saying it again…

Posted on Monday 6 January 2014

    “… we have to recognize that the pharmaceutical industry has an irreducible conflict of interest in relation to the way it represents its drugs, in science and in marketing. And unless we can resolve this in a way that is more in the public interest and in patients’ interest, I would argue that drug companies should not be allowed to evaluate their own products.”
    Fiona Godlee, testimony to the House of Commons,
    Committee of Public Accounts,
    June 2013
Having lived through a few such things, I’ve learned that it takes more than a just cause. And it takes more than a lot of supporters. It needs a clear and reasoned voice. I think this is what such a voice sounds like. We could use such a voice on our side of the pond…
Mickey @ 7:00 AM

evidencedbasedmedicine isn’t one word…

Posted on Monday 6 January 2014

Evidence Based Medicine [often pronounced evidencebasedmedicine] has evolved into one of my least favorite terms, even beating out chemicalimbalance. The reason it tops the list is that it’s even used by people who are not tricksters like the chemicalimbalance set. They often mean well. They’re saying that you shouldn’t confuse opinion or preference with fact, that too many people in this world render expert medical opinions or advice that aren’t backed up by anything factual – and that’s an excellent point. There’s a background implication that people in medicine who do this shoot-from-the-hip thing are charlatans with ulterior motives. So if I’m extolling the virtues of evidencebasedmedicine, why is it my least favorite term? Well, part of the answer is PTSD. If you were in psychoanalytic training in the late 1970s or early 1980s, you would’ve been bludgeoned with "what is the evidence for…?" questions or been seen as a necromancer or worse so many times that you wince at the mention. Being a psychiatrist wasn’t much better with the Szaszian critiques or the reductionistic-medical-model-thinking criticisms that seemed to come out between the bricks and through the cracks in the windows. These days, it’s being put in the position of defending the belief that all mental illness is brain disease treatable with toxic chemicals. I’m obviously really not very good at that one. So, to summarize, many people use the term evidencebasedmedicine to say, "You’re a deluded lunatic."

But that’s not why it’s my least favorite term. It’s because it has been turned into a trick, a surrogate for the scientific method. And it has become an agent of harm. Three years ago, I drew the picture on the left to diagram EMB as it was being presented in a particular article: Structured Interview, Diagnostic Manual, Treatment Algorithm informed by Clinical Trials, resultant Treatment recommendation based on EBM treatments. On the right, I’ve circled the elements that have been regularly misused in one or another form of corruption.  Every one of them vulnerable to misuse by the prophets of evidencebasedmedicine:

 

In fact, there’s really only one kind of Medicine, and it’s Evidence Based Medicine. But many now use evidencebasedmedicine as a false certification of their distortions due to conflictsofinterest. That’s my introduction to this article:

by Des Spence
British Medical Journal. 2014 348:doi: [Published 3 January 2014]

Evidence based medicine [EBM] wrong footed the drug industry for a while in the 1990s. We could fend off the army of pharmaceutical representatives because often their promotional material was devoid of evidence. But the drug industry came to realise that EBM was an opportunity rather than a threat. Research, especially when published in a prestigious journal, was worth more than thousands of sales representatives. Today EBM is a loaded gun at clinicians’ heads. “You better do as the evidence says,” it hisses, leaving no room for discretion or judgment. EBM is now the problem, fueling overdiagnosis and overtreatment.

You see, without so called “evidence” there is no seat at the guideline table. This is the fundamental “commissioning bias,” the elephant in the room, because the drug industry controls and funds most research. So the drug industry and EBM have set about legitimising illegitimate diagnoses and then widening drug indications, and now doctors can prescribe a pill for every ill. The billion prescriptions a year in England in 2012, up 66% in one decade, do not reflect a true increased burden of illness nor an ageing population, just polypharmacy supposedly based on evidence. The drug industry’s corporate mission is to make us all sick however well we feel. As for EBM screening programmes, these are the combine harvester of wellbeing, producing bails of overdiagnosis and misery.

Corruption in clinical research is sponsored by billion dollar marketing razzmatazz and promotion passed off as postgraduate education. By contrast, the disorganised protesters have but placards and a couple of felt tip pens to promote their message, and no one wants to listen to tiresome naysayers anyway.

How many people care that the research pond is polluted, with fraud, sham diagnosis, short term data, poor regulation, surrogate ends, questionnaires that can’t be validated, and statistically significant but clinically irrelevant outcomes? Medical experts who should be providing oversight are on the take. Even the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence and the Cochrane Collaboration do not exclude authors with conflicts of interest, who therefore have predetermined agendas. The current incarnation of EBM is corrupted, let down by academics and regulators alike.

What do we do? We must first recognise that we have a problem. Research should focus on what we don’t know. We should study the natural history of disease, research non-drug based interventions, question diagnostic criteria, tighten the definition of competing interests, and research the actual long term benefits of drugs while promoting intellectual scepticism. If we don’t tackle the flaws of EBM there will be a disaster, but I fear it will take a disaster before anyone will listen.
Mickey @ 12:00 AM

in the sunlight…

Posted on Sunday 5 January 2014

A recent post on Behaviorism and Mental Health, Psychiatry’s Over Reliance On Pharma, took a meta-look at Dr. Lieberman’s The NIMH-CATIE Schizophrenia Study: What Did We Learn? Dr. Hickey pointed to Dr. Lieberman’s blaming pharma for their distorted messages, rather than holding psychiatrists responsible for listening to those messages, and continuing to listen even now after all the scandal. Fair point, well made. But there was a discussion in the comments about clinical trials that brought back some old memories. They have to do with calling clinical trials of drugs research. I don’t think of clinical drug trials as research. I think of them as product testing.

