribunals to determine the status of the Taliban detainees since a presidential determination of their status eliminates any legal doubt under domestic law. |
| 03/13/02 Jay S. Bybee |
President’s Power as Commander in Chief to Transfer Captured Terrorists to the Control and Custody of Foreign Nations: Concludes that, “the President has plenary constitutional authority, as the commander in chief, to transfer such individuals who are held and captured outside the United States to the control of another country.” The memo is criticized and partly repudiated in Steven Bradbury’s 1/15/09 memo re status of certain OLC opinions. |
| 04/08/02 Patrick F. Philbin |
Swift Justice Authorization Act Concludes that Congress cannot interfere with the President’s exercise of his authority as Commander-in-Chief to control the conduct of operations during war, including his authority to promulgate rules to regulate military commissions. The memo is criticized and partly repudiated in Steven Bradbury’s 1/15/09 memo re status of certain OLC opinions. |
| 06/08/02 Jay S. Bybee |
Determination of Enemy Belligerency and Military Detention Concludes that “the military has the legal authority to detain [Jose Padilla] as a prisoner captured during an international armed conflict,” and that the Posse Comitatus Act poses no bar. |
| 06/27/02 John C. Yoo |
Applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) to Military Detention of United States Citizens Concludes that the “the President’s authority to detain enemy combatants, including U.S. citizens, is based on his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief ” and that the Non-Detention Act cannot interfere with that authority. The memo is criticized and partly repudiated in Steven Bradbury’s 1/15/09 memo re status of certain OLC opinions. |
| 08/01/02 Jay S. Bybee |
Standards of Conduct For Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A Concludes that conduct rises to the level of torture under domestic law and the Convention Against Torture only if it causes pain akin to pain associated with organ failure, impairment of bodily function and death. Prosecution for such acts may be barred where it infringes upon the President’s Commander-in-Chief powers to conduct war and necessity and self-defense may justify interrogation in violation of § 2340A. The memo is criticized and partly repudiated in Steven Bradbury’s 1/15/09 memo re status of certain OLC opinions. |
| 08/01/02 John C. Yoo |
Letter regarding “the views of our Office concerning the legality, under international law, of interrogation methods to be used on captured al Qaeda operatives” Concludes that interrogation methods that comply with 18 U.S.C.§2340-2340A do not violate international obligations under the Convention Against Torture based on the U.S. reservation requiring specific intent. Additionally, the methods could not fall under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court because (1) "a state cannot be bound by treaties to which it has not consented;" and (2) even if the ICC could act, the methods do not fall within the Rome Statute’s crimes since they are not a "widespread and systematic" attack on civilians and neither al Qaeda members or Taliban soldiers qualify as prisoners of war. |
| 08/01/02 Jay S. Bybee |
Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative Concludes that the CIA’s proposed interrogation plan for Abu Zubaydah — which contemplates methods including “insects placed in a confinement box” and “the waterboard” — does not violate the torture statute. |
| 03/14/03 John C. Yoo |
Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United States Concludes that the Fifth Amendment’s due process protections and the Eight Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment do not apply to enemy combatants held abroad and that federal criminal laws of general applicability do not apply to authorized interrogations of enemy combatants. Also asserts that customary international law can be overridden by the President at his discretion. The memo is criticized and partly repudiated in Steven Bradbury’s 1/15/09 memo re status of certain OLC opinions. |
[…] so far as we can know, that Cheney has this disorder – just reading the memos that he masterminded [below], or reviewing his NSA Surveillance Program, or thinking about his monomaniacal march to Iraq, tell […]
[…] supply legal rationalizations to the CIA for their action plan for using torture. If you review the Yoo Memos, that’s how they read. They don’t read like legal opinions, they read like witness […]