Thumb on the Scales
Josh MarshallAs some mix of manic euphoria, delirium and exhaustion settles over Democrats nationwide, it’s worth stepping back from the clamor for a moment to consider just why it is the Democrats have superdelegates in the first place and whether the whole concept should be abolished. Obama supporters say that the superdelegates as a group should not overturn the verdict of the primary and caucus election process while Clinton supporters say that it’s precisely the point of the super delegates to make their own considered judgment about who the party’s nominee should be regardless of the finally tally of pledged delegates. the second accurately portrays why the superdelegates were created.
In fact, even this description puts too gentle a gloss on it. Coming out of the 1970s, the Democratic party establishment created the superdelegates precisely to put a brake on the power of "the groups", which was shorthand for, and not necessarily in this order, the hippies, the blacks, the gays, the feminists, the environmentalists and everyone else suspected of driving the Democratic party to the left of the American mainstream and out of contention in national elections. In this view, there were ordinary Democrats on the one hand and these assorted freaks on the other who came out every four years and out-organized the ordinary Dems to nominate rotten presidential candidates who got slaughtered in national elections.
The more palatable argument was that the superdelegates balanced out the idealism of party activists with the more pragmatic experience of party regulars and elected officials who had experience winning actual elections. But however you argue it, the supers were put there precisely to second-guess the results of the primary and caucus process.
And there the decision stood, fixed almost as though in amber, after 1982 when the system was created. But it never really mattered because all the presidential nomination battles since then either had a clear plurality winner or didn’t even go on long enough for the superdelegates to really be an issue. And now we wake up more than twenty years later wondering just why we have these superdelegates in the first place…
"… the superdelegates balanced out the idealism of party activists with the more pragmatic experience of party regulars." To my way of thinking, it seems like one of the ways that someone thought of as a "check" on the "mob rule aspect of democratic systems. As I think about it, it seems reasonable to me. In traditional tribal governments, there are councils of edlers that provide the check on the passion of the masses. In England, the system of having a House of Lords and a House of Commons, while sounding anachronistic, provides this same dampening function. In our Congress, the distinction between Senate and House of Representatives addresses both regionalism and the volatile nature of the electorate.
So the superdelegate idea hasn’t bothered me. In fact, now that Josh brings it into focus, I like it. After I read this, I recalled a recent op-ed on the subject, that I want to mention is a slightly different context.
The Democrats’ Super Disaster
By JOHN YOOUntil recent weeks, one of the least understood aspects of the Democrats’ primary contest was the role of superdelegates. These are Democratic Party insiders, members of Congress, and other officials who can cast ballots at the party’s national convention this summer. But now these unelected delegates are coming in for a close inspection, because neither Hillary Clinton nor Barack Obama can win their party’s nomination without superdelegate support. The big Pennsylvania primary on April 22, for example, has only 158 delegates at stake (each of them will be pledged to support one of the candidates). By comparison, there are a total of 795 superdelegates, none of whom are required to honor the will of the voters of their state at the party’s convention.
Sound undemocratic? It is. That the 2008 Democratic nominee for president will be chosen by individuals no one voted for in the primaries flew for too long under the commentariat’s radar. This from the party that litigated to "make every vote count" in the 2000 Florida recount, reviled the institution of the Electoral College for letting the loser of the national popular election win the presidency, and has called the Bush administration illegitimate ever since.…The Democrats have created an electoral system that echoes failed models from the American past, and threatens to sap the presidency of its independence and authority by turning it into the handmaiden of Congress instead of the choice of the American people.
I like the superdelegate system. It hasn’t mattered until this election, but it sure matters now. The superdelegates are prey to voting based on factors other than the will and the whim of the people, to be sure. But "Electability" is important. I expect following the "Party Line" is another important factor. But I expect that the superdelegates are more "Color-Blind" and "Gender-Blind" than the voters at large. That’s a good thing. And "Electability" is also a good thing. It think that the superdelegate system is kind of clever, even though it may lead us away from the "will of the people this time." In situations where the "will of the people" is strong, the superdelegates become superfluous as in the past.
"…the historical record on this is not heartening. During the reign of the Jeffersonians, the progenitors of today’s Democrats, the congressional caucus chose the party’s nominee. It was a system that yielded mediocrity, even danger. Congressional hawks pushed James Madison into the War of 1812 by demanding ever more aggressive trade restrictions against Great Britain and ultimately declaring war — all because they wanted to absorb Canada. It ended with a stalemate in the north, the torching of the U.S. capital, and Gen. Andrew Jackson winning a victory at the Battle of New Orleans."King Caucus" finally broke down when the system reached a peak of "cabal, intrigue, and faction." Jackson received the plurality of the popular vote in the election of 1824, but with no Electoral College majority the choice went to the House of Representatives. In what became known as the "corrupt bargain," House Speaker Henry Clay, who had come in fourth, threw his electors behind John Quincy Adams in exchange for being appointed Secretary of State. Jackson spent the next four years successfully attacking the legitimacy of the Adams administration and won his revenge in the election of 1828.
It is unlikely that a candidate today would trade a cabinet post for a superdelegate’s vote. Sen. Harry Reid is unlikely to be the next Secretary of Veterans’ Affairs, or Speaker Nancy Pelosi the next Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. But the election of 1824 ought to serve as a caution about what may happen again today, if we let Congress play a large role in choosing the next president.
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