In my case, the DSM-III revolution arrived in the form of a person, a new chairman, and he spoke of nothing except research. At first, I thought he was interested in building the department into a more academic place, and maybe that was right. But as I listened, what he primarily meant was clinical drug research. For that and a thousand other reasons, I began to look for other work. That’s a long story that’s not pertinent here. What  is pertinent is that I had left a research tract in an earlier time of life, not in psychiatry, and I had a fairly solid idea what research was. Drug trials were an aside, something reasonably important, but not research. At some point, part of this department building thing was to institute a monthly Grand Rounds with outside speakers. The first one was a presentation by someone who gave a drug talk about Mellaril, paid for by Sandoz [that speaker was later the first author on the primo Seroquel clinical trial and even later spent ten years in prison for fraud]. I was gone into private practice not too long after that Grand Rounds.

By any right-thinking that I know, a clinical drug trial is essentially composed of two parts: the design, which specifies all the details in a protocol about how it is to be conducted and analyzed; and the trial itself, which is carried out according to that protocol including the result analysis at the end [predefined]. The whole point of the pre·definition is to curb the temptation to play with the data once it is in hand. I would see that not as a research endeavor, but as administrative enterprise – something important to do well, but more in the range of robotic than creative. I hate to use the term assembly line because it has negative connotations and I don’t mean that, but I can’t think of something else – so "good assembly line" is the point here. And one needs to be paid well to do it, because it’s a pain in the ass to do. Part of the drill is to treat all subjects the same, and that’s hard to do in clinical medicine with sick people.

Everything about a clinical drug trial design is an attempt to eliminate bias, human and otherwise: randomization, blinding, standardized instruments, placebo control, active comparators, an a priori protocol, etc. Creativity, following hunches, making outside observations, anything that branches from the straight line is verboten – antithetical to the point of the trial. If something interesting happens along the way, apply for another grant because it doesn’t belong in this one. Research is something else. Research has branches. A hypothesis or a question is where it starts, but it’s refined, or redirected, or even abandoned along the way. It’s more about immersion in a question that’s unanswered and looking all around for a way out, like a spot of mold on the petri dish. In a clinical trial, that’s a contaminated sample, missing data. In research, it’s the discovery of penicillin.

At least in psychiatry, those invested in the outcome of a clinical trial have found a number of ways to lean the results. Sometimes it’s in the design e.g. an active comparator given in the wrong dose. But usually it’s by adding a third part – playing with the results to see if they lend themselves to presentation enhancement techniques; or re·framing adverse effects; or putting the whole thing in a file drawer to grow old alone. A lot of the KOLs who sign these things really don’t involve themselves in that process it turns out. They’re just tickets into an academic journal or window dressing for the author’s byline. Five or six years ago, I didn’t actually know that. They’re called researchers, but they aren’t, and many aren’t even trialists. They’re more like trophy·wives or front·men. They know a lot and present well, but they’re something other than researchers or trialists.

So back to Phil’s point. Why have psychiatrists continued to listen? Why psychiatry’s over·reliance on pharma? Part of the real answer is that they didn’t know it was just pharma. Another part is that there was no other place to listen. Another part is that their patients watch too much television. Another part is that’s what they get paid to do. Another part is that’s what they get referred patients for – "med consults." Another part is it’s easy. And the worst part is that they don’t put the time and effort into swimming upstream and figuring things out for themselves. I actually liked the CATIE study even if I’m not so taken with Dr. Lieberman. Maybe the overly-positive messages about the Atypical Antipsychotics did ultimately come from pharma, but they came out of the mouths of academic psychiatrists and flowed into algorithms and guidelines certified by same that were everywhere.

Back to the beginning and my memories. I have been reassured by many who were there to know that I trust that the pharmaceutical invasion of academic/practicing psychiatry came after the DSM-III revolution and did not have a finger in causing it. I have to take that on faith, because in my microcosm, they came at the same time. And there were a number of young psychiatrists who came to Atlanta [from Saint Louis] who opened clinical research centers in that same time frame [that are still going strong]. For that matter, John Feighner, the Saint Louis psychiatry resident whose criteria formed the nucleous of the DSM-III went on to have a successful and lucrative career running a clinical research center. So, at the least, the synergy between a segment of psychiatry and pharmaceutical industry funded clinical drug trials came early on in the days of the DSM-III, certainly in my neck of the woods.

From my perspective, the entire point of the Data Transparency movement is to eliminate that third part I mentioned above – playing with the results. The trials themselves are well regulated, but as we’ve seen, the end of the trial is often the beginning of the manipulation phase. If the raw data is there, there are plenty of people poised to analyze it correctly. It’s a profession in its own right – vetting these studies. If psychiatrists, physicians, other mental health types, and patients have access to the truth, it’s a different game. The fate of psychiatry as defined by its critics, or the majority of practitioners, or by yours truly isn’t really any of my business. That’s for a future clinical trial played out in the sunlight…
Mickey @ 9:47 AM

caberet…

Posted on Saturday 4 January 2014

I think Deep Throat’s line, "Follow the money," was a bit of fiction from screenwriter William Goldman rather than historical fact, but it doesn’t matter. It captured a principle that may well outlive its origins. Here, Ginny Barbour uses it with finesse:

PLoS blogs
By Virginia Barbour
January 3, 2014
Ginny Barbour, Medicine Editorial Director at PLOS, discusses a recently-published UK Government spending report on access to clinical trial information and the stockpiling of Tamiflu.

