1 Boring Old Man

Last winter, I was personally captivated by the Chilcot Inquiry – the British Hearings delving into the origins of the Iraq War. The different legal roads to our illegal war in Iraq was of particular interest to me [the crime of aggression…]. We know from the Downing Street Memo [July 23, 2002] that the US course was already set for war by that time. The British Prime Minister [Tony Blair] headed for the US to implore the US to act through the UN, meeting with Bush at his Crawford Ranch in September 2002.  Blair convinced Bush to approach the UN for authorization, but probably pledged England’s allegiance no matter what the outcome. Bush agreed, over-riding Cheney’s advice to go ahead without the UN.

Congress authorized the use of force in Iraq after the Administration’s media campaign [beginning on September 8th, 2002]:

As was their custom, the Bush Administration quickly invalidated the Authority of the Congress and the call to work through the Authority of the UN with a John Bybee Memo from the DoJ/OLC:

We went to the UN and got a Resolution [UN 1441] on November 8, 2002 which gave Hussein one more chance to comply with inspections, but did not lay out the consequences. Hussein agreed and inspections resumed.  So in negotiating the UN 1441, the bottom line US position was that there was no further need for UN Security Council Action. If Saddam was not in compliance, that fact authorized the use of force. Again, after UN 1441 was adopted, the Administration went further – both invalidating the UN resolution and weakening the requirement for compliance, with John Yoo’s OLC blessing:

Tony Blair was in a bind, however. He’d apparently pledged support to Bush no matter what, but back home in the UK, the American notion of "regime change" was not seen as a case for war [Cassus Belli]. So, when America decided to move forward without a second UN resolution authorizing the use of force, whether England would join us came down to an opinion by Lord Peter Goldsmith, England’s Attorney General. In the winter Chilcot Hearings, it was clear that he was in a lot of turmoil. He had strongly held that a second UN Resolution would be required, but changed his tune a few days before the invasion after personally visiting Washington. His explanations of why he decided that UN 1441 was sufficient authorization for war were at best forced [the crime of aggression…]. I was impressed that the British at least struggled with the legality of the invasion, something that didn’t seem to bother the US government [to our never ending shame]. But the British are less forgiving of their government.

Chilcot inquiry:

Iraq papers show Lord Goldsmith’s warning to Tony Blair
guardian.co.uk
by Richard Norton-Taylor
30 June 2010

Tony Blair was warned by his government’s chief law officer that an invasion of Iraq would be illegal the day before he privately assured President George Bush he would support US-led military action, documents released today by the Chilcot inquiry reveal. They provide an unprecedented insight into how Lord Goldsmith, then the attorney general, repeatedly warned the prime minister of the potential consequences of invading Iraq without fresh UN authority – much to Blair’s irritation. Goldsmith changed his view shortly before the invasion on 20 March 2003…

Documents released today include a note, marked secret and dated 30 January 2003. "In view of your meeting with President Bush on Friday," Goldsmith told Blair, "I thought you might wish to know where I stand on the question of whether a further decision of the [UN] security council is legally required in order to authorise the use of force against Iraq." Goldsmith warned Blair that he "remained of the view that the correct legal interpretation of resolution 1441 [the last security council decision on Iraq] is that it does not authorise the use of force without a further determination by the security council". Goldsmith concluded: "My view remains that a further [UN] decision is required."

A handwritten note, believed to be by David Manning, Blair’s chief foreign policy adviser, warned: "Clear advice from attorney on need for further resolution." Demonstrating his frustration with Goldsmith, Blair scrawled in the margin : "I just don’t understand this." An aide wrote: "Specifically said we did not need further advice [on] this matter."

The following day, 31 January 2003, Blair flew to Washington for a meeting with Bush. Manning records the president – in a minute previously disclosed – telling Blair that military action would be taken with or without a second security council resolution and the bombing would begin in mid-March 2003. The note records Blair’s reaction: "The prime minister said he was solidly with the president."

Last night, Philippe Sands QC, professor of international law at University College London, said the note indicated "the full extent of Mr Blair’s disdain for the attorney general". Sands added: "Did Mr Blair tell the US president he has been advised that he needs a further resolution? He does not. Did he hesitate? Not at all. The official note records him as saying that he is ‘solidly with the president’." He said the new documents provided a "devastating paper trail that lays bare the fact that Lord Goldsmith effected a 180-degree change of direction in less than a month, and that he did so in the total absence of any new facts or legal considerations."

The documents released today disclosed that on 19 December 2002, three months before the invasion, Jonathan Powell, Blair’s chief of staff, told Goldsmith there was "no question" of the UK backing US military action against Iraq "without UN support" in the event of the US becoming "frustrated with the UN and decide to take military action regardless".

On 30 July 2002, Goldsmith warned Blair that on the question of using force in self-defence, "the key issue here is whether an attack is imminent. "The development of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] is not in itself sufficient to indicate such imminence." He added that any UK participation in military action "would engage the United Kingdom’s responsibility under international law".

On 14 January 2003 in a note handed to Blair, Goldsmith warned that UN security council 1441 "contains no express authorisation by the security council for the use of force". By 7 March, after a trip to Washington, Goldsmith told Blair that a new UN resolution might after all not be needed, although going to war without one would risk Britain being indicted before an international court. Ten days later, on 17 March 2003, Goldsmith published a short note saying an invasion would be lawful…

^{the heros}