Researcher Chris Ames, who helped secure the documents’ release under Freedom of Information laws, said: “The memo contradicts the evidence of other Chilcot witnesses, who said British collaboration with US war plans did not begin until the early summer of 2002”. Britain had been involved in detailed discussions with the United States 11 months before the US-led invasion of Iraq, newly declassified documents revealed.
The then most senior US general, Tommy Franks had held top secret talks in Britain with Tony Blair’s government about toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime earlier than previously disclosed, the Daily Mail reported. According to the report, General Franks held a classified meeting at RAF Brize Norton, Oxfordshire in April 2002 with the then Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon to discuss the invasion. Franks had similar meetings in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and flew in Britain to answer Hoon’s questions about ‘US plans for Iraq’, secret Pentagon documents revealed.
Exactly what was said has been censored, but declassified sections of the documents show Gen Franks had a separate meeting with Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, then Britain’s chief of defense staff, and senior officers. At that meeting, ‘regional issues’ including Iraq were discussed, and Gen Franks was told the Ministry of Defense had ‘put together a small cell for thinking strategically about Iraq and what course of action are available to handle the regime’.
Hoon did not mention the meeting when he gave evidence to the Chilcot Inquiry on Iraq earlier this year. And Admiral Boyce, now Lord Boyce, told the Chilcot panel he had set up an Iraq planning group, but only in May 2002…
MR JONATHAN POWELL: I think American opinion, or, rather, American policy shifted relatively gradually during that period. At the beginning, they were focused entirely on Afghanistan and the campaign in Afghanistan. By the time you get to December, you have speeches being made in the Senate calling for action on Iraq, Senators Lieberman and McCain wrote to the President demanding action on Iraq. We started sensing that something was happening. David Manning went to Washington in December and talked on Condi Rice and received assurances from her there were no immediate plans for action in Iraq, but said the administration had asked for a full review of the options before them. When he went back again in January, he again asked Condi and she said they were considering options but no plan had been made. So, really, I think it was February and March that they started to get into more concrete plans.
BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: Concrete plans for what?
MR JONATHAN POWELL: For considering how they would actually deal with Iraq. You remember there was the State of the Union speech in which he talked about the Axis of Evil, and, again, David spoke to Condi Rice on 14 February to make sure the Americans would not plunge into any plans before the Prime Minister met the President at Crawford and received an assurance that they wouldn’t. The first facetoface encounter we had on this was with VicePresident Dick Cheney, who came to Number 10 on 1 March 2002. He was on his way for a Middle East tour and he wanted to discuss Iraq with us before he discussed it with Middle East leaders. The Prime Minister warned him of the law of unintended consequences. If you are going to deal with something like Iraq, you have to think ahead about what might happen and that you do not expect.
BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: What was Dick Cheney’s view at the time? What was he proposing?
MR JONATHAN POWELL: Dick Cheney was proposing to go and consult the Middle East leaders on what should be done in Iraq, to see what their tolerance would be for action. He said at the end of the meeting
BARONESS USHA PRASHAR: But the action was about regime change?
MR JONATHAN POWELL: The action was about yes, about replacing Saddam, and, at the end of the meeting, he said that a coalition would be nice, but not essential.
balck?
whoops…