Yesterday the UK Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee, which monitors UK Government spending – focusing on “value-for-money criteria which are based on economy, effectiveness and efficiency” – published a rather amazing report; not just because of the topic of its enquiry but in particular its conclusions, which have implications well beyond the UK. The topic was “Access to clinical trial information and the stockpiling of Tamiflu”: the conclusions were that the money spent on Tamiflu was likely misspent, and moreover the lack of access to clinical trial data more widely is unacceptable.
Richard Bacon MP, member of the Committee of Public Accounts, said in  quote which succinctly sums up how unacceptable the current position is :
    “The full results of clinical trials are being routinely and legally withheld from doctors and researchers by the manufacturers of medicines. This has ramifications for the whole of medicine. The ability of doctors, researchers and patients to make informed decisions about treatments is being undermined. Regulators and the industry have recently made proposals to open up access, but these do not cover the issue of access to the results of trials in the past which bear on the efficacy and safety of medicines in use today.”
Or, as the report’s summary says
    “This longstanding regulatory and cultural failure impacts on all of medicine, and undermines the ability of clinicians, researchers and patients to make informed decisions about which treatment is best.”
AllTrials, a coalition spearheaded by Ben Goldacre [doctor and author of Bad Pharma], the charity Sense About Science, the BMJ, PLOS [where I am the Medicine Editorial Director] and a group of independent academics, was born out of real anger that the many backroom discussions on trials were simply going nowhere and there was a need to bring the issue of hidden data into the public view. The campaign has been successful in mobilizing academics and patients groups, has lobbied UK and European Parliamentarians and overall has been a key reason in the movement toward more transparency of a number of pharmaceutical companies.

It’s ironic in the end though that it may take a Committee whose job it is to look at spending to point out what Health Departments seems to have been willing to ignore – that hiding clinical trial data is tremendously damaging to society, at an individual, professional and yes, even a financial level.

Ben Goldacre sums it up thus:
    “We cannot make informed decisions about which treatment is best, when vitally important information is routinely and legally kept secret. Future generations will look back at this absurd situation in the same way that we look back on mediaeval bloodletting.”
It’s not really so ironic, it’s the way the world works. Allen Jones ran across a funny account working as an investigator for the Pennsylvania OIG. The trail he followed ended up busting a mega-scam called TMAP, still under-prosecuted. How could we be surprised that it was the money spent by the British government on Tamiflu that finally revealed that the efficacy of the drug rested on selected clinical trials, and there were a raft of unpublished trials sitting in Roche’s file drawers? Joel Grey and Liza Manelli told us that "Money makes the world go round" a long time ago. Thus, the Pharmaceutical industry and friends have tainted the integrity of the medical profession as a whole keeping it spinning…
Mickey @ 9:59 PM

streams…

Posted on Saturday 4 January 2014

On clinical trials

  1. We were surprised and concerned to discover that information is routinely withheld from doctors and researchers about the methods and results of clinical trials on treatments currently prescribed in the United Kingdom. This problem has been noted for many years in the professional academic literature, with many promises given, but without adequate action being taken by government, industry or professional bodies. This now presents a serious problem because the medicines in use today came on to the market—and were therefore researched—over the preceding decades. None of the latest proposals from regulators or industry adequately addresses the issue of access to the results of trials from previous years on the medicines in use today.

      Recommendation: The Department should take action to ensure that the full methods and results are available to doctors and researchers for all trials on all uses of all treatments currently being prescribed, and should also ensure that there is clear and frequent audit of how much information is availble and how much has been withheld.

  2. The results of clinical trials on humans are the key evidence used by regulators, researchers and clinicians to assess whether a medicine works and how safe it is. Medicine manufacturers submit evidence on products they wish to market in the UK to the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency [MHRA] or the European Medicines Agency [EMA].
  3. The scope for independent scrutiny of a medicine’s effectiveness is undermined by the fact that the full methods and results of many clinical trials are not made available to doctors and researchers. The problem of non-publication of clinical trial results has been known since the mid-1980s. We also heard evidence that trials with positive results are about twice as likely to be published as trials with negative results. While several clinical trial registries have been established, none covers all clinical trials on all uses of all treatments currently being prescribed worldwide. There have been recent announcements by the EMA, and some manufacturers, to improve access to information about clinical trials but none adequately addresses the issue of incomplete disclosure throughout medicine. Opening up information about all clinical trials to medical researchers would support the work of regulators by permitting thorough, independent external review by doctors and researchers .

      Recommendation: The Department and the MHRA should ensure, both prospectively and retrospectively, that clinical trials are registered on an appropriate registry and that the full methods and results of all trials should be available for wider independent scrutiny, beyond the work undertaken by regulators during the licensing process.
  4. NICE and the MHRA do not routinely share information provided by manufacturers during the process for licensing medicines. When applying for a licence, manufacturers have a legal obligation to provide all the information on the safety and efficacy of a medicine that is required by European regulators. However, NICE does not have statutory powers to demand information from manufacturers, in contrast to the Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Healthcare in Germany, which performs a similar role to NICE. NICE seeks confirmation from the medicine manufacturer’s UK medical director on the completeness of information, but this may not include all clinical trials in other parts of the world, not least because UK medical directors may themselves not have full information. The MHRA confirmed there was no legal obstacle that would prevent it from sharing information with NICE. However, there is no routine sharing of the information provided by manufacturers to regulators as part of the licensing process with NICE. This leads to the risk of omissions and duplication in the collection of evidence.

      Recommendation: NICE should ensure that it obtains full methods and results on all trials for all treatments which it reviews, including clinical study reports where necessary; make all this information available to the medical and academic community for independent scrutiny; and routinely audit the completeness of this information. NICE and the MHRA should put in place a formal information-sharing agreement to ensure when NICE appraises medicines it has access to all of the information provided to regulators by the manufacturer during the licensing process.
AGENCY SITE Wikipedia

NICE <link> <link>
MHRA
<link> <link>
EMA <link> <link>

So I changed my mind. This is the clinical trials part of the report mentioned in the last post [a river…] by the House of Commons Committee of Public Accounts [Access to clinical trial information and the stockpiling of Tamiflu]. The UK system is a National Health Service so the Agency structure is different. On the right are some links for the ones mentioned. It’s a different system, but the problems are the same. NICE and MHRA are UK Agencies and EMA is a European Union Agency.

While this is simply a committee report, it’s a very positive and strong committee report. They have been burned pretty badly by Roche and its Tamiflu for a lot of money and that’s what the remainder of the report is about. So action is almost guaranteed. There’s a lot riding on the Cochrane review currently being prepared now that they have begun to get the trial data they need to actually evaluate that drug’s effectiveness in saving lives. But it has focused appropriate much-needed attention on the whole issue of the secrecy of clinical trial data. I don’t know how long it will take for the US to follow suit, but this has to be a strong force on the right side of that equation. So if I didn’t emphasize it enough, add Iain Chalmers of the Cochrane Collaboration and Peter Gøtzsche of the Nordic Cochrane Centre to the list of streams that fed the river that lead to this report. It’s a fine start for the new year…

The only thing wrong is that we won’t be able to wake up Monday morning and read about it on Pharmalot

Mickey @ 1:01 PM

a river…

Posted on Saturday 4 January 2014

“Eventually, all things merge into one, and a river runs through it. The river was cut by the world’s great flood and runs over rocks from the basement of time. On some of the rocks are timeless raindrops. Under the rocks are the words, and some of the words are theirs. I am haunted by waters.”
Norman Maclean, A River Runs Through It and Other Stories

I’m not sure why, but this feels like a story that needs a history to go along with it. In August 2012, I was wandering the Internet looking for I-don’t-recall-what, and I landed on the GSK site where I found something I hadn’t seen before – all the raw data from Paxil Study 329. Like many, I had been mildly obsessed with that study ever since running across Jon Juriedini‘s 2003 letter, and I knew that data hadn’t been there before [a movement…]. I wrote David Healy thinking that if anyone might know why it was there, he would. And he did, telling me that Peter Doshi, an epidemiologist, had gotten GSK to publish it a week or so before. Apparently, that was part of the settlement that Elliot Spitzer got in 2004, but they’d only published summaries until pressed by Doshi. I didn’t know who Peter Doshi was, but quickly found that he and colleague Tom Jefferson were running down the Tamiflu story. Governments were spending billions stockpiling Tamiflu in case of a flu epidemic, but the Cochrane group found that there were many missing trials and Roche wouldn’t release them. Here are some references from their work [Drug Data Shouldn’t Be Secret, The Imperative to Share Clinical Study Reports: Recommendations from the Tamiflu Experience]. That was my introduction to the movement that ultimately became the AllTrials petition and campaign. Back then, I stuck with having a shot at the Paxil Study 329 data [starting with the lesson of Study 329: the basics…].

Later, in September 2012, when I ran across the now famous Ted Talk by Ben Goldacre [something of value…], there it was again – Tamiflu. And if you’re interested in what I’m interested in, who wouldn’t start following Ben Goldacre and buy Bad Science and Bad Pharma [now on the shelf next to Healy’s Pharmageddon]? And that gets me to the House of Commons. Following Goldacre is like hitting a moving target, but I ran across some comment he made about testifying to Parliament, and ended up watching it. He and BMJ Editor Fiona Godlee [Secrecy Does Not Serve Us Well] met with the House of Commons Committee of Public accounts in June and delivered a performance for posterity [goldacre and godlee…]. Godlee’s final comment was the essence of simplicity, but dead on the mark [a sticky wicket…]:
"Unless we can find a solution to the commercial incompetence problem, we have to recognize that the pharmaceutical industry has an irreducible conflict of interest in relation to the way it represents its drugs, in science and in marketing. And unless we can resolve this in a way that is more in the public interest and in patients’ interest, I would argue that drug companies should not be allowed to evaluate their own products."
Some day, there will be a book, or a graduate thesis, or maybe a panel at a meeting where this story gets told, and the people highlighted in red above will be the central characters – semi-independent streams that all run together to make a river. And one of the big waypoints on that river will be the House of Commons Thirty-fifth Report of Session 2013–14 entitled Access to clinical trial information and the stockpiling of Tamiflu that has just been released. There are plenty of other streams entering this river, but this is just a blog, not a thesis or an awards ceremony. But it’s the stuff of awards ceremonies, and I hope one comes along some day. I’m not going to try to summarize this report and its recommendations to Parliament. It’s short and the recommendations are in bold. Suffice it to say that they say everything about clinical trial data and data transparency that’s right – and that’s the river that runs through it…
Mickey @ 7:30 AM

DSM-5 retrospective III…

Posted on Friday 3 January 2014

No retrospective of the DSM-5 process would be complete without a commentary from the summer of 2009, when things moved into the public arena. And there’s no better ringside commentator than Danny Carlat who was blogging the whole thing blow by blow. Senator Grassley’s Investigation was still in the news, and a few weeks before, Dr. Nemeroff’s pal Zach Stowe had been fingered for committing the same sins as his boss – unreported income for speaker gigs while on a grant from GSK. All hell broke loose when Allen Frances went public:
The Carlat Psychiatry Blog
by Danny Carlat
June 30, 2009

Psychiatry’s diagnostic manual is due for a revision. But what began as a group of top scientists reviewing the research literature has degenerated into a dispute that puts the Hatfield-McCoy feud to shame. The latest installment in this remarkable episode of American psychiatry involves an editorial by Dr. Allen Frances, the chairman of the committee that created the current version of the the DSM, the DSM-IV. The editorial has not even been officially published [it is in press at Psychiatric Times] but already it has made the rounds of the blogs and is being read and debated widely. Now, the APA has just released this rather stunning response
First, Carlat summarizes Dr. Frances’ criticisms of the developing DSM-5 [we know the back story from Greenberg’s 2010 article in Wired].
In his editorial, Dr. Frances criticizes the evolving DSM-V on multiple levels, and makes the following claims:
• The process of writing the manual is less transparent and less inclusive than the process he oversaw when he chaired the DSM-IV committee.
• The underlying science of psychiatry has not advanced enough to merit the kind of extreme makeover proposed by the DSM-V chairpeople:
    "The simple truth is that descriptive psychiatric diagnosis does not need and cannot support a paradigm shift. There can be no dramatic improvements in psychiatric diagnosis until we make a fundamental leap in our understanding of what causes mental disorders. The incredible recent advances in neuroscience, molecular biology, and brain imaging that have taught us so much about normal brain functioning are still not relevant to the clinical practicalities of everyday psychiatric diagnosis. The clearest evidence supporting this disappointing fact is that not even one biological test is ready for inclusion in the criteria sets for DSM-5."
• The main change being proposed—the official inclusion of a series of rating scales into the diagnostic criteria—is poorly conceived because busy clinicians will reject this extra paper-work.
• Other proposed changes in DSM-V will make it too easy to over-diagnose a range of conditions:
    “The result would be a wholesale imperial medicalization of normality that will trivialize mental disorder and lead to a deluge of unneeded medication treatment–a bonanza for the pharmaceutical industry but at a huge cost to the new false positive "patients" caught in the excessively wide DSM-V net. They will pay a high price in side effects, dollars, and stigma, not to mentions the unpredictable impact on insurability, disability, and forensics.”
Frances’ article is compelling, not only because of the substance of his arguments but because of his clear and forceful writing style. With each sentence, you get a sense that this man has carefully thought through all of these issues and is passionately concerned about the future of his field.
All familiar: Secrecy, an unwarranted paradigm shift, superfluous rating scales, and the medicalization of normality with overdiagnosis and overmedication. Then Carlat summarizes the APA response from Alan Schatzberg, David Kupfer, Darrell Regier, and James Scully, which ends with:
“Both Dr. Frances and Dr. Spitzer have more than a personal “pride of authorship” interest in preserving the DSM-IV and its related case book and study products. Both continue to receive royalties on DSM-IV associated products. The fact that Dr. Frances was informed at the APA Annual Meeting last month that subsequent editions of his DSM-IV associated products would cease when the new edition is finalized, should be considered when evaluating his critique and its timing.”
Now look at the response to Dr. Carroll’s comments about the CAT-DI test signed by Robert D. Gibbons, David Weiss, Paul Pilkonis, Ellen Frank, Tara Moore, Jong Bae Kim, and David Kupfer [see insider trading…]:
"It is, however, completely unclear that his lack of enthusiasm is based on any scientifically rigorous foundation. Indeed, his knowledge of these methods seems lacking. Finally, Carroll is quick to point out the acknowledged potential conflicts of others as if they have led to bias in reporting of scientific information. In this case, it is Carroll who has the overwhelming conflict of interest. As developer, owner, and marketer of the Carroll Depression Scale–Revised, a traditional fixed-length test, it is not surprising that the paradigm shift described in our article would be of serious concern to him."
This latter response came before we knew of their commercial enterprise and the obvious COI for Drs. Kupfer and Frank.

In our military, we have an article, Article 113: Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman [shortened now to Conduct Unbecoming an Officer]. Uncharacteristically, considering the usual military penchant for details, it’s very loosely defined. We don’t need a definition, because we all know what it means. It refers to the fact that we hold our leaders to a higher standard of conduct than the simple standards of the civil and criminal laws. There’s a similar implicit standard in Medicine.

This era of the DSM-5 Revision spans the manipulative logic of A Research Agenda for the DSM-V through the response to Drs. Spitzer and Frances complaints to this recent reaction to the revelations about Drs. Gibbons and Kupfer and their opening salvo in response. There’s only one name that’s on all three documents – David Kupfer. There have been equally disturbing parallels throughout the the same time frame in the conduct of the psychiatric leadership, all well known to us all. The problems in psychiatry are not ideological, they’re Article 113 problems in our leadership, and the DSM-5 process is a paradigmatic example…
Mickey @ 1:30 PM

DSM-5 retrospective II…

Posted on Friday 3 January 2014

In DSM-5 retrospective I… I reviewed some of the story of the DSM-5 beginning with Kupfer et al’s 2002 book, A Research Agenda for the DSM-V [I continue to think that one can’t understand the DSM-5 without reading, or at least scanning that book – it’s a free pdf]. I thought it was a trick to rationalize changing rather than revising the diagnostic manual, and saw it and the process that followed as heavily influenced by commercial interests. Before I read it, all I knew of Dr. Kupfer was from ancient history. He was a major figure in the search for biomarkers back then, and he found one:
by Kupfer DJ.
Biological Psychiatry. 1976 Apr;11(2):159-174.

Previous investigations have indicated that one of the most consistent EEG sleep findings in depressive patients has been a shortened REM latency. On the basis of these studies, we have concluded that with the exception of drug withdrawal states [such as CNS depressant or amphetamine withdrawal and narcolepsy] shortened REM latency points to a strong affective component in the patient’s illness. Short REM latency has also been observed in patients suffering from schizo-affective illness as well as in certain schizophrenic patients who require tricyclic antidepressants in their management. Furthermore, this psychobiologic marker is a persistent, rather than a transient phenomenon, and can be observed over a period of several weeks unless a patient’s condition becomes more favorable through clinical intervention. This present report indicates that short REM latency is found in virtually all primary depressive illness and is absent in secondary depression. Thus, REM latency appears to be a dependable, measurable marker for diagnosing primary depression, and we argue that the phenomenon is independent of age, drug effect and changes in other sleep parameters. It is expected that EEG sleep and motor measurements can yield further significant data and improve differential diagnosis in psychiatry, in much the same way that laboratory data support other medical specialities.
It’s a heavily  cited paper in the Biological Psychiatry journal. I recall it as one of the important moments along with Dr. Carroll’s Dexamethosone Suppression Test that seemed to be  a window opening into the biology of Endogenous Depression. But after 1980, there was no more Endogenous Depression to study, and its analog, Melancholia, moved from its time honored place as a noun, to an adjective tacked onto something else, Major Depressive Disorder. Their sensitivity was not high enough to gain them wide acceptance as clinical tools, but the implication of biological correlation were certainly widely noted and discussed.

But this was a different Dr. Kupfer on a different trajectory. Then recently, we happened on to another story [see insider trading…]. This Dr. Kupfer was a coauthor and business partner with statistician Robert Gibbons in developing a computerized screening instrument for depression and anxiety. It was developed using NIMH grants by Dr. Gibbons. It was discussed in a series of papers in our best journals. But it was not mentioned as a conflict of interest by any of the authors even though it turned out to be a mature commercial enterprise waiting to launch. Only after it was exposed did the authors offer an apology for failing to list it as a COI. but offered no explanation. To make things remarkably worse, this screening test aims to capitalize on a part of the DSM-5 present from inception – Dimensional Diagnosis [as in anxiety and depression] – a part of the DSM-5 specifically championed by Dr. Kupfer from the outset. This isn’t just the appearance of a COI. This is a COI. This is the kind of thing you can go to prison for in the dog-eat-dog business world. And Medicine should and does have a higher standard than that.

Lest you think this connection between Dr. Kupfer and Gibbons company and the DSM-5 is just circumstantial evidence, try this on for size. Today, I was pointed to something else. This is from Dr. Jane Costello‘s letter of resignation from the DSM-5 Task Force in 2009 [reproduced here from the Carlat blog]:

The tipping point for me was the memo from David and Darrell on February 18, 2009, stating “Thus, we have decided that one if not the major difference between DSM-IV and DSM-V will be the more prominent use of dimensional measures in DSM-V”, and going on to introduce an Instrument Assessment Study Group that will advise workgroups on the choice of old scale measures or the creation of new ones. Setting aside the question of who “decided”, on what grounds, anyone with any experience of instrument development knows that what they proposed last month is a huge task, and a very expensive one. The possibility of doing a psychometrically careful and responsible job given the time and resources available is remote, while to do anything less is irresponsible…
hat tip to Uri
I have a worst case impression of what went on here. After his REM sleep days, Dr. Kupfer became a member of the KOL Klan. Like many of his colleagues, his name is on 900+ papers, including a few with Dr. Gibbons who was a consultant to the DSM-5 Task Force on the very Diagnostic Assessment Instruments Study Group mentioned above by Dr. Costello. Kupfer began to lead the DSM-5 Task Force with the agenda of making the change to a neuroscience based document with psychiatry becoming a neuroscience based specialty. In 2002, he was in solid company. It was before the scandals and disillusionment with the pharmaceutical academic alliance in psychiatry. It appears as though he and Dr. Gibbons saw a way to capitalize on the "diagnosis by dimension" theme, and Dr. Gibbons got $5 M from the NIMH to develop his instrument [really?…]. Maybe they had independent plans that ran together later. But however this came about, they never declared their commercial plans as a COI for obvious reasons – it was too incriminating. As I said, this was insider trading…

And what about "the memo from David and Darrell on February 18, 2009, stating ‘Thus, we have decided that one if not the major difference between DSM-IV and DSM-V will be the more prominent use of dimensional measures in DSM-V’, and going on to introduce an Instrument Assessment Study Group that will advise workgroups on the choice of old scale measures or the creation of new ones." I presume from this that in 2009, they still fantacized adding Dimensions to the DSM-5, quantified by psychometrics. That was certainly apparent in their symposium, Dimensional Aspects of Psychiatric Diagnosis, in 2006.

So what’s to be made of all this?

  • The secret development of the CAT-DI and CAT-ANX instruments on NIMH money as a commercial enterprise by members of the DSM-5 Task Force targeting the Dimensional aspect of the DSM-5 being championed by Dr. Kupfer, a share holder, is a scandal of the first magnitude. It was a very unethical thing to do. They lied outright to do it. And the potential for the test to be used to increase the burden over-medication to the detriment of our patients makes it an even more cynical endeavor. In a rational world, the American Psychiatric Association should be investigating this story with an eye on censoring everyone involved.
  • The scandal is part of a larger push to radically change the psychiatric diagnostic system to fit the vision of a sub-segment of the psychiatric hierarchy, undertaken largely behind closed doors, following an agenda that was never made explicit or validated by the general psychiatric community. The plan was to make psychiatry conform to their neuroscience and psychopharmacologic models, heavily influenced by commercial and industrial interests. That initiative consumed the efforts of the DSM-5 Task Force. And it failed.
  • The $25 M DSM-5 Task Force spent its time and resources trying to put the agenda mentioned in 2. into place unsuccessfully, and ignored their assigned task. There were plenty of major glitches in the DSM-IV that needed attention like the Major Depressive Disorder diagnosis that were ignored, and were perpetuated in the DSM-5. So we let the Mental Health community at large down as well as psychiatry and our patients by focusing on the agenda of a circumscribed subgroup of psychiatrists, many of whom were compromised by obvious conflicts of interest.
I wish I could say otherwise, but this recent revelation about Dr. Kupfer’s folly and the failure of the DSM-5 in general is just one more example of corruption in high places for personal gain in psychiatry – epidemic in the KOL culture that has dominated the field for several decades. And the overall story of the DSM-5 Task Force is a tale of the influence of industry being put into policy by this same strata of our academic community.
Mickey @ 11:30 AM

DSM-5 retrospective I…

Posted on Friday 3 January 2014

Something very unusual happened in the process of the revision of the psychiatric diagnostic manual – the DSM-5 revision published last May. The leaders of the previous revisions, Robert Spitzer [DSM-III, DSM-IIIR] and Allen Frances [DSM-IV], both became outspoken critics of the enterprise and went public with their dissatisfaction. Dr. Spitzer was refused access the the minutes of the DSM-V meetings, and then found out that all the members of the Task Force had signed confidentiality agreements. In a series of articles in the Psychiatric News in 2008 and early 2009, he repeatedly pointed out that secrecy was unprecedented and incompatible with the charge of the Task Force. Dr. Allen Frances declined to join Dr. Spitzer’s campaign until May when he learned about some of the things the DSM-5 Task Force were contemplating, and he went public with his concerns with what became the very public campaign that continues to the present [see dangerous men…]. The response from the APA was silence, defensiveness, or attacks – but never engagement.

As this increasingly loud controversy filled our airways, I went back and read the book that had introduced the whole DSM-5 process in 2002, A Research Agenda for the DSM-V [available as a pdf]. I’ve mentioned this book repeatedly but have never gotten much of a response. I think it’s a book of dirty tricks that contains the roots of what came later. From the Introduction [page 18 of the PDF]:
Need to Explore the Possibility of Fundamental Changes in the Neo-Kraepelinian Diagnostic Paradigm

… Disorders in DSM-III were identified in terms of syndromes, symptoms that are observed in clinical populations to covary together in individuals. It was presumed that, as in general medicine, the phenomenon of symptom covariation could be explained by a common underlying etiology. As described by Robins and Guze [1970], the validity of these identified syndromes could be incrementally improved through increasingly precise clinical description, laboratory studies, delimitation of disorders, follow-up studies of outcome, and family studies. Once fully validated, these syndromes would form the basis for the identification of standard, etiologically homogeneous groups that would respond to specific treatments uniformly.

In the more than 30 years since the introduction of the Feighner criteria by Robins and Guze, which eventually led to DSM-III, the goal of validating these syndromes and discovering common etiologies has remained elusive. Despite many proposed candidates, not one laboratory marker has been found to be specific in identifying any of the DSM-defined syndromes. Epidemiologic and clinical studies have shown extremely high rates of comorbidities among the disorders, undermining the hypothesis that the syndromes represent distinct etiologies. Furthermore, epidemiologic studies have shown a high degree of short-term diagnostic instability for many disorders. With regard to treatment, lack of treatment specificity is the rule rather than the exception.

The efficacy of many psychotropic medications cuts across the DSM-defined categories. For example, the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors [SSRIs] have been demonstrated to be efficacious in a wide variety of disorders, described in many different sections of DSM, including major depressive disorder, panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, dysthymic disorder, bulimia nervosa, social anxiety disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, hypochondriasis, body dysmorphic disorder, and borderline personality disorder. Results of twin studies have also contradicted the DSM assumption that separate syndromes have a different underlying genetic basis. For example, twin studies have shown that generalized anxiety disorder and major depressive disorder may share genetic risk factors [Kendler 1996]…
I would never be a person accused of defending the DSM-III or the Feighner Criteria, but my reading of Kupfer et al is that they’re making a Straw Man Argument here – presenting things in a certain way so as to be able to shoot them down. And they don’t mention what Dr. Spitzer said in the Introduction to his DSM-III:
For most of the DSM-III disorders, however, the etiology is unknown. A variety of theories have been advanced, buttressed  by evidence – not always convincing – to explain how these disorders came about. The approach taken in DSM-III is atheoretical with regard to etiology or pathophysiological process except for those disorders for which this is well established and therefore included in the definition of the disorder. Undoubtedly, with time, some of the disorders of unknown etiology will be found to have specific biological etiologies, others to have specific psychological causes, and still others to result mainly from a particular interplay of psychological, social, and biological factors. The major justification for the generally atheoretical approach taken in DSM-III with regard to etiology is that the inclusion of etiological theories would be an obstacle to use of the manual by clinicians of varying theoretical orientations, since it would not be possible to present all reasonable etiologic theories for each disorder.
Robert Spitzer, in the DSM-III, p 6.
There are plenty of other more likely explanations for the disappointments they mention with the previous DSMs. There’s a major flaw in the DSM system that would explain much of what they complain about. The creation of the omnibus unitary Major Depressive Disorder [MDD] destroyed the most likely candidate for biomarkers, Endogenous Depression or Melancholia, a category Dr. Kupfer himself had studied productively in the past [REM latency: a psychobiologic marker for primary depressive disease]. Who ever said that the conditions listed in the DSM were biological or genetic in origin? We hypothesis that some are, pending confirmation. I agree with some of those hypotheses. But what is it about the medications that suggests disease specificity? More likely, they are symptomatic medications, unrelated to underlying etiology. And the more basic concern that the biologic measures don’t map onto DSM categories as Drs. Robins and Guze predicted may well have the same significance – the biological hypotheses are simply incorrect.

It’s an odd book in that it looks at thirty years of evidence of a failed set of hypotheses and concludes that the hypothesis is right but we’re just not collecting the right evidence – the truth was in the hypothesis, not in the test results. Ergo, the diagnostic system based on the predictions was wrong, because it didn’t produce the expected results themselves. I’m of course making something of a Straw Man Argument myself here. I support the research into the biological basis of conditions that warrant that exploration. I’m arguing against the global point they’re making, not all the specifics. The rest of this book lays out a plan to explore other ways to classify mental illness, chasing the biology and the responses to biological treatment.  They say very little about revising the DSM. Their focus was on changing it. And that continued in a series of expensive and extensive symposia over the next several years:
I’m covering monotonous ground here for a reason. Doctor Spitzer knew something was wrong. He focused on the secrecy. Why be secret? Dr. Frances knew something was wrong too. He focused on the implications of some of the changes the Task Force were considering, and on what they weren’t doing [which I would paraphrase as their assigned task, revise the DSM]. I propose that both of them were reacting something more fundamental. The DSM-5 Task Force leaders didn’t like the DSM-IV. They didn’t want to revise it. They wanted to change it into the biologically based manual they wanted it to be, that Robins and Guze had dreamed of it being, and that the pharmaceutical industry had been pushing towards for decades. Classify and treat mental illness by symptoms, not disorders. They wanted to move the system to meet the neuroscience and the psychopharmacology rather that fit those things to our patients. And the reason I’m reiterating this history is that I think we’ve recently been given a window into the DSM-5 Task Force that supports this view. But before I close this piece, let me mention that they admitted that was their goal late in the game:
by David J. Kupfer, M.D. and Darrel A. Regier, M.D., M.P.H.
American Journal of Psychiatry 168:672-674, 2011.

In the initial stages of development of the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,we expected that some of the limitations of the current psychiatric diagnostic criteria and taxonomy would be mitigated by the integration of validators derived from scientific advances in the last few decades. Throughout the last 25 years of psychiatric research, findings from genetics, neuroimaging, cognitive science, and pathophysiology have yielded important insights into diagnosis and treatment approaches for some debilitating mental disorders, including depression, schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder. In A Research Agenda for the DSM-V, we anticipated that these emerging diagnostic and treatment advances would impact the diagnosis and classification of mental disorders faster than what has actually occurred…
Medscape News
by Jeffrey A. Lieberman, MD
09/28/2011

…we anticipated that this iteration of the DSM would incorporate biological markers and laboratory-based test results to augment the historical and phenomenologic criteria that traditionally are used to establish psychiatric diagnoses. Sadly, this has proved to be beyond the reach of the current level of evidence…
So mine is a conspiracy theory. The leaders of the DSM-5 Task Force and their colleagues wanted to change the DSM-5 into a system that mirrored their own view of psychiatry and mental illness. It was the view Dr. Insel came to call Clinical Neuroscience. And they wanted to orient the diagnostic system accordingly, to fit the findings of neuroscience and to fit the psychopharmacology of the day. Their goal was to highjack the revision of the manual to make a rather dramatic paradigm shift. Thus all of the secrecy. Thus the oddball revisions they did come up with. Thus their complete failure to address their assigned task – revising the system we had. Dimensional diagnosis was a major part of that plan – fit the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness to what the drugs did and neuroscience findings showed. And I would accuse them of being heavily motivated by their own connections with industry and commercial interests. I think Dr. Frances and I might disagree on that last part, but I’m unswerving, particularly in light of the recent revelations about some of the unacknowledged activities of the DSM-5 leader – Dr. David Kupfer…
Mickey @ 9:29 AM

gulp…

Posted on Wednesday 1 January 2014


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If you’ve clicked on your usual morning fare, you’ve probably already seen this announcement in the place of Pharmalot this morning. I must say, I’ve been kind of uneasy since Ed’s last post about Compounding has been sitting there for days without his usual patter about taking off for the holidays – but I didn’t expect this. I don’t have any information about it because there’s not one of his usual (back story) links that have been so invaluable over the years to catch me up when I got confused. Besides reporting the important stories, Ed has a amazing knack for sewing them together so the whole picture comes into focus. I did what people do in such circumstances. I clicked on Pharmagossip where Jack Friday said:
But Ed Silverman lives on!
Ed Silverman can still be reached by writing to pharmalot@gmail.com
Then I became aware of the song playing in my head, Joni Mitchell’s Big Yellow Taxi [1970], and looked it up on YouTube:
Don’t it always seem to go
That you don’t know what you got ’til it’s gone.
They paved paradise,
Put up a parking lot.
I thought about the exit of the Bereavement Exclusion from the DSM-5, and I looked up something timeless just to see if it’s still there:
by Erich Lindemann
American Journal of Psychiatry. 1944 101:141-148.
Did I mention having a few conspiracy theories and flights of fantasy about how to fix it? I don’t know what this is about. I expect somebody will sleuth it out, or even better, Ed will let us know. For the moment, I’m going to have my first cup of coffee of the New Year [that I usually have reading Pharmalot] and let it sink in without trying to correct for non-random missingness. It never works anyway…
Mickey @ 12:05 